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AND

CURTIS V.

The purpose of this essay is to outline a strategy for implementing an equitable regime for the allocation of the seabed and the ocean
subsoil. The importance and timeliness of the subject is based on the
coinciding of three events of landmark historical importance: (1) the
convening in June, 1974 of the Caracas Conference to write a new
international treaty governing the seas and their resources; (2) the
arrival of the long-awaited world resource-and-commodity crunch;
and (3) the virtual termination of political support in the West, particularly in the United States, for bilateral aid programs to underdeveloped countries.
The Caracas meetings and other subsequent negotiations will
concern themselves with a broad agenda on which the disposition of
seabed and subsoil resources is but one item. Freedom of navigation,
fisheries, investment guarantees, pollution control, and various other
sea-related subjects will also share the agenda. These issues are inevitably related to the question of seabed and subsoil resources if only
because the negotiators will be creating a total package in which the
various items serve as trade-offs in the search for near-unanimity.
The question of seabed and subsoil resources is, nevertheless, of such
overriding importance as to warrant separate analysis.
Ocean mineral resources are the world's last great new frontier
in an era of massive mineral consumption and predictable mineral
shortages. The technological and legal challenge of the opening of this
new frontier must be placed in the context of a greater ethical challenge to place the world economy on foundations which permit the
* Senior Fellow, Center for International Studies, New York University
** Junior Fellow, Center for International Studies, New York University
***

Junior Fellow, Center for International Studies, New York University
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narrowing, rather than the widening, of the gap between rich and
poor nations.
I. THE RUSH TOWARD BROAD SEAWARD EXTENSIONS OF NATIONAL
JURISDICTION

The U.N. Seabed Committee has begun work drafting a treaty
establishing an international regime for the exploration and exploitation of the seabed beyond national jurisdiction, and on the international machinery to promote such exploration and exploitation for
the benefit of mankind. This effort has been closely linked to the
problem of defining the area subject to national jurisdiction.
As population expansion, rising standards of living, and the development of deep-sea mining technology have made inevitable
man's exploitation of the resources beyond the traditional three-mile
limit, different views emerged as to the manner in which this exploitation should proceed. Many coastal states favor more exclusive jurisdiction over their adjunct sea areas, while noncoastal and some
coastal states support a sharing of jurisdiction over the off-shore seas
by the coastal state and the international community.
While most coastal states have taken the position that their geography entitles them to almost exclusive rights over the resources of
the sea area adjacent to their coasts, there are nuances of difference
among them. Latin American states, such as Brazil and Uruguay,
describe their exclusive claims in terms of "sovereignty" and the area
claimed in terms of a "territorial sea" of about 200 miles width.' The
majority of Latin American, African, and Asian states make a distinction between the territorial sea, which they wish to set at 12
miles, and an "economic zone" or "patrimonial sea" of 188 miles.
According to the latter view, the coastal state, in its territorial sea,
would exercise the traditional incidents of sovereignty, and, in the
other 188-mile band, would enjoy exclusive or "sovereign" functional
rights over the area's resources, both renewable and non-renewable,
i.e., fishing and minerals Both the states demanding a 200-mile
sovereign territorial sea and those merely demanding exclusive func1. See 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. 21, Vol. 3, at 23-29, U.N. Doc. A/9021 (1973).
2. Cf. the proposals of: Organization of African Unity, id. Vol. 2 at 4; Colombia,
Mexico and Venezuela, id. Vol. 3 at 19; Ecuador, Panama and Peru, id. at 30; Argentina, id. at 78; Algeria, Cameroon, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar,
Mauritius, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia and United Republic of
Tanzania, id. at 87; Pakistan, id. at 106. See also the proposal of Iceland, id. at 23;
China, id. at 71; Australia and Norway, id. at 77. Most of the proposals made a
provision for landlocked and other disadvantaged states to share in the exploitation of
the living resources of the neighboring coastal states. None of the proposals, however,
was specific with regard to the exact implementation of such right and some of the
proposals speak in terms of "privilege." Cf. Canada, India, Kenya and Sri Lanka, id.
at 83.
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tional jurisdiction but not territorial sovereignty over resources-thereby leaving open such matters as navigation-agree
that the seabed and subsoil resources, to a distance of 200 miles,
should become the exclusive preserve of those states endowed with
coastlines. The resultant windfall, based on the length of the coast
rather than on need or population, would be further augmented where
the ocean off the coast happens to have the configuration of a particularly wide submerged shelf. Five coastal nations have shelves that
extend beyond 200 miles at depths of less than 200 meters.3 Australia,
Argentina and Norway have insisted that the coastal state has the
right to retain any jurisdiction-including the entire shelf-to which
it was entitled under prior international law.
"Jurisdiction" or "functional sovereignty"-even if short of outright territorial sovereignty-is used by coastal states to include the
following competences:
1. The exclusive national use of the resources of the area and the retention of the revenues derived therefrom;
2. The exclusive right to authorize and regulate all activities relating to
the exploration and exploitation of the area, which includes the imposition of pollution control measures and supervision of scientific research;
3. The prerogative of settling according to national-rather than international-law any dispute arising from such activities.

From an international public-policy point of view, these assertions of
wide functional jurisdiction leave much to be desired. Four of the
3. The five states are Argentina, Australia, Canada, the U.S.A., and the U.S.S.R.
OFFICE OF THE GEOGRAPHER,

BuREAu OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH, DEPARTMENT OF

STATE, LIMITS IN THE SEAS, THEORETICAL AREA ALLOCATIONS OF SEABED TO COASTAL

STATE, INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY STUDY,
cited as OFFICE OF THE GEOGRAPHER].

Ser. A, No. 46 (August 12, 1972) [hereinafter

the Coastal State has the right
4. Australia and Norway, supra note 1, at 78 "...
to retain, where the natural prolongation of its land mass extends beyond the
[economic zone- patrimonial sea], the sovereign rights with respect to that area of the
sea-bed and the subsoil thereof which it had under international law before the entry
into force of this Convention: such rights do not extend beyond the outer edge of the
Continental margin."
It may be worth noting that the U.S., due to the open-ended jurisdictional definition contained within the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§
1331-43 (1970), can be interpreted as now laying claim to jurisdiction over 2500 square
nautical miles of seabed that is more than 200 miles from its coast. See OFFICE OF THE
GEOGRAPHER, supra note 3. A treaty that included a seaward limitation of 200 miles of
national jurisdiction could, therefore, be interpreted as amending the OCS Lands Act.
Congressional action conforming the OCS Lands Act jurisdictional definition with the
eventual treaty is a preferable alternative.
The total global area involved is only 35,800 square nautical miles, as compared
to the 24,632,400 square nautical miles of sea-bed within the 200-mile delimitation. Id.
The area under dispute is somewhat larger if states, such as Argentina, continue to
claim jurisdiction to the edge of the continental margin, as opposed to the 200-meter
isobath mark. Argentina, supra note 1, at 80. See also Columbia, Mexico, and Venezuela, supra note 1, at 21.
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principal beneficiaries of such a policy, according to estimates made
by the United States Government, 5 would be the United States, the
Soviet Union, Australia, and Canada, while the landlocked states,
who stand to gain nothing, include sixteen of the world's poorest
nations (Bolivia, Paraguay, Afghanistan, Nepal, Bhutan, Laos,
Uganda, Chad, Central African Republic, Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland, Mali, Zambia, Rwanda, and Burundi). Yet the extension of
national jurisdiction would not have gained so much favor had the
rich coastal nations not been joined enthusiastically by the poor
states with substantial coastlines. Their lack of technological knowhow makes particularly attractive the idea of claiming an extended
and exclusive sea area which could be exploited on their own terms
in the future. This approach is certainly more enticing than the acceptance of an international authority which, they suspect, would
tend to serve the interests of the economically powerful and technologically advanced nations.'
Among both developed and underdeveloped coastal states, there
is no complete agreement on the question of jurisdiction. Canada and
the Soviet Union maintain that the coastal state should have exclusive jurisdiction over the minerals of the continental shelf. They
argue that this position is merely a restatement of what was previously agreed upon in the 1958 Geneva Convention.7 The Soviet
proposal sets a 500-meter isobath or 100 nautical mile limit on the
area of exclusive rights over continental shelf resources.8 The Canadians have set no such limit. Others, such as the U.S. and the Netherlands, have proposed that the coastal states share with an international equitable regime the revenue derived from the exploitation of
the resources in the area between the outer limit of the proposed
5. See OFFICE OF THE GEOGRAPHER, supra note 3.
6. See Economic Significance, in terms of Sea-Bed MineralResources, of Various
Limits Proposedfor NationalJurisdiction, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO THE
COMISSION OF THE PEACEFUL USES OF THE SEABED AND THE OCEAN FLOOR BEYOND THE

U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/87 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Economic Significance], in which he refers to the "limited and general nature of the
existing information available on the extent and location of sea-bed minerals." Id. at
5. The disillusioning view of the developing countries vis-a-vis an international machinery seems to have developed as a result of the failure of the U.N. to solve their
most immediate political and economic problems (decolonization and development).
7. 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. 21, Vol. 3, at 29. U.N. Doc. 4/9021 (1973). The Soviet
LIMITS OF NATIONAL JURISDICTION,

Union proposal with regard to the limit of the continental shelf does not specify the
rights of the coastal state over such area and seems to maintain the traditional concept

adopted in the Geneva Convention of 1958 that the area beyond the territorial sea is
essentially part of the high sea, excepting only the sovereign rights of the coastal states
over the continental shelf for the purpose of exploring its natural resources. This is
confirmed by the Soviet proposal on fishing which defines the sea area beyond the
territorial sea as part of the high seas. See 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. 21, at 158, U.N. Doc.
A/8721 (1972).
8. See 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. 21, at 158, U.N. Doc. A/8721 (1972).
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economic zone and the 200 meter isobath 5 In this way, at least some
of the benefits derived from the further extension of national jurisdiction would be redistributed in accordance with an equitable principle. The U.S. proposes giving the coastal state exclusive rights over
the continental shelf up to a 200-meter depth and favors establishment of a "trusteeship area" of preferential but limited rights for the
coastal states up to the edge of the continental margin. 5 The Netherlands has proposed 40 nautical miles or a 200 meter isobath as the
outer limit of exclusive jurisdiction and would devote a further 40mile-wide "intermediate zone" to the exclusive exploitation of the
coastal state, but subject to the rules and regulations established by
the competent international authority. Under this approach, if the
coastal state were classified by the international authority as an
"advantaged" state-in terms of the proportion of the intermediate
zone to its land area-it would share the exploitation of the intermediate zone with "disadvantaged" states in proportion to the rate of
disadvantage."
Similar to the position of the United States, though for different
reasons, is that of states which are geographically disadvantaged, i.e.,
states which are landlocked, shelf-locked, semi-shelf-locked, or
which, like Zaire, have trivial coastlines in relation to their population and land-mass. In their view, an equitable share of the benefits
of the sea could only be attained through recognizing a limited jurisdiction for the coastal states over the adjacent sea area, while at the
same time guaranteeing the geographically disadvantaged states a
right to share in the revenue from the exploitation of the non-living
resources. In the Kampala Declaration, the landlocked and geographically disadvantaged states have staked out a claim to equal participation in the benefits to be derived from the resources of the
seabed
2
and subsoil beyond the territorial waters of coastal states.
II.

THE SEARCH FOR AN EQUITABLE PRINCIPLE

An equitable principle applicable to the seabed and subsoil can
be formulated as follows:
No state should be permitted to extend its jurisdiction over seabed
and subsoil resources beyond the limits permitted by existing international law without sharing the benefits of such an extension with the rest
of the international community in accordance with each member's need.

9. Draft U.N. Convention on the International Seabed Area. 25 U.N. GAOR
Supp. 21, at 130, U.N. Doc. A/8021 (1970); Netherlands proposal concerning an intermediate zone, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. 21, Vol. 3, at 111, U.N. Doc. A/9021 (1973).
10. Supra note 9, at 138-40.
11. Supra note 9.
12. The Kampala Declaration, Kampala, Uganda, March 22, 1974, Art. VIII. See
also the proposal to that effect of Afghanistan, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Nepal and
Singapore, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. 21, Vol. 3, at 85, U.N. Doc. A/9021 (1973).
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The rationale for such an equitable principle is that the international legal order ought not to be amended in such a way as to transfer
to some states resources previously held in common by all states if
the effect of such transfer is unduly to enrich certain states at the
expense of others, without rational regard for each nation's economic
need. Development of large ocean tracts previously legally or
technologically beyond the reach of states ought to be the occasion
for greater equalization of benefits among states, not for the creation
of new and greater discrepancies.
To gauge how much of the previous res communis will now be
subject to national jurisdiction, one must begin by determining the
present limits. This is not a simple task given the confused state of
the law. The Geneva Convention defines the continental shelf, subject to the coastal state's sovereign rights, as "the seabed and subsoil
of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of
the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond that limit, to
where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation
of the natural resources of the said areas.' 3 Is the "submarine area"
referred to in the definition limited to the shelf, or could it include
the slope and the rise to the end of the margin? Could it even go
further to the deep sea basin? The legislative history of the definition
does not clarify the problem. The text of the International Law Commission draft, from which the Convention developed, was repeatedly
altered. In 1951, the Commission adopted the "exploitability" test on
the ground that though
it seems likely that a limit fixed at a point where the sea covering the
continental shelf reaches a depth of 200 meters would at present be sufficient for all practical needs; [nevertheless] technical developments in
the near future might make it possible to exploit the resources of the
seabed at a depth of over 200 meters. Moreover, the continental shelf
might well include submarine areas lying at a depth of over 200 meters,
but susceptible of exploitation by means of installations erected in neighboring areas where the depth does not exceed this limit."

In 1953, nonetheless, the Commission abandoned the "exploitability" test on the ground that it "lacks the necessary precision and
might give rise to dispute and uncertainty."'' 5 In its final draft of 1956,
to compound the problem, the Commission retained the 200 meters
criterion, but added to it the exploitability test. And although it
recognized the latter criterion to be imprecise, the Commission's special rapporteur now felt, in contradistinction to the Commission's
13. Convention on the Continental Shelf, done April 29, 1958, Art. 1, 15. U.S.T.
471; T.I.A.S. No. 5578.
14. Report of the Int'l L. Comm'n, [1956] Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 296, U.N. Doc.
A/CN. 4/101 (1956).
15. Id.
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1951 view, that "the time still seemed to be remote when technical
development would allow the exploitation of the seabed at a depth
over 200 meters"'6 and that, therefore, no practical difficulties will
arise in the foreseeable future. It was this view which prevailed in the
final text of 1958.
The Commission's guess of 1951 was better than that of 1956 or
1958. The time for technological advance beyond the 200-meter limit
has proven not to be so remote. The industrial capacity to extract
non-living resources from the seabed has advanced in sophistication
and depthward reach far beyond the expectations of the draftsmen
of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf. 7 If that Convention
must be read so that the only limit on national jurisdiction expansion
is the limit of "exploitability," then the Convention may inadvertently have sanctioned exclusive national jurisdiction over natural
resources beyond the flat shelf, past the slope and rise onto the very
deep seabed itself. It may have sanctioned the extension of jurisdiction by a technologically advanced state across its own shelf, slope,
rise, adjacent ocean bed, and onto the rise and slope near less advanced states. It may even be argued that by virtue of the "exploitability" criterion the whole seabed of the world has been inchoately
apportioned among coastal states, to the median line between continents. 6 This, too, invokes a political absurdity, implying that the
16. 11 U.N. GAOR 6, 115th Comm., U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.500 (1956).
17. J. ANDRASSY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE RESOURCES OF THE SEA 84-90 (1970).
For an example of these expectations, see Mouton, Recent Developments in the Technology of Exploiting the Mineral Resources of the Continental Shelf, U.N. Doc.
A/C.13/25 (1958); C. FRANKLIN, THE LAW OF THE SEA: SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 29
(Naval War Coll., Int. L. Studies 1959-60, Vol. 53, 1961); M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE,
THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 687 (1962). As another author stated:
"Some including advisors to the Marine Sciences Commission, have
stated that it was the intent of the Conference that the definition cover
only the geologic continental shelf which normally ends at 200 meters and
that the purpose of the exploitability test was to permit the development
of nearby adjacent areas." Krueger, The Background of the Doctrine of
the Continental-Shelf and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 10
NAT. RES. J. 442, 473 (1970).
Krueger cited to the following as proponents of this theory: COMMISSION ON MARINE
SCIENCE, ENGINEERING AND RESOURCES, OUR NATION AND THE SEA: A PLAN FOR NATIONAL
ACTION 143-145 (1969); Henkin, Changing Law for the Changing Seas, in UsEs OF THE
SEAS 69,79 (E. Gullion ed. 1968); Henkin, The Outer Limit to the ContinentalShelf:
A Reply to Mr. Finlay, 64 AM. J. INT'L. L. 62 (1970); B. OXMAN, THE PREPARATION OF
ARTICLE 1 OF THE CONVENTION ON THE CONTINENTAL SHELF 74

(1968). See also, A Discus-

sion of the Legislative History and Possible Construction of the Convention on the
Continental Shelf, U.N. Doc. A/AC.135/19 (1968).
For additional material, see Henkin, InternationalLaw and "The Interests": The
Law of the Seabed, 63 AM. J. INT'L. L. 504 (1970); The United Nations and the
Oceans-CurrentIssues of the Law of the Sea, in TWENTY-THIRD REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO STUDY THE ORGANIZATION OF PEACE 13 (1973).
18. S. ODA, INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF SEA RESOURCES 167 (1963).
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1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf meant to vitiate the Convention on the High Seas by eliminating the latter's subject matter.
This is surely a political as well as ethical absurdity which could not
have been intended by the inopportune legal phrase: "limits of exploitability."
Somewhat less easily dismissed is the argument that the Geneva
Convention's exploitability test meant to open up to national jurisdiction the subsoil and seabed of the shelf's slope and rise, to the end
of the continental margin. 9 A reading of the Convention, however,
reveals no reason to depart from the literal meaning of its words:
"shelf' means "shelf." In the view of one eminent authority, the
intention behind the "limits of exploitability" criterion was not to
expose vast additional seabed areas to conquest by national technology followed by national jurisdiction, but only "to admit of sovereign
rights in marginal areas beyond the 200 meter isobath, in areas which
are not strictly continental shelf but rather depressions, and in areas
intersected by crevasses. . . ."0 In other words, the "limits of exploitability" test was meant to take care of local variances, to allow
for instances where the flat shelf was interrupted by incidental
breaks, or where the sharp drop which is the "slope" occurs, exceptionally, at a depth slightly more than the usual 200 meters.
Accepting that "shelf' means "shelf," or, with a few exceptions,
submerged areas to a depth no greater than 200 meters, it follows that
most coastal states would acquire very substantial additional areas
of jurisdiction if the international community were to permit the
establishment of 200-mile economic zones."' Using the 200-meter
depth criterion, the average width of the continental shelf is between
30 and 44 nautical miles,2 although a few states, including the U.S.
(off Maine) and Canada (off Newfoundland), have continental
shelves extending, in places, even beyond 200 miles. 3 If such an
agreement materializes, this additional area ought not to be parceled
out without application of equitable economic principles of benefit
distribution. Anything less would constitute an encroachment on the
19. Krueger, supra note 17, at 473, 475.
20. D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 410 (2d ed. 1970).
21. See OFFICE OF THE GEOGRAPHER, supra note 3. Also, an untitled, multi-colored
map prepared by the Office of the Geographer, Dept. of State, illustrates this point.
The map's index table is headed "Boundaries separate seabed areas of sharply contrasting topographic gradients." The ocean areas are divided into four differently
colored areas designating: shoreline to 200 meter isobath, continental platform greater
than 200 meters (with slopes steeper than 1:40), continental rise area beyond 200
nautical miles, territorial seas claims.
22. For a listing of sources, see ANDRAssy, supra note 17, at 9 n.15. See also A.
SLOUKA, INTERNATIONAL CUSTOM AND THE CONTINENTAL SHELF 41-42 (1968).
23. See OFFICE OF THE GEOGRAPHER, supra note 3.
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res communis"4 without adequate provision to compensate those

whose share in the res communis is concommitantly reduced. 25
The stakes in these negotiations are high. Beyond the 200-meter
limit lie extensive deposits of petroleum." The immensity of the
seabed's hydrocarbon reserve, its relatively minor development at
THE FUTURE OF THE OCEANS 14-16 (1971); E. JONES, LAW OF THE
64 (1972). As Prof. Jones commented at 64:
"Thus, the unilateral claims of certain nations extending the breadth
of the territorial sea constitute a process of encroachment upon the internationally sanctioned doctrine of res communis which endangers the future status of the freedom of the seas."
25. This concept of compensation has been raised in discussions of the 200 mile
economic zone. As Georges Wehry, of the Netherlands Mission to the U.N. stated:
"If the zones grow and eventually become accepted as inevitable in
the way they are put forward by a number of farthest reaching states, this
would inevitably lead to demands, which one can hear clearer and clearer
from day to day in these handicapped countries, for compensation-compensation, of course, not only in the international area, as this
international area, if the 200-mile zone were accepted, would in fact yield
no substantial benefits for many decades or even centuries; so this demand for compensation would mean a demand for compensation also
regarding benefits derived from within the areas of national jurisdiction.
And there will be no escaping from that demand." Wehry, Concepts in
Sharing of Common Heritage Wealth, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTH ANNUAL LAW OF THE SEA INSTITUTE AT UNIVERSITY OF RHODE ISLAND 88 (L.
Alexander ed. 1972).
26. Almost all of the petroleum lies on the landward side of the continental margin, but at least 32% is deposited seaward of the 200-meter line. The calculations given
below may be proven too modest by the vigorous current explorations.
Seaward
Landward
24. W.

FRIEDMANN,

SEA-OCEANIC RESOURCES

40 Nautical
Mile Limit

59% of total ultimate
reserves- 90% of
proved reserves

41% of total ultimate
reserves, including
20 billion barrels
already discovered

200 Meter Isobath Limit

68% of total ultimate
resources including
167.5 billion barrels
proved (almost all
reserves discovered
to date)

32% of total ultimate
resources, including
some reserves discovered
to date, near term
prospects on outer shelf
and upper slope

200 Nautical
Mile Limit

87% of total ultimate
resources including
all of proved reserves
and most immediate
prospects

13% of total ultimate
resource, long term
prospect in continental
rise

3000 Meter Isobath Limit

93% of total ultimate
resource, including
all proved reserves
and immediate prospects

7% of total ultimate
resources, some long-term
prospects in continental
rise and deeper parts of
small ocean basins
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present, and the potential shortages and high prices of petroleum
from land-based sources have heightened interest in these oceanbased resources. The off-shore hydrocarbon resource is estimated at
approximately 2272 billion barrels." Current world production is approximately 50-60 million barrels/day, or 20 billion barrels/year. '
Current exploration of both the continental margin and the deep
seabed has also shown that many minerals, such as manganese,
nickel, copper, and cobalt are found in concentrated degrees in nodules lying on the deep seabed at depths of 3,000 meters isobath or
more, although there is little evidence of the existence of such nodules
29
on the continental shelf, slope, or rise.
These, then, are the very substantial stakes. Already in the past
two decades, first unilaterally, through the Truman Proclamation on
the Continental Shelf3 0 and, subsequently, through the 1958 Convention, the international community has surrendered to national jurisdiction those areas between the traditional 3-mile limit and the 200meter isobath boundary. In this area are contained the greatest
known mineral and petroleum resources of the seabed and subsoil.
Will the international community now agree to a further give-away
of most of the earth's remaining non-renewable resources currently
still in the res communis? Or will the opportunity for a general reordering be used to establish a more soundly equitable system in which
coastal states are allowed to exercise the jurisdictional control made
Source: Economic Significance, in terms of Sea-Bed Mineral Resources, of Various
Limits Proposed for National Jurisdiction, REPORT OF THE SECRETARYGENERAL TO THE COMMISSION ON THE PEACEFUL USES OF THE SEABED AND THE
OCEAN FLOOR BEYOND THE LIMITS OF NATIONAL JURISDICTION, U.N. Doc.

A/AC.138/87 (1973).
Hydrocarbons are generally thought to be most prevalent on the shelf and upper
slope, with lesser quantities on the lower slope and continental rise. Almost no deposits
are thought to occur on the abyssal plains, ranging in depth from 5,000 to 7,000 meters.
The deep-sea trenches may contain deposits, although at such depths that recovery is
almost an impossibility. Favorable geographic conditions, including the deposition of
sediments and reservoir rocks and possible structural and stratigraphic traps, are also
essential to the accumulation of hydrocarbon deposits. Id. at 12-13.
Whereas, the manganese nodules occur relatively widely on the sea-bed, most
deposits occur below deep water and at substantial distances from the continents,
where sedimentation rates are very low. Id. at 18.
See JONES, supra note 24, at 70-71 (1972).
27. Economic Significance, supra note 6, Table 1 at 14.
28. These are approximate figures based upon past production and predicted
increases in production. Id. at 9; ROYAL DUTcH/SHELL GROUP OF COMPANIES, INFORMATION HANDBOOK 1973-74 60 (1973).
29. Economic Significance, supra note 6, at 18-20; JONES, supra note 24, at 70.
Some nodules have been found in shallow water, although these deposits are not
considered of mineable quality or quantity. Economic Significance, supra note 6, at
20.
30. Friedmann, The Law of the Sea: Past, Present and Future, in THE FATE OF
THE OCEANS 101 (J. Logue ed. 1972). For a text of the Proclamation, see Proclamation
No. 2667, 3 C.F.R. 67 (1945-1948 Comp.).
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inevitable by geography, but as trustees for mankind rather than as
windfall exploiters?
Proposals that seek to operationalize the equitable option all
turn on a regional or international system of sharing, and envision an
allocation either of actual operating rights or of revenues derived from
operations. All proposals distinguish between application of equitable sharing in (1) a limited area seaward of the existing limits of
national jurisdiction, and (2) the rest of the high seas. In the latter
area, all jurisdiction would vest in an international authority and all
revenues earned would be subject to redistribution in accordance
with an equitable formula based on need. In the former, either jurisdiction and the right to mine would be shared between the coastal
state and a regional or international authority, or else the revenues
realized by the coastal states from operations in the area would be
shared.
III.

CALCULATING THE FISCAL BASIS FOR AN EQUITABLE REGIME

Revenue sharing, rather than a division of jurisdiction and multiplicity of operating authorities, has the advantage of simplicity and
acceptability to coastal states. In practice, there are a number of
bases for calculating the share of revenues derived from the area to
be allocated to the regional or international authority:
(1) a quantum tax. In the case of oil, such a tax would be based
on a percentage of value per barrel as set by international agreement. 3 Gas would be assessed at 6,000 cubic feet per barrel equivalent.
31. One problem would be to ascertain the "internationally agreed price" for the
products. This could be accomplished by an agreed upon panel of economic experts
setting a uniform price level for crude petroleum products on a world market, and then
setting a percentage tax. However, due to the energy crisis and the revised price
schedules of Canada and the OPEC countries, the price of crude oil and natural gas
has rapidly increased since early 1973. As an example of this increase, note the following tables entered into the Congressional Record by Senator Chiles (D. Fla.):
Table 1-Canadian Oil Prices in Chicago-Alberta Crude (Pembina)
Date

Wellhead Price

Transport Cost

Export Tax

1/1/73
9/1/73
12/1/73
1/1/74
1/11/74

2.96
3.81
3.81
3.81
3.81

0.45
0.45
0.45
0.45
0.45

0
.40
1.90
2.20
6.40

Total
3.41
4.66
6.16
6.46
10.66

Table 2-Venezuelan and Arab Oil Prices [per barrel]
Date
8/31/70
1/1/73
12/1/73
Source:

Venezuelan crude,
35 gravity

Arab light crude,
34 gravity

2.34
4.63
8.00

1.80
3.07
11.65

120 CONG. Rac. S592 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 1974).
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(2) a percentage tax on the gross revenue derived from the mineral extracted. This would be more difficult to administer than the
first method and would be subject to manipulable market variables
32
reflecting time and place of extraction.
(3) a percentage tax on all royalties, taxes, bonuses, leasing
fees, etc., derived by the adjacent coastal state from the extracted
minerals. This would be simple in theory, but would, in practice,
prove the least equitable.3 3 Developing nations depend on the taxation of hydrocarbon and other mineral production for a significant
portion of their income and themselves consume relatively little of
what is produced. Developed nations tend to have alternative sources
of taxation and, being the principal consumers of their own primary
products, tend to impose relatively lighter taxes on their production,
with more allowances and exemptions.
(4) a percentage tax on realized net profits from extraction. The
advantage of this approach is that it does not, like a fixed gross
production tax, penalize the less-profitable but economically imporIt appears that the recent posted prices will decrease due to consumer-nation pressure
and increased output. TIME, April 22, 1974, at 49.
If one set a 10% tax rate on petroleum products sold beyond 12 miles and one billion
barrels was produced, approximately $1.1 billion of revenue at $11/barrel would be
produced. OPEC countries currently sell their production on a posted price system
with most of these countries exacting a 55 percent tax. See ROYAL DUTCH/SHELL GROUP
OF COMPANIES, INFORMATION HANDBOOK 1973-74, at 52 (1973).
32. For instance, a country may want to differentiate hydrocarbons and minerals
extracted in its economic zone and used domestically and those exported by price
differentials. Such a system could lead to coastal nation rivalry in bidding for exploitive concerns by raising or lowering its price to suit the companies' interests.
33. Through 1968, 5.8 billion dollars in such revenue had been collected by the
U.S. Government on offshore oil. Address by R.D. McCurdy, Economics of Oil and Gas
Operations Offshore, U.S.A., Offshore Technology Conference, May, 1969.
A recent book, speaking in terms of U.S. revenue policy, stated:
"Based on a price of $3.45 per barrel, each one million barrels per day of
production will contribute a royalty of 210 million dollars annually to the
federal treasury (Recent and anticipated increases in the price of crude
will substantially increase this revenue)."
D. KASH, ENERGY UNDER THE OCEANS 222 (1973). For further discussion of these
revenues, see id. at 228.
In explaining the now-shelved trusteeship proposal of President Nixon, John R.
Stevenson indicated that the regime would exact its revenue from royalties, etc. As he
stated:
The trusteeship zone would extend from the 200 meter depth line to
beyond the base of the continental slope. The President contemplated
that the regime for exploration and exploitation would provide for the
collection of substantial mineral royalties to be used for international
community purposes, particularly economic assistance to developing
countries. Stevenson, The United States Proposal for Legal Regulation
of Seabed Mineral Exploitation Beyond National Jurisdiction,4 NAT.
RFS. LAW. 570, 576 (1971).
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tant operations, those, for example, at greater sea depth where costs
are much higher." A profits tax would take these expenses into account in calculating the international levy. On the other hand, "profitability" is a notoriously flexible, manipulable term and difficult to
enforce without armies of clerical examiners. Moreover, an international revenue-sharing system that does not tax "off the top" invites
national governments to reduce the share available to the regional or
international authority by increasing their own tax take.
It is safe to assume that, at least in the next decade, the bulk of
revenues accruing to an international authority would derive from the
area of shared revenue jurisdiction between the existing 200-meter
isobath limit and the proposed new 200-mile (or continental margin)
boundary, rather than from the further areas that would be wholly
within the jurisdiction of the international authority. Nevertheless,
it is important that any new international regime for the high seas
establish itself both in the areas of mixed (inner) and of absolute
(outer) international jurisdiction. Given the world's insatiable need
for resources and the speed of technological innovation, this may well
be the last opportunity to transfer to direct, effective international
administration those outer areas of the seabed and subsoil beyond the
200-mile limit.
Equitable principles should apply not merely to the question of
jurisdiction and to the collection of revenues from deep sea mining
operations, but also to the income redistributive mechanism and the
internal structure of the international authority to which these revenues accrue. An equitable revenue redistribution mechanism is one
which recognizes that the poor should get a larger share than the rich.
One functional basis would be the formula used by the U.N. in assessing members' dues. Such a "capacity to pay" evaluation would take
into account the G.N.P. of each participating state, its population,
per capita income, and any recent national disasters affecting economic viability. 3 An inversion of this formula, so that the capacity
34. As the U.N. Secretary General's Economic Significance Report stated:
"The costs of exploitation increase at an exceedingly rapid rate with
increasing water depth; for example at 330 metres the cost will be at least
four times higher than at 33 metres, where the cost is already twice that
of an on-shore field of similar characteristics. Operations under 300
metres or more of water may be so costly that only giant fields will
perhaps be profitably exploited. In some off-shore areas today, a 2000 to
4000 barrels a day well might be considered an uneconomic discovery.
Distance from shore also influences the economic possibilities of developing off-shore fields, particularly in the case of natural gas, as there are
no viable alternatives for transporting to shore installations other than
by pipeline (footnotes omitted)." Supra note 6, at 17. See KASH, supra
note 33, at 81-90.
35. 28 U.N. GAOR, Report of the Comm. on Contributions, Supp. 11, U.N. Doc.
A/9011 (1973).
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to pay became the quantum of need, would provide an equitable
sliding scale for determining the proportion of the international fund
to be distributed to each participant.
Another equitable formula is that currently employed by the
U.N. Development Program." This formula would allocate the revenue shares by targeting amounts that each country should receive on
the basis of need and a professional assessment of its program of
development. Instead of using an automatic sliding scale, this approach substitutes country-by-country analysis of development problems and focuses on the specific needs of each economy.
A third approach would establish an organic process of decisionmaking by an assembly of participating states. Such an assembly, as
well as an international secretariat, would be needed not only for
purposes of budgeting revenues, but also in order to administer the
areas of the high seas which are the outward zone beyond the proposed 200-mile limit. In this area the international authority would
be "sovereign" for purposes of licensing mining, or operating its own
mining enterprise, as well as for making all laws applicable to the
seabed and subsoil. (This leaves aside, as beyond the scope of this
essay, other roles pertaining to pollution control, freedom of navigation, etc., to which such an Authority might be assigned.)
In addition, as the revenues generated by the operations of the
Authority increase, it might absorb the burden of supplying, administering and assisting in the technical implementation of international
assistance programs which are currently operated on a bilateral
basis.37 If, as seems well within the realm of present contemplation,
the international Authority could expect to realize an annual redistributive pool equivalent to 10 billion dollars at present value, the entire
bilateral aid program could be subsumed. While this money
would-and should-continue to come out of the purses of the wellto-do and go into the world's emptier pockets, the resultant redistributive scheme would have important advantages over the present
bilateral aid arrangements. In particular, the system would be less
vulnerable to the donor state's internal political vagaries, since no
legislative appropriations would be involved. A multilateral system
would be less marred by the external political pressures a donor
brings to bear on recipients. Most important, once a steady source of
income is established to finance development projects, middle and
long-range development planning could, at last, become an international reality.
36. 17 U.N. D.P./26 (1973).
37. This would not be an AID program, but instead have no strings attached and
be aimed simply at bringing out national expertise in certain skills and professions.
See Pardo, The Law of the Sea: The United Nations and Ocean Management,
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 25, at 26.
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ADVANTAGES AND POLITICS OF AN EQUITABLE SEA REGIME

There is much in this proposal to commend it to the government
and people of the United States and, indeed, something akin to it
remains an important ingredient in the U.S. proposals for the law of
the sea.3 8 Among the advantages are the following:
(1) it would avoid the potential conflict of a wide-open "race
for ocean space";
(2) it would multilateralize the giving of aid, ensuring that
other developed and rapidly developing states contributed their fair
share alongside the United States, Canada and the Western Europeans;
(3) it would establish an international administration capable
of forming the self-supporting, independent nucleus of an international regime to protect the freedom of the high seas beyond national
jurisdiction.
Unfortunately, there are signs that the U.S. position in support
of revenue sharing is being eroded by forces abroad, as well as in the
executive branch, and in Congress.
Among the states that might be expected to benefit most from
revenue sharing-the landlocked, other geographically disadvantaged, and even underdeveloped countries with substantial coastlines
(all of which would expect to get back more than they contributed to
an international authority) - there has been little inclination to
embrace the American proposal. In part, this is precisely because it
is the American proposal. However, this relucantce also reflects to a
large extent, an understanding that the U.S. revenue-sharing proposal is linked with other less acceptable measures intended further
to reduce the jurisdiction of coastal states in favor of international
jurisdiction over pollution, navigation, and investment disputes. Divorced from these other considerations, the revenue-sharing proposal
would probably enlist far wider support.
This is not to say that other U.S. proposals may not also be
important and worth pursuing, from the American policy perspective. At least the proposal relating to free rights of passage through
international waterways stands a relatively good chance of being supported by many other states on the basis of their own navigational
self-interest. The revenue-sharing proposal, however, would benefit
from being unencumbered by the freight of a "package deal." It
38. See Draft U.N. Convention, supra note 9. For additional material on the draft
seabed treaty, see Knight, The Draft United Nations Convention on the International
Seabed Area: Background, Descriptionand Some PreliminaryThoughts, 8 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 259 (1971). For an account of events concerning U.S. policy since the proposal
was submitted, see Hollick, Seabeds Make Strange Politics, 9 FOREIGN POLIcY 148
(1972-73), and Hollick, United States Oceans Politics, 10 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 467 (1973).
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stands on its own as beneficial, both in the narrower U.S. and broader
international interest.
V. THE "UNILATERALIST" ALTERNATIVE
Although the President and the Departments of State and Defense continue to support an internationalist position, there is increasing evidence of a campaign by other federal executive departments-Treasury and Interior in particular-that favors a unilateral
U.S. approach. A certain amount of support for this near-sighted
effort is being engendered in the Congress. Even as the Caracas Conference gets underway, an equally significant battle appears to be
shaping up within the U.S. Government between the "internationalists" and the "unilateralists."
This, of course, has been a battle of long duration. The United
States began the modem era of international ocean's policy with a
"unilateralist" quantum leap: the 1945 Truman Proclamation, which
asserted exclusive U.S. sovereignty over the resources of the seabed
of the contiguous continental shelf. In 1953, the U.S. incorporated
this proclamation into domestic legislation. Neither the proclamation, nor the Submerged Lands Act 3 and the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act,4 specified the seaward limit of U.S. jurisdiction except
to the extent that use of the term "continental shelf" implies a geographic limitation. Internally, as well as internationally, debate continues as to the exact location of those limits." In any event, in 1958,
the U.S. participated in the formulation of the Geneva Convention
on the Continental Shelf and was an early signer."2 Pleading the
"limits of exploitability" provision of the 1958 Convention, the U.S.3
has continued to permit exploration in depths exceeding 200 meters.
Technological limitations, however, have until recently restricted
actual mineral exploitation to well within the 200-meter isobath.
While the situation is rapidly changing, the U.S. is still committed to the maintenance of some international jurisdiction over the
39. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-15 (1970).
40. Id. §§ 1331-43.
41. See text accompanying notes 12-24, supra.
42. The 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, U.N. Doc.A/Conf. 13/L.55 was
signed on April 29, 1958 by a majority of the states attending the conference, including
the United States. U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, 2 OmCIAL REcORDS 57, U.N.

Doc. A/Conf. 13/38. See note 13, supra.
43. In 1961 the Department of the Interior issued a lease for the recovery of
phosphate deposits off the coast of Southern California despite the knowledge that one
deposit was 40 miles seaward and in waters as deep as 4000 feet. Krueger, supra note
17, at 478 n. 135.
In 1967, Interior interpreted Sec. 4F of the OCS Lands Act to apply to the erection
of artificial islands 120 miles off the coast of California. Waters as deep as 6000 feet
separated the proposed sites from the mainland. Id. at 478-79 n. 136.
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seabed beyond the 200-meter depth." This U.S. policy was first expressed by President Nixon in 1970.11 In that statement, and in draft
treaty articles subsequently submitted to the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, the U.S. proposed limiting
national jurisdiction over resources to depths of no more than 200
meters. 6 Also certain areas beyond the 200 meter depth would be
held by the coastal state as a trusteeship zone.' As noted, this proposal has disappointingly had little support. Although the appearance of international indifference is more tactical than real, and wide
support for the proposal will undoubtedly surface in the hard bargaining at Caracas and beyond, the tactics of the developing states
in seeming to prefer their own unilateralist solutions have strengthened the bargaining position of the unilateralists within the U.S.
Government.
Thus, pressures for unilateral interim action are growing. The
energy crisis has precipitated Project Independence, in which President Nixon has committed the U.S. to achieving domestically sufficient energy supplies by 1980.48 In the U.S., those who wish to bring
about a strong international regime may be forced to recognize the
inevitability of some unilateral action. Efforts must, however, continue to make any such action consistent with the future international regime.
The U.S. Government is now considering several unilateral actions. The Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act (H.R. 9 and S.
1134) 4" would authorize the Secretary of the Interior to lease areas of
the deep seabed (i.e., tracts of seabed admittedly in areas beyond the
continental margin) to corporate developers. Those sponsoring this
legislation hope to begin harvesting metal nuggets from the deep
ocean floor. These nodules contain commercially exploitable manganese, copper, nickel, and cobalt. The United Nations Secretary
General has estimated that a single nodule mining venture-and several are currently planned by U.S. and foreign companies 5 -could
44. Statement by Ambassador John R. Stevenson, chairman of the U.S. Delegation to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor Beyond
the Limits of National Jurisdiction, Plenary Sess., August 22, 1973, p. 3.
45. United States Oceans Policy, Statement by the President, 6 WKLv. COMP.
PRES. Docs. 677-78 (1970).
46. See note 9, supra.
47. Id. Art. 26-30.
48. "The Energy Emergency," Presidential Message to Congress, Nov. 8, 1973, 9
WKLY. COMP. PREs. Docs. 1319, 1322 (1973).
49. See generally Hearingson S. 1134 Before the Subcomm. on Minerals,Materials & Fuels of the Senate Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 1134].
50. Deepsea Ventures, Inc./Tenneco, Inc., Hughes Tool Co., Kennecott Copper
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supply 7.9 percent of the cobalt, 2 percent of the manganese, 1.3
percent of the nickel and .13 percent of the copper needed for global
industry by 1980.5'
While the Department of the Interior has stated that no legislation is in any way necessary to allow U.S. companies to conduct
exploitation on the deep seabed," the industry is anxious to secure
governmental guarantees on the integrity of its investment. Such a
guaranty program would come close to committing the United States
to facilitating actions by U.S. firms that are incompatible with the
international law the U.S. wants to see established and, arguably,
even with existing international laws.
While nominally subservient to a future regime that might
emerge from present international negotiations, the bill imposes an
obligation on the U.S. to negotiate with other states for recognition
of the "grandfather" rights granted under the Act, something the
State Department knows it could not succeed in obtaining.5 Section
10 (a) does make licenses issued under the proposed Act subject to a
future international regime, but only if "such regime fully recognizes
and protects the exclusive rights of each licensee to develop" its licensed area. This would be quite difficult to accomplish. Failing that,
the legislation mandates full restitution to the participating corporations for lost investment in areas not internationally recognized to be
open to unilateral U.S. development." Obviously, the legislation, if
passed, would place the U.S. hopelessly at cross-purposes with any
conceivable international regime. (Another, even worse, pending
piece of legislation would unilaterally extend United States exclusive
fishing jurisdiction from the present 9 nautical miles beyond our 3mile territorial sea to a 200-mile zone. 5 )
Corp., Ocean Resources, Inc., International Nickel Co. (Canada), Sumitomo
Group/MITI (Japan), AMR: Metallgesellschaft/Preussag/Salzgitter (West German),
CNEXO-Societe Le Nickel (France). A. Rothstein & R. Kaufman, The Approaching
Maturity of Deep Ocean Mining-The Pace Quickens, in Hearings on S. 1134, supra
note 49, at 214.
51. Report of the Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor
Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. 21, at 125, U.N.
Doc. A/8721 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Report].
52. Statement of Leigh Ratiner, Director, Office of Ocean Resources, Dept. of the
Interior, Hearing on Law of the Sea Before the Subcomm. on Oceans and Atmosphere
of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., at 24 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Law of the Sea Hearing].
53. Sec. 10, entitled "Investment Protection," subjects licenses issued thereunder
to a future international seabed regime provided "that the United States fully reimburses the licensee for any loss of investment ....
The section further puts the U.S.
government in the role of insuring (for an unspecified premium) the licensees against
any loss due to (a) interference with the leased tract's development or (b) any unauthorized recovery of hard minerals.
54. Hearings on S. Res. 82 Before the Senate Foreign Relations Comm., 93d
Cong., 1st Sess., at 50 (1973).
55. S. 1988, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), referred to the Committee on Commerce.
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Unilateral action by the U.S. will inevitably sink the prospects
of a successful international regime's emerging from the international
negotiations. Hearings on Senate Resolution 82,56 which endorsed the
objectives envisioned by President Nixon's ocean policy statement of
May 23, 1970, were held on June 19, 1973.11 The Department of State
representative, referring specifically to H.R. 9 and S. 1988 stated that
their passage "would have potentially disastrous effects on the possibility of achieving a success at the Law of the Sea Conference." His
reasoning was clear: "foreign countries that have been roundly criticized-and I feel justly so-by the United States for unilaterally
extending their jurisdiction to the detriment, not only of the U.S. but
of the international community generally, would believe and feel that
the U.S. [in passing H.R. 9 or S. 1988] would be doing exactly that
for which other countries have been criticized."59
Representative Donald Fraser, a Congressional participant in the
United States delegation to the U.N., took part in floor debate over
The Interim FisheriesZone Extension and Management Act of 1973 (S. 1988) applies
solely to anadromous species, e.g., salmon (Sec. 4(a)). It also strongly exhorts the
Secretary of State to initiate and conclude international treaties to promote and conserve coastal fishing (Sec. 5). The Act shall "cease to be in effect on the date the Law
of the Sea Treaty or Treaties now being developed regarding fisheries jurisdiction and
conservation shall enter into force." (Sec. 10) The treaty language is, however, purely
hortatory.
While 12 nations now claim 200-mile fishing zones (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa
Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Republic of Korea, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Sierra
Leone, and Uruguay: International Boundary Study, Limits in the Seas, National
Claims to Maritime Jurisdiction, Ser. A, Pub. No. 36 (1972) (with corrections to
March, 1972) issued by the Geographer, U.S. Department of State, reprinted in Law
of the Sea Hearing, supra note 52, at 71-72), the vast majority of coastal states do
adhere to a 12-mile limit. Id. The present United States fisheries policy utilizes a
species approach with preferential rights for the coastal states (see United States of
America: Revised Draft Fisheries Article, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.11/L.9, reprinted in
Report, supra note 51, at 175). S. 1988, in contrast, establishes an exclusive coastal
state jurisdictional belt for anadromous species. It is hardly sound policy for the U.S.
to espouse contradictory solutions to the fisheries problem. The distinction between
preferential and exclusive coastal rights is significant. Under the latter, the U.S. longdistance fishing fleets (comprising 20 percent of the U.S. fishing industry) would be
hampered by the almost certain retaliation by virtually every other coastal nation. In
1972 the fish and shellfish landed by U.S. fishing craft in international waters off
foreign shores were valued at $155,723,000. The total U.S. catch was valued at
$765,500,000. Hearing on S. Res. 82 Before the Subcomm. on Oceans and Int'l. Environment of the Senate Foreign Relations Comm., 93d Cong., 1st Sess., at 29 (1973);
[hereinafter Hearings on S. Res. 82].
56. S. Res. 82, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., adopted unanimously July 9, 1973, 119 CONG.
REC. S 12810 (daily ed. July 9, 1973).
57. Hearings on S. Res. 82, supra note 55.
58. Id. at 23-24.
59. Id. at 24.
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H.Res. 330,10 the House counterpart of S. 82. On April 2, 1973, he
asked:
Well, the United States could unilaterally assert jurisdiction to 200 miles
or to a 200-meter depth or to 1,000 or to 10,000 miles, but do we want
to? We could make the assertion, but if we did it unilaterally, this would
provide a source of conflict with other nations which would take the
position that this is not an accepted international standard. We have
criticized other nations for making unilateral claims to vast areas of the
international ocean, and we have steadfastly refused.to recognize such
unilateral claims, believing such matters are properly a subject for international agreement in precisely the kind of forum which we have in the
forthcoming law of the sea conference.6'

The Administration continues to resist unilateral congressional
action and, instead, has asked Congress to give U.S. negotiators until2
1975 to work out an acceptable international ocean regime.
Nevertheless, congressional hearings have already been held on H.R.
9,13 and the Administration is preparing its own version of a seabed
mining act should treaty talks stall."
More ominously, the Administration has begun its own program
of unilateral encroachment on the seabed despite its opposition to
H.R. 9 and S. 1988. On July 3, 1973, the Department of the Interior
began issuing oil and gas leases for portions of the outer continental
shelf up to a 600-meter depth, pursuant to the procedures and openended authority contained in the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act.
Accompanying the July 3rd announcement was a caveat which
stated: "Nothing contained in this call for nominations or in the
issuance of new leasing maps should be interpreted as being inconsistent with the President's Oceans Policy Statement of May 23,
1970, relating to offshore development beyond the 200 meter depth
contour. Leases ultimately issued beyond 200 meters will be subject
to the international regime to be agreed upon." That caveat has
been superseded by the Interior Department's recent unexplained-and unwarranted-conclusion that "it will not be necessary
to insert any additional provisions in leases to be issued beyond the
200 meter isobath to comply with the President's Oceans Policy and
to accomodate the international negotiations now in progress regard60. H.R. Res. 330, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., adopted by a vote of 303 yeas, 52 nays,
78 not voting, April 2, 1973, 119 CONG. REc. H 2310 (daily ed. April 2, 1973).
61. 119 CONG. Rac. H 2312 (daily ed. April 2, 1973).
62. Letter from Charles N. Brower, Acting Legal Adviser and Acting Chairman,
Inter-Agency Task Force on the Law of the Sea to Sen. Henry M. Jackson, Ch., Insular
Affairs Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Interior, March 1, 1973, in Hearings
on S. 1134, supra note 49, at 15 [hereinafter cited as Letter from Brower to Jackson].
63. Hearings on S. 1134, supra note 49.
64. Letter from Brower to Jackson, supra note 62.
65. 38 FED. REG. 9839 (1973); 38 FED. REG. 17743 (1973); similar caveat in 38 FED.
REG. 27307 (1973).
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ing the law of the sea." 6 The Council on Environmental Quality has
recently given qualified approval to deep-sea oil drilling on the outer
continental shelf, 7 indirectly endorsing operations further out than
50 miles by stressing the relatively lower environmental risk of such
far-out drilling to the shorelands.18 Although estimates of the reserves
of petroleum to be found on the U.S. outer. shelf have fluctuated
widely, even within the past year, there is little doubt that whatever
there is will not much longer go untapped.
The analysis means that if the international community is to
benefit from petroleum resources lying even as much as 300 miles off
the U.S. Atlantic coast, on the outer continental shelf or slope, it will
only be because Caracas or its successor meetings will have produced
a generally acceptable package of agreements establishing an international regime and operationalizing a system of revenue sharing.
VI.

HOLDING THE LINE AGAINST THE UNILATERALIST OPrION

As yet, the United States remains committed to a multilateral
revenue-sharing plan for the windfall of scarce resources that lie beyond the present reach of national jurisdiction. Revenue sharing is
the fourth of the five principles pertaining to coastal areas promulgated by the U.S. delegation at the Seabed Committee.70 On August
10, 1972, the U.S. representative to this committee, noting his "conclusion from previous exploitation patterns that a significant portion
of the total international revenues will come from the continental
margin off the United States in early years,"'" nevertheless stated
that
[w]e continue to believe that the equitable distribution of benefits from
the seabeds can best be assured if treaty standards provide for sharing
some of the revenues from continental margin minerals with the international community, particularly for the benefit of developing countries.'

The Draft Articles on the Coastal Seabed Economic Area submitted by the U.S. on July 18, 1973, provided in Article 2, sec. (3):
"the coastal state shall make available in accordance with the
provisions of Article -, such share of revenues in respect of mineral
resources exploitation from such part of the Coastal Seabed Eco66. 38 FED. REG. 30457 (1973).
67. N.Y. Times, March 23, 1974, at 1, col. 6.
68. Id. at col. 7.
69. Almost 50 billion barrels were reported in the autumn of 1973, but a revised
estimate of less than half that amount was issued by the U.S. Geological Survey in
the spring of 1974. Id.
70. The U.S. delegation to the Seabed Committee has repeatedly restated its
position. See for example, Statement by Hon. John R. Stevenson to the U.N. Seabed
Committee, Aug. 10, 1972, reprinted in Law of the Sea Hearing,supra note 52, at 53.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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nomic Area as is specified in that Article."73 The statement accompanying the Draft Articles noted that "[r]evenue sharing is, in our
view, an important element in an overall comprehensive settlement
of the law of the sea issues which. . . could have specific application
to resolving the issue of the outer limit of coastal state resource jurisdiction." 74 Remarking that few nations had spoken in favor of revenue
sharing, the U.S. delegation concluded that perhaps no real discussion of revenue sharing was possible until other nations "have some
better idea of the role which revenue sharing will play in an overall
political settlement,"75 i.e., until other countries recognize that revenue sharing by the U.S. is a quid pro quo for their accepting certain
positions advocated by the United States. In addition to the suggested standards for coastal areas,7" the U.S. seeks the protection of
scientific research,77 the conservation and protection of fish stocks,7"
and the freedom of transit through straits.7" It is these additional
caveats to the revenue-sharing proposal which have caused other
states to fail to "rise to the bait."
Yet it is handsome bait. While the U.S. is on record as favoring
the sharing of a substantial portion of the revenues it receives from
exploitation in depths greater than 200 meters, 0 there may even be
more to sweeten the pot. Washington has deliberately left open the
possibility of sharing revenues from exploitation in the closer-in area
between the outer limit of national sovereignty (probably now to be
set at 12 miles) and the end of the 200-meter isobath.5 ' The State
Department's proposal seems to hint that even in this area, which the
Continental Shelf Convention has already placed firmly in national
73. United States of America: Draft Articles for a Chapter on the Rights and
Duties of States in the Coastal Seabed Economic Area, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.IIIL.35
(1973).
74. Statement by Hon. John R. Stevenson to Subcomm. II of the U.N. Seabed
Committee, July 18, 1973.
75. Id.
76. See note 73 supra.
77. See the Draft Articles for a Chapter on Marine Scientific Research and the
accompanying Statement by Ambassador McKernan, Alternative U.S. Rep. to the
U.N. Seabed Comm., submitted to Subcomm. HI on July 20, 1973.
78. See note 55 supra.
79. U.S. Draft Articles on the Breadth of the Territorial Sea, Straits and Fisheries,
submitted to Subcomm. II of the U.N. Seabed Comm., U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/S.C.lI/
1.40 reprinted in Report of the Seabed Comm., 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. 21, U.N. Doc.
A/8421 (1971).
80. Articles 5 and 29, U.S. Draft Convention, supra note 9.
81. Statement by Ambassador Stevenson, supra note 74, at 4. "[W]e recognize
that allowance may have to be made for the fact that the Geneva Convention on the
Continental Shelf already provides coastal States with the sovereign right to explore
and exploit the resources of the shelf to the depth of 200 meters with a somewhat
different, and in our view, less satisfactory, provision for the protection of other interests in, and uses of, the area than is provided in our draft articles ....
Hence, there
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hands for purposes of resource exploitation, at least some types of
international jurisdiction and revenue sharing might be acceptable in
the context of a comprehensive new agreement.
But such agreements are some time off, and are only likely to
result from some loosening up of the U.S. "package." If revenue
sharing, the application of equitable principles to the new territories
beneath the sea being opened up by technology, is worth doing at all,
then it is intrinsically valuable whether or not the final sea law agreement includes other objectives of U.S. policy. If the effect of revenue
sharing is, at last, to place international development assistance on
a sounder basis than the present system of "give-what-you-can" hatpassing, then that objective ought not to be lost by being encumbered
with other, quite unrelated objectives that make it unacceptable to
the very countries that are the potential beneficiaries of a sound
system of sharing.
Meanwhile, however, the U.S. may soon lose the capability to
negotiate for any system of equitable distribution of ocean exploitation because of the momentum of the unilateralists within the country and abroad. The best way to counter the unilateralists' thrust
towards a "grab-what-you-can" system may be for the U.S. to take
the initiative by instituting, unilaterally, an interim system of equitable benefit-sharing. The operation of this system should, of course,
be limited to those areas which, by existing international law, are
clearly within the jurisdiction of the United States or which are
within the 200-mile economic "trusteeship" zone which has a preponderant measure of state support. Acting alone, the U.S. could establish the concept of revenue sharing by unilaterally creating a trust
fund into which would be placed twenty percent of the assessed value
of minerals generated by exploitation off the U.S. shores beyond the
territorial sea. In other words, for each barrel of oil or cubic foot of
gas extracted from the seabed beyond 12 miles from shore, a certain
percentage of the value could be set aside in a government trust fund.
To encourage exploration, the government could permit selective,
temporary price differentials or tax credits.
The statute under which oil and gas leases are now issued for
seabed beyond our territorial sea is the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act of 1953. s2 This act can be amended to:
(1) create a trust fund to expire at the enactment of a suitable
international regime or at the end of a specified renewal term,
e.g., 5 years.
may be some states which will not wish to subject the area between 12 miles and 200
meters to a new legal regime, or they may object to the application, in that area of
one or more of the international standards we propose-for example, revenue sharing .... We welcome active consultation with other delegations on this question."
82. See note 40 supra.
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(2) direct the Secretary of the Interior to collect and place into
such fund a specified portion of the gross revenues generated by
exploitation of the seabed beyond 12 miles from shore.0
(3) direct the Secretary of the Treasury to allow the affected
companies tax credit for those monies paid to the Secretary of
the Interior under (2).
A proposed amendment to that effect is included below. 4
It is perhaps instructive to compare our proposal with the sug83. The four methods for determining the amount of tax due have been discussed
previously, see text accompanying notes 31-34, supra. Although the U.S. could adopt
any of the alternatives, the course best suited for eventual adoption by the international community is a percentage tax of a posted price per barrel.
84. Proposed Amendments:
"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
of America in Congress assembled. These amendments to the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act may be cited as the International Equitable Sharing of Revenues Act.
Section 2. When used in this Act (a) The term 'Commercially extracting party' means any person
licensed by the Secretary of the Interior to engage in the recovery
of minerals on the outer continental shelf at a substantial rate of
production (without regard to profit or loss) for the purpose of
marketing or commercial use and does not include recovery for any
other purpose such as sampling, experimenting in recovery methods, or testing equipment or plant for recovery or treatment of
minerals.
(b) The term 'gross revenue' means all revenues actually received
by a commercially extracting party in a fair market sale of the
unimproved minerals recovered from the outer continental shelf or,
if no such fair market sale occurs, the fair market value as determined by the Secretary of the Interior, of the unimproved minerals
recovered from the outer continental shelf by the commercially
extracting party.
(c) The term 'person' means any government or unit thereof and
any juridical or natural person.
Section 3. There is hereby established in the U.S. Treasury an International Revenue Sharing Fund. The Secretary of the Interior shall collect
from each commercially extracting party and deposit into this fund each
year an amount equal to 20 per centum of the gross revenues of each
commercially extracting party attributable to the recovery of minerals
located on a portion of the outer continental shelf whose water depth does
not exceed 200 meters. The Secretary of the Interior shall also collect from
each commercially extracting party and deposit into this fund each year
an amount equal to 35 per centum of the gross revenues of each commercially extracting party attributable to the recovery of minerals located on
a portion of the continental shelf whose water depth does exceed 200
meters.
(b) These amendments shall apply to any lease heretofore issued
under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. The Secretary of the Interior shall ascertain the depth position of each lease issued heretofore
under that Act and so notify each leaseholder. The Secretary of the Interior shall include notification of depth position in each lease issued hence-
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gested escrow fund contained within H.R. 9.55 This rather vague escrow fund, into which the U.S. Government would deposit an unstated percentage of the licensing and taxing revenues it receives
forth under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act.
(c) From time to time the Secretary of the Treasury shall report in
the Federal Register on the amount contained in the fund.
Section 4. The fund shall continue until the President of the United
States affirms to the Secretary of the Treasury that the international
community has reached general agreement on a regime for the oceans or
until five years from the date of this enactment, whichever occurs earlier,
provided, however, that this act may be extended by appropriate Congressional Act.
(b) If this fund terminates upon affirmation by the President of the
United States that the international community has reached general
agreement on a regime for the oceans, the monies in the fund shall be paid
over by the Secretary of the Treasury to the international body charged
with administering the international ocean regime or, if the President of
the United States shall find that no such body exists, directly to those
developing nations that Congress shall hereafter designate.
(c) If this fund terminates in the absence of an appropriate international regime after the passage of five years from the date of this enactment, the monies therein shall be treated by the Secretary of the Treasury as general revenues.
Section 5. The Secretary of the Treasury shall allow to each commercially
extracting party an income tax credit in an amount equal to any monies
collected by the Secretary of the Interior pursuant to Section 3 of this Act.
Section 6. Nothing contained in this Act shall be interpreted as an extension by the United States of jurisdiction over the continental shelf or the
high seas."
For a useful precedent to this proposal, see the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act,
43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1624. An Alaskan Natives Fund is created, §1605, and, inter alia, a
specific percentage of the gross value of the minerals thereafter produced or removed
from certain lands is placed therein, §1608(b) and (c). The provisions for this Fund
are not applicable to the Outer Continental Shelf (§1608 (i)).
85. H.R. 9, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. §9 (1973) which provides:
ESCROW FUND
SEC. 9. A fund shall be established for assistance, as Congress may
hereafter direct, to develop reciprocating States. The United States shall
deposit in this fund each year an amount equivalent to-*per centum of
all license fees collected during that year by the United States pursuant
to section 5(a) and an amount equivalent to-*per centum of all income
tax revenues derived by the United States which are directly attributable
to recovery of hard minerals from the deep seabed pursuant to licenses
issued under this Act: Provided, That the amount deposited by the
United States per license issued and per unrelinquished square kilometer
under license shall not exceed the amount contributed for assistance to
developing reciprocating States by other licensing reciprocating States
(except developing States) per license issued by them and per unrelinquished square kilometer licensed by them. For the purposes of this section, "developing reciprocating State" means a reciprocating State designated by the President, taking into consideration per capita gross national product and other appropriate criteria.
*An appropriate amount to be determined by the Congress.
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from deep seabed exploitation, is meant to aid developing reciprocating states. This bow toward revenue sharing has been dismissed as
"lip service." 80 A percentage of the licensing fee (a mere $5,000 for a
block of 40,000 square surface kilometers 7 ) would have to be quite
large to be at all significant. There is provision for sharing with an
international fund an unstated percentage of a tax on revenue "directly attributable to recovery of hard minerals from the deep seabed
• . . under this Act." 88 But the escrow fund contributions cannot
exceed the rate of contributions of other reciprocating developed
states, 9 a "reciprocation" not currently contemplated by any nation
in the world. Most importantly, this fund is mere window-dressing for
what has already, above, been analyzed as an essentially undesirable
unilateralist legislative scheme.1°
Our proposal carries no such additional baggage. An amendment
to the OCS Lands Act would affect operations on the continental
shelf where the vast bulk of mineral wealth lies-not, as does H.R.
9, on the deep seabed. Furthermore, the suggested amendments are
in no sense an assertion of additional jurisdiction by the U.S.
In sum: the United States' effort to preserve an equitable international co-jurisdiction over coastal waters beyond the 12-mile territorial sea is a laudable one. Actions aimed at preventing unilateral
extensions of U.S. jurisdiction that will frustrate that policy must be
continued. However, current energy demands ensure that the U.S.
will continue to conduct oil and gas exploitation at greater and
greater depths. The likelihood of the international community's viewing such exploitation as consistent with a future international regime
is significantly greater if measures are taken now to allocate a portion
of the revenues generated to a trust fund whose monies will eventually go to such a regime.
86. Knight, The Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act-A Negative View, 10
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 446 (1973).
87. Supra note 85, at Sec. 5 (a).
88. Id. at Sec. 9.
89. Sec. 2(i) of the Act provides: " 'reciprocating state' means any foreign state
designated by the President as a state having legislation or state practice or agreements
with the United States which establish an interim policy and practice comparable to
that of the United States under this Act." Id.
90. See text accompanying notes 52-55, supra.
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Peremptory norms of international law (jus cogens) have been
the subject of much recent interest.' In light of their extensive and
quite unprecedented treatment by the International Law Commission and the Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties,' it may be
surprising that attention has not been greater.' At the same time,
inquiry into the relationship between peremptory norms and the
sources and functions of international law has been virtually nonexistent.4 This is indeed surprising, given the recent substantial interest in these areas as part of a larger "theoretical explosion" in international legal studies.5
In the following pages, we propose to examine the conceptual
ramifications of the simple question, what is the source of peremptory
norms? Further, we propose to use this conceptual examination to
shed some light on certain profound but only dimly perceived trends
that are presently at work in the international legal order. We do not
intend to undertake a systematic examination of purported peremptory norms. Such an exercise is more properly the reserve of publicists
who wish to gain credence for their personal visions of the natural
order.' Instead, our interest is focused on peremptory norms as a
* Visiting Research Fellow, Center of International Studies, Princeton University;
Lecturer, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies; Associate Professor, School of International Service, American University.
** M.A. in International Studies, American University; Lieutenant, USAF, SAC
Headquarters, Offutt Air Force Base, Omaha, Nebraska.
1. V. Paul regards it as "one of the most discussed and controversial questions in
the theory of international law today." Paul, The Legal Consequences of Conflict
between a Treaty and an Imperative Norm of General InternationalLaw (jus cogens),
22 OSTERREICHISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FUR OFFENTLICHES RECHT

19 (1971).

2. For an exhaustive set of citations on the relevant deliberations of the International Law Commission and the Vienna Conference, see S. ROSENNE, THE LAW OF
TREATIES, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION 290-93 (1970).
3. Paul's research uncovered approximately a dozen articles on the subject during
the last decade. Paul, supra note 1, at 22-23, n.13-15. The relative lack of attention is
revealed in the failure of a recent major treatise, A MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW (M. Sorensen ed. 1968), even to mention peremptory norms.
4. The principal exception seems to be Virally, Reflexions sur le 'jus cogens," 12
ANNUAIRE FRANCAIS DE DROrr INTERNATIONAL 19-29 (1966).
5. A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW xii (1971). We

share Professor D'Amato's view that "the underlying theory and structure of international law has been given unprecedented attention during the last three or four years."
Id.
6. A good example is Verdross, Jus Dispositivum and Jus Cogens in International
Law, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 55 (1966).
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category of norms with an identifiable source and a distinctive function to perform in the international legal order of today's world.
I
Precisely why the source and function of peremptory norms have
gained so little attention is a matter that deserves consideration. The
idea that some norms are "higher" than other norms in the international legal order has enjoyed a considerable revival in recent decades. Many writers believe that peremptory norms are the concrete
form taken by higher law. As a matter of definition, peremptory
norms are those which cannot be changed except by norms of a comparable status. All other norms can be changed by subsequent treaty
or customary practice. The difference is such as to encourage the
inference that peremptory norms have their origin in a higher natural
order and that our knowledge of them is received directly. The lawmaking procedures of the community would simply be one available
means for articulating and formalizing norms whose existence is independent of and antecedent to the perception of their existence.
Given the inherent nature of peremptory norms, their status
would not be affected by imperfect adherence to established lawmaking procedures while they are being articulated. Their emanation
from such forums as the U.N. General Assembly does not circumvent
existing sources of international law or suggest the emergence of a
new source. It merely indicates that the General Assembly is one
likely place for the collective awareness of such norms to be concretized. Even if there is significant resistance in some quarters to the
particular formulation adopted by the community as a whole, such
that the emergence of an ordinary rule of law would be prevented, we
would assume that either the formulation itself is defective or the
capacity of some participants in the legal order to see the higher
quality of such norms is blocked by narrow prejudice. The peremptory norm is not actually prevented from existing because of that
resistance. This line of reasoning would see any concern for the formal
source of peremptory norms as falsely conceived in its reference to the
sources of ordinary positive norms, and any concern for their material
source as properly a matter of metaphysical rather than legal inquiry.
As in most metaphysical matters, it is impossible to prove that
peremptory norms are not the substance of higher law. The inclination to view them in this manner is understandable in view of recent
history and certainly helps to explain the fascination that the concept
of peremptory norms holds for some scholars. Conversely, it is no
easier to demonstrate that peremptory norms are superior because
they are part of the natural order. However, even in the strictly positivist view, there is nothing in the logic of law or the structure of legal
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orders to prevent some norms from being given a superior status.' On
the contrary, this is one frequent configuration in a structurally differentiated legal order. Differentiation is an inevitable accompaniment to social complexity. It means that norms are divided into
groups that are distinguishable in terms of some attribute, such as
source, scope, conditions of bindingness and validity or, most notably, function.' Structures differentiated by function promote, but by
no means guarantee, improved performance of functions.
Although the identification of peremptory norms of international
law as a distinctive category indicates a differentiated legal order, one
is not forced to conclude on this basis alone that peremptory norms
are superior to ordinary rules. Actually, their differentiated, putatively superior status is not demonstrable by reference to level of
compliance or other empirical criteria. Their status must be inferred
from the stipulation that peremptory norms are not subject to derogation by ordinary norms. This could be a way of classifying peremptory
norms as superior to other norms, but it could also mean that peremptory norms are simply unrelated to other norms. In fact, their
status and substance are in no way dependent on changes in the
substance of ordinary rules because they are doing something in the
legal order upon which ordinary rules have little bearing.
On inspection, then, what appears to be a hierarchically arranged legal order could be something quite different, i.e., a legal
order in which different kinds of law seem to be of differing importance because of the functions they perform. Although individual
peremptory norms seem to have a content intrinsically more important than ordinary rules, it may actually be that they perform a function more vital to the workings of the legal order than do the overriding number of individual norms not designated as peremptory. If
peremptory norms have nothing to do with ordinary rules in terms of
their operation and yet seem to be superior because of their function,
this is not to say that either kind is more legal in character than the
other. Both kinds of norms are equally legal because they arise from
a legally designated source of international law and are stated as law,
no matter what function they perform in the legal order.
7. Indeed, H. Kelsen has argued the logical necessity of a hierarchical arrangement of positive norms in the international legal order. H. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 408-38 (1952).
8. According to one authority, "[ilntragroup differentiation represents a division
of the group into subgroups that perform different functions in the group without being
superior or inferior to each other. When such subgroups become ranked, as 'superior'
and 'inferior' then intragroup differentiation becomes intragroup stratification." Sorokim, Social Differentiation, 14 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
406 (1968).
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Norms in the international legal order can be arranged in different categories to serve different purposes if nation-states, as the
major participants in the order, choose to have it that way. Peremptory norms are one category intended to be set apart from the bulk
of norms making up the legal order. Furthermore, since nation-states
can and do decide what the law shall be, the creation of peremptory
norms is subject to the same rules of lawmaking as any valid norm.
Finally, the process of acquiring legal status is identical to the process
of acquiring a peremptory nature. The two processes may take place
independently, as in cases where long-standing norms become peremptory at a later date, but they operate in the same way. This
means simply that they operate in conformity with the requirements
of one of the several modes in which the international community
creates its norms. In short, peremptory norms, whether in becoming
norms or in becoming peremptory or both, must be considered in
terms of the sources of international law.
II
For our purposes the most salient feature of peremptory norms
is their general nature. Their status as general international law is not
a logical necessity so much as a compelling psychological association
of normative superiority with universality.' What is decisive is the
fact that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as well as the
literature treats peremptory norms as general in character. In the
language of Article 53 of the Vienna Convention:
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present
Convention, a peremptory norm of international law is a norm accepted
and recognized by the community of States as a whole as a norm from
which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character. 0

One of the stock assertions of international law texts is that
general international law has its source in custom, whereas conven9. It is frequently argued (e.g., by Virally, supra note 4, at 13-17) that peremptory
norms must be general because only the international community as a whole can create
norms that are inalterable in the eyes of community members when they are not acting
as a whole. Without altering the logic, the metaphor "international community" works
to reinforce the psychological association.
A further argument, exemplified by Verdross, supra note 6, is to associate peremptory norms with the notion of a public order of the international community. We regard
this municipal law analogy as inviting unnecessary criticism of the concept of peremptory norms by treating the international legal order as more advanced than it is. This
was the nature of G. Schwarzenberger's famous attack on peremptory norms, cited and
summarized in Verdross.
10. Convention on the Law of Treaties, done May 22, 1969, conveniently found
in 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 698 (1969).
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tions yield particular international law, that is, law whose binding
effect is restricted to the parties. Of course, a convention with a great
many parties may well be regarded as expressing rules of general
international law, but what has happened is that the terms of the
convention are co-extensive with customary law. Such law may have
already existed, with the convention merely a declaratory expression
of it, or it may have arisen in response to wide adherence to the
convention and a community-wide appreciation of its salience in the
relations of all states."
It should also be noted that the source identified in the Statute
of the International Court of Justice as "general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations"' 2 would by definition yield rules of
general international law. Without entering into the perennial doctrinal disputes over general principles as a source of international
law, we might observe that there are very few specific norms actually
attributable to this source and those few seem generally to be
procedural guidelines for international tribunals."3 As such, it is unlikely that they would be viewed as having a peremptory character.
Insofar as norms relating to the substance of interstate relations may
be identified with general principles of law, the operative source is
likely to be custom, doubtless structured by community responsiveness to the relevant general principles. Certainly in the instance of
peremptory norms customary factors will have been brought to bear
in their formation.
One might conclude, then, that peremptory norms are necessarily customary in character. The fact that those actual norms commonly asserted to be peremptory typically find their definitive formulation in the provisions of such conventions as the United Nations
Charter does not mean that those provisions are themselves peremptory. It means only that there exist identical customary norms that
are peremptory. The moment at which such norms come into existence or acquire full cogency is not something that can be determined
by reference either to the convention or the manner of its conclusion.
Thus when we are told that "a new norm of the character ofjus cogens
may appear in the form of a treaty or custom,"" we would be inclined
to regard this as a convenient shorthand description of a more subtle
process in which the terms of a convention can codify norms that have
11. The relation of conventions to customary law formation is thoroughly presented in Baxter, Treaties and Custom, 129 HAGUE ACADEMY RECUEIL DES CouRS 31104 (1970); and D'AMATO, supra note 5, at 103-66.
12. I.C.J. STAT. art. 38.
13. A typical treatment is Virally's in A MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note 3, at 143-48.
14. Paul, supra note 1, at 42.
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already acquired a peremptory nature or are in the process of doing
so. The process of codification, by focusing community attention on
the importance of the norms in question, may be empirically related
to the process of acquiring cogency, but the two are analytically separable.
The principal difficulty with this position arises in connection
with the concluding words of Article 53: ". . . a peremptory norm
. . .can be modified only by a subsequent norm having the same
character." This entirely reasonable proposition indicates that peremptory norms are subject to alteration only through the emergence
of new norms with the same overriding character but a different
content. 5 Yet in the instance of norms that emerge by way of custom,
such a development is hardly conceivable. In order for any established peremptory norm ever to be changed through subsequent contrary practice, there would have to be a full display of cogency in
what is only a nascent, just discernible normative pattern. Without
manifest cogency, legal effect would be denied as a matter of course.
If, nonetheless, the normative pattern persisted and gathered cogency
over time, it would have to be admitted that the prior norm was not
peremptory after all but merely mistaken as such. As one writer put
it: "to change a valid norm of jus cogens by means of a custom seems
to be impossible in most cases, as any act, contrary to jus cogens,
would be incompatible with it and unlawfull [sic]."'"
On the few occasions in which anyone has addressed this problem, the proffered solution is simple enough. The International Law
Commission, in its commentary on the draft articles on the law of
treaties, noted that ". . . a modification of a rule of jus cogens would
today most probably be effected through a general multilateral treaty
. ." Similarly, Paul observed that changing a peremptory norm
"seems to be possible only by a subsequent treaty."' 8 This is, however, a bogus solution, since conventions do not create peremptory
norms in their own right. If we accept the usual understanding of the
term, "general international law," this conclusion is inescapable.
15. One writer, S.A. Riesenfeld, would disagree. "Certainly a peremptory norm
might be subject to replacement by a non-peremptory norm. The rule accomplishing
this change in status would itself be non-peremptory. The essential question is, how
widespread the international acceptance of such a capitis diminutio would have to be."
Editorial Comment, Jus Dispositivum and Jus Cogens in InternationalLaw: In Light
of the Recent Decision of the German Supreme ConstitutionalCourt, 60 AM. J. INT'L
L. 511, 514 (1966).
16. Paul, supra note 1, at 43.
17. Report of the International Law Commission on the Second Part of its Seventeenth Session, January 3-28, 1966, and on its Eighteenth Session, May 4-July 19, 1966,
reprinted in 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 411 (1967).
18. Paul, supra note 1, at 42.
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This line of reasoning, with its logically unacceptable outcome,
should cause us to re-examine the initial premise that custom alone
can yield norms of general international law. There has in fact been
a minor flurry of discussion on this very issue, revolving around the
apparent fact that at least some provisions of some multilateral conventions become general norms very rapidly, even "instantaneously,"
or indeed may be general norms from the outset. 9 Calling such norms
customary, as is usually done, distorts the concept of custom almost
beyond recognition. Alternatively, one of the present writers has
argued the conceptual utility of viewing these norms as products of a
new and distinctive source of international law. 0
The putative new source is identified with certain outcomes of
community-wide forums like the U.N. General Assembly and ad hoc
international conferences called to conclude multilateral conventions. When these outcomes-whether resolutions or convention provisions-are set apart from other outcomes of the same forum by
being formal in language, distinctively labeled or not susceptible to
reservation, and when they are overwhelmingly supported, they reflect an intent of the participants to create direct and immediate
obligations for all members of the community. At a more abstract
level, we are suggesting that an increasingly complex and institutionalized international system has, or will soon have, both the need and
the means for a more nearly legislative form of law-making than
presently exists.
Two things prevent this new source from becoming a reality:
(1) the resistance displayed by Western statesmen, who see it as a
threat to their historic control over international law, and (2) its
concomitant lack of expression in a legal vehicle, which would establish its formal validity."' Western acquiescence would surely result in
19. Much of this discussion is occasioned by the 1969 judgment and other opinions
of the International Court of Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, conveniently found in 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 340-433 (1969). In addition to the several
opinions in that case, see Baxter, supra note 11, at 57-74; D'AMATO, supra note 5, at
103-12; D'Amato, Manifest Intent and the Generation by Treaty of Customary Rules
of International Law, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 892 (1970); Notes & Comments, Further
Thoughts on a New Source of InternationalLaw; Professor D'Amato's "Manifest Intent," 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 774 (1971).
20. Notes & Comments, supra note 19, at 776-778.
21. Notes & Comments, Professor Falk on the Quasi-Legislative Competence of
the General Assembly, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 349, 349-55 (1970); D'Amato, On Consensus,
8 CANADIAN YEARBOOK INT'L L. 104 (1970). See also Goldie, The North Sea Continental
Shelf Cases-A Ray of Hope for the InternationalCourt?, 16 N.Y.L. F. 327, 344 (1970)
for a critique of the concern for formal validity, as displayed in this essay, and a
brilliant characterization of processes that exceed in density and self-consciousness the
processes whereby practice consolidates into customary law. To Goldie, they yield a
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rapid validation of the new source through expression in a rule arising
from an existing source. Continued resistance of the West makes
validation highly unlikely in the short run, since the embodiment of
a new source in general law implies a supportive consensus that includes all major groups of states. Nonetheless, pressure for legal expression can build up gradually, with the point being conceded piecemeal by states unwilling to accept it outright. This has always been
the way customary law emerges in situations of mixed or inconsistent
practice and, barring a major change of heart in the West, must be
the specific method by which a rule providing for the formal validity
of a new source will arise. It should be emphasized, however, that it
is a process involving a lengthy, if indeterminate, passage of time.
There are scattered signs of the first tentative movement toward
legal expression of such a new source. Simply in their perception of
it, certain publicists are contributing to that movement. More importantly, at the public level the International Court of Justice in its
1969 Judgment on the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases gave some
support, however ambiguous, to the idea." Some of the dissenting
opinions in those cases did so less ambiguously. 3 Further, the formulation of Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
can be adduced to support the notion that a new source of general
norms is emerging. The important thing here is that a large number
of states, including many Western states, have joined in an authoritative statement whose terms can be seen to imply the operation of a
new source in what is admittedly a restricted context." That context
is of course the production of peremptory norms. While the source of
peremptory norms where none existed previously is not delimited in
this fashion, it seems quite likely that they too will arise from this
new source.
law different enough from anything we have had until now to be called "international
common law." This of course is the law whose source is described here in briefer, more
general terms.
22. 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERzALS 340, 373-77 (1969). See Notes & Comments, supra
note 19, for elaboration.
23. Significantly, these were the opinions of the Socialist Judges, Koretsky and
Lachs. 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 340, 400-03 and 417-21 (1969).
24. R.D. Kearney and D.E. Dalton, from their perspective as members of the U.S.
delegation to the Vienna Conference, have commented that "there was no substantial
attack on the concept of jus cogens." Kearney & Dalton, The Treaty on Treaties, 64
AM. J. INT'L L. 495, 536 (1971).
On the roll call vote on art. 53, Canada, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany,
Greece, Holy See, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and the United States were
among those states voting in favor. Australia, Belgium, France, Liechtenstein, Luxemburg, Monaco, and Switzerland voted against. Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, and the United Kingdom abstained. On the roll call vote for the convention as a
whole, only France voted against, while Australia and Switzerland were among nineteen nations which abstained. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/11/Add. 1 (1969).
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More specifically, either new peremptory norms are generated or
existing norms are made peremptory. In either case, that process is
conveniently described as a "source" of international law. Note that
the term "source" refers not simply to the named thing, like custom
or customs, but to a dynamic, if structured, process of law coming
into being through the agency of whatever that thing happens to be.
In the instance at hand, the process is novel and not well-delineated.
To the extent that it exists, it is a new source, one that manifestly
involves an intent of the community, as expressed in a communitywide forum, to create general norms directly.25

III
The concept of peremptory norms originated in the thinking of
Western publicists. Their faith in Western culture and institutions
shaken by the convulsions of recent decades, these individuals were
prompted by a desire to strengthen the international legal order as a
vehicle for justice and order. Yet the concept was embodied in the
Vienna Convention at the insistence of Asian, African, and Latin
American states for altogether different purposes-purposes which
looked to the future rather than the past. Specifically, these states
saw the concept of peremptory norms as both an immediate symbol
and eventual instrumentality for restructuring the international legal
order.2"
It would be instructive at this point to view peremptory norms
as a subset of "general principles" of international law, which is
something they would seem to be almost as a matter of definition.
25. Editorial Comment, supra note 15, at 514, may well have come to the same
conclusion about non-peremptory norms that change existing peremptory norms. At
least in principle such a change is possible "when there is widespread international
consensus to such a change." Id. Riesenfeld did not elaborate on this suggestive proposition.
26. As early as 1963, comments in the General Assembly's Sixth Committee on
the International Law Commission's draft articles on peremptory norms reveal the
affirmative orientation of Asian, African and Latin American states toward the concept. U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/175, at 267-279 (1963). Socialist states also displayed a favorable though more particularized view of the concept. They also saw peremptory norms
as reinforcing the fundamental position of the principles of peaceful coexistence in the
international legal order, because the content of peremptory norms could be ascertained by reference to such principles, known in the context of the United Nations as
the principles of friendly relations. In general, Western states were much less enthusiastic about the whole idea of peremptory norms. They tended to view the ILC's
formulation as not legally operationalized, on the grounds that there was neither a
definitive list of peremptory norms nor the means for determining when a treaty was
in conflict with such norms.
See also the comments of I.M. Sinclair, a member of the British delegation to the
Vienna Conference, to the same effect. Sinclair, Vienna Conference on the Law of
Treaties, 19 INT'L & COMp. L. Q. 47, 66 (1970).
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Non-Western states have demonstrated an active concern for establishing the importance and defining the content of these general principles.27 The latter task has proven exceedingly difficult and where
successful has been undertaken at a level of considerable generality.
Inasmuch as general principles are inefficient for identifying individual instances of deviant behavior, we might conclude that their function is not specifically constraint-oriented. The major alternative is
that they perform a symbolic function. Concretely, this could mean
that such principles stand as generally understood and accepted
characterizations of the abiding concerns of the international community. Apparently, general principles perform a service comparable
to myth in any culture. A substantial change in the thematic content
of such symbols signals the emergence of new concerns in the community including particularly the concerns of its newer, more restless
members.
The ability to shape the content of prevailing symbols is usually
an important psychological value in its own right. Beyond that, the
expectations of members of the community are continuously being
conditioned by these symbols. Ultimately, control over symbols
yields a cumulatively significant element of control over behavior.
The value in having such control is material as well as psychological.
All this helps to explain why the general principles of international law have engaged so much interest among non-Western states
in the forum of the General Assembly. 8 Equally, it helps to explain
why peremptory norms, as the paramount category of norms with a
symbolic thrust, have been so important to those same states. Thus
far the relative lack of concern for the content of peremptory norms
indicates that their existence as a category, however devoid of content, is itself a substantial change in the structure of the international
legal order. Furthermore, non-Western states see themselves as eventually being able to specify the content of peremptory norms along
lines of their choice.
These observations lead to a second general factor in explaining
why non-Western states have become so concerned about peremptory
norms. These states are deeply resentful of the grip that Western
states have on the content of existing international law through their
27. For elaboration, see Onuf, The Principle of Nonintervention, the United Nations, and the InternationalSystem, 25 INT'L ORG. 209 (1971).
28. An alternative explanation, usually offered in reference to Latin Americans,
simply assumes that an enthusiasm for rhetoric over substance is a cultural artifact,
unrelated to significant social function or even dysfunctional. For an example, see
Dreier, The Special Nature of Western Hemisphere Experience with International
Organization, in INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE 12 (R.W.
Gregg ed. 1968).
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control over its traditional sources. Manipulation of symbols will
eventually expedite a change in the content of specific norms, but
non-Western states would like to hurry that process. The existence
of a new source, having the attributes discussed in these pages, would
be indispensable for this purpose. The process of renovating the legal
order is further hastened if, instead of changing the content of myriad
existing norms one by one through such a new source, attention were
focused on a smaller number of norms which are designated as peremptory and thus central to the emerging legal order. The consequence would be to enormously amplify the amount of change actually undertaken. Effectively, the designation of some few new
norms as peremptory obviates the need to change everything at once
to accomplish great change. It recognizes that some norms, especially
those called peremptory, are constitutive of the legal order, while the
rest are merely declaratoryof the effect of the legal order in stipulated
circumstances .2
Conceived this way, generally stated peremptory norms are simultaneously the decisive symbols of the international legal order
and its constitutive propositions. Moreover, these two roles are powerfully and reciprocally reinforcing. If this is an accurate representation of the situation, then the struggle over peremptory norms first
as a category, and then as items whose content is to be elaborated,
and the emergence of a new source of international law are related
developments which are integral to the future of the international
legal order.
With so much ultimately at stake, it is hard to believe that the
participants in the Vienna Conference never really thought about the
implications of the way they worded Article 53. Obviously, they could
have been careless or simply absorbed in other concerns."0 At least on
the surface, it does seem to be true that the matter was never faced;
one Western spokesman raised a series of unanswered questions
about the source and nature of peremptory norms, only to be completely ignored in subsequent debate.3 ' Yet statesmen are generally
29. The distinction between constitutive and declaratory effects, long familiar in
recognition theory, also brings to mind the work of Myres McDougal and associates in
connection with constitutive as opposed to public order decisions. The similarity is
more apparent than real. See the succinct statement in McDougal, Lasswell, & Reisman, Theories about InternationalLaw: Prologue to a Configurative Jurisprudence,8
VA. J. INT'L L. 188, 297 (1968).
30. Kearney & Dalton, supra note 24, thought that "the real problem was how to
define the test for recognizing a rule of jus cogens." This concern, focused by an
amendment of the United States, did dominate debate, as summarized in id. at 53638.
31. M. Bindschedler (Switzerland) asked: "First, how did a new peremptory norm
of international law emerge? Secondly, was a peremptory norm engendered by custom,
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careful not to acquire unwanted obligations by being absent-minded.
Alternatively, there may have been a tacit agreement not to raise
these issues, knowing full well what their implications were, because
doing so would merely expose sensitivities unnecessarily. The desired
result may possibly have been to intentionally obscure the intent of
Article 53.
In contrast to the generation of norms through the new source in
question, where intent is decisive, custom as a source is ultimately
dependent on behavior, to which intent is contributory along with
many other factors. Obviously, where intent is clear, its impact is
heightened. Although no such clarity of intent surrounds the drafting
of Article 53, the very act of drafting it in such a way as to imply the
existence of a new source is indicative behavior. It promotes, however
modestly, the emergence of a customary rule expressing that new
source. Much more in the way of germane behavior is required, particularly if the new source is not to be restricted to the narrow domain
of peremptory norms. Some of that behavior may even come in the
form of responses to Article 53 as a significant expression of a new
source, regardless of whether that was even the intention.
by a treaty, or by both? Thirdly, to become a peremptory norm, did a rule have to be
accepted by all States of the international community, or only by a majority of those
States, and, in the latter case, by what majority? Fourthly, must a new peremptory
norm contain an express declaration concerning its peremptory character, or did that
character follow from the content of the new norm? Fifthly, was a peremptory norm
valid only for the parties to a treaty or for all States? The Swiss delegation believed
that the former presumption was correct." United Nations Conference on the Law of
Treaties, 22d Plenary Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/11/Add. 1 (1969).

REFLECTIONS ON EDUCATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
IN AFRICA
HENRY

J. RICHARDSON, HI*

Any inquiry into the aims and purposes of teaching international
law in Sub-Saharan Africa, and even into the extent to which this
area of law is taught and its importance in African legal education,
will confront an apparent general absence of specific consideration
and gaps in goal-formulation relative to Africa and international law.
The definition of these goals and objectives of legal education invariably draws in broader policy questions concerning African states and
their participation in both the international legal process and in the
African continental legal process. Discussions of these questions are
limited inter alia by the important issues of vantage point for recommending policy decisions which will be explored initially. These are
the necessary prelude to the discussion which follows on strategies of
African legal education in international law, the current state of the
art on the Continent, and the influence of U.S. aid.
At this point, important gaps in thinking about objectives of
legal education for producing international lawyers are apparent.
Such gaps are confronted by the need for Sub-Saharan Africa generally to produce more international lawyers, for reasons involving two
major policy considerations: (1) the need for available international
legal expertise to meet problems arising between African states and
the outside world community; and (2) the need for similar training
of lawyers to meet problems arising in Pan-African relationships.
Equally important is the interaction between these two objectives.
Both will be discussed here along with some projected ramifications
for legal education in moving toward developing African perspectives
on international law, all in the context of present trends and expectations for educating African lawyers and scholars. New African initiatives and potential give promise that this need for international lawyers will be met sometime in the not so distant future.
Vantage Point
Since the early years of this century in the legal community of
the United States, more recently in Britain,' and doubtless in other
* Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University. I wish to thank my colleagues,
Professors A.A. Fatouros and Roland Stanger for perceptive comments on earlier drafts
of this essay, and to acknowledge the research assistance of Susan Driskill. Any errors
are, of course, my own. I am appreciative also to the World Peace through Law Center
for the opportunity to present an earlier version of this inquiry to the World Peace
through Law Conference, Section on Legal Education, Abidjan, August 26-31, 1973.
1. See Stevens, American Legal Education: Reflections in Light of OMROD, 35
MODERN L. REV. 242 (1972).
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countries as well, there has been an on-going debate over the degree
to which legal education should have as its primary objective the
training of students in "lawyer skills"-the techniques of moving a
case through the courts-as against the objective of educating lawyers not only with the above skills but especially with the knowledge
to mobilize the legal process to serve the cause of intelligent authoritative policy-making. The controversy has traveled to Africa, sometimes in rather intense form.' A variant of this debate is central to
an inquiry into education in international law in Africa,4 an area that
has been uncommonly muted up to this point. Here, the aim is to
spotlight issues that appear ripe.
Upon first reflection it would seem sensible that the more industrialized, "developed," and internally specialized a particular society
is, the more that society could be content with a compartmentalized
system of legal education, i.e. educating lawyers in increasing depth
to perform legal skills growing increasingly narrower in scope. Yet
this seems not to be so in the United States, for at least two reasons:
(1) lawyers (and therefore legal education) are inevitably concerned
with policy-making issues by reason of the extensive interactions of
community social processes with legal process; 5 and (2) lawyers
emerged some time ago as the generalists of America to whom expectations of policy-making and dispute-resolving competence attach,
even as somewhat more superficially they divide themselves into
"specialities. ' ' 6 The specialties, however, continue to get more "generalized" in that each one of them tends to encompass a progressively
wider scope of human behavior over time from its narrow beginnings,
thus continuing to require the generalist lawyer's knowledge of other
areas of the law and human behavior in order to successfully pursue
the "specialty." The upshot may well be that specialization becomes
increasingly unreal.
Not only are lawyers in the United States, and arguably in some
2. A milestone inquiry in the voluminous literature on this topic, which retains
its significance today, is Lasswell and McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy:
Professional Training in the Public Interests, 52 YALE L.J. 203 (1943) (reprinted, as
cited here, in McDOUGAL & ASSOCIATES, STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1960), at 42-

154).
3. See W.B. HARVEY, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN GHANA vii-xi, 369-371, 378-381
(1966).
4. See Proceedings, Conference on Legal Education in Africa, Addis Ababa, Oct.
20-24, at 4 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Proceedings].
5. Lasswell and McDougal, supra note 2, at 46-47.
6. Id. at 49-52. Corporate law is an example: in the United States the corporate
form of organization with its accompanying legal problems has spread from the domain
of entrepreneurs both upward into public and governmental corporations, and sideways into ghetto marketing cooperatives and rural shareholders cooperatives.
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other countries, "concerned" with policy-making, but they become,
if only through default, inevitably involved with decisions about the
fundamental values of the society and their realization,' notwithstanding the attempts of many law schools to conceal such questions.'
This is the situation in a society like the United States, whose basic
outlines have been more or less in place for 200 years under the same
constitution. Those recognized as the best and most influential lawyers tend to be those who have a keen appreciation for the interrelationship of law, social change, public order and other fundamental
goals. Many of these lawyers were educated in those law schools that
took the lead in orienting themselves towards exploring these societal
interrelationships. Beginning in the 1920's, restrictive educational
practices and curricula began to be battered by the winds of legal
realism with its emphasis on process and existential and empirical
verification of doctrine. This battering continues, to the extent that
we can now hazard a suggestion that legal education in this "settled"
country, with legal institutions and processes relatively continuous
over time, has become, generally speaking, more policy and valueoriented.9
Let us turn now to African states as developing countries, with
well-founded caution as to any implied comparisons with the United
States. However else a "developing country" may be defined, it is
clearly a country in the process of more or less rapid social change.
Basic institutions are being restructured, and custom and tradition
are being re-evaluated to determine their relevance to developmental
progress and the country's needs. Fundamental social questions
about the quality of life, the configuration and allocation of authority, the desired pattern of distribution of resources, and similar questions have sometimes been only recently settled, or often not yet
settled at all. It would seem to follow, therefore, that in a developing
society where proportionately fewer lawyers must do more work,
those lawyers must be even more sensitive to the interrelationships
among legal process, social change, public order, and human dignity
than their rich-country counterparts, just to be able to meet on their
merits the challenges facing them."°
This necessity of orientation is probably even more true for the
international lawyers in African countries, for several reasons." First,
the decentralized nature of the international legal process requires
7. Id. at 59-78.
8. Id. at 78-91.
9. For an implied critique of the restrictive aspects of even legal realism, see
Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 2 at 42-59.
10. L.C.B. GOWER, INDEPENDENT AFRICA: THE LEGAL PROFESSION 102-03 (1967).
11. Cf. id. at 40.
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earlier recourse by lawyers to "non-legal" (in the technical, procedural sense) considerations and decision-makers than would be true
if operating in a more centralized "command" national legal system.
Second, the international community itself is in the grip of intense
social and public order changes, in substantial part due to the emergence of African and other third world countries. Third, developing
countries, especially relative to their economic needs for development
and their struggle to maintain an adequate level of sovereignty, may
have a more continuously intensive relationship with international
organizations, particular foreign countries, and with the international
community generally than might more industrialized, relatively selfsufficient nations. This has arguably been the case for all weak states
since the 19th century. Modern developing countries attempt to mobilize, often collectively, international law and organizational resources to exercise influence against great powers and other states,
in partial compensation for their lack of great power self-sufficiency
and of effectively utilizable resources. Thus, relationships with selected sectors of the international community, e.g. the United Nations and through it, other states, are significant in maintaining and
advancing third world interests and protecting the sovereignty of
each state. Lastly, processes of social change in the international
community and social change in individual nation-states intersect at
key junctures, in ways favorable and unfavorable to the state, not the
least of which is the intersection of domestic and international legal
processes through, for example, national constitutions, or earlier,
13
colonially-imposed legal arrangements.
If the above observations are valid, then one goal of African legal
education might be to produce international lawyers who can uphold
their countries' interests, Africa's interests, and larger world community interests in the midst of these complex intersecting trends."
As subsequently discussed, the upholding of these interests is closely
tied to the development of explicitly African perspectives on international law which reflect the special mixture of Pan-African and wider
international considerations binding on the Continent. That goal
might well be refined into an imperative, since these trends, and
therefore the need for such lawyers, seem irreversible in the foreseeable future.
The question of goals raises the issue of the vantage points of
those who inquire, and who consequently recommend policies on the
objectives, strategies, resources and outcomes of African interna12. See generally R.P. ANAND, NEW

STATES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1972).
13. See generally McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, Theories About International
Law: Prologue to a ConfigurativeJurisprudence,8 VA. J. INT'L L. 188 (1968).
14. GOWER, supra note 10.
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tional legal education. Scholar-observers from Africa, more intimate
participants in her aspirations, legal processes and arrangements for
legal education, have special responsibilities and insights not fully
shared by those from other countries joined to Africa only by interest,
concern, academic career, nor perhaps even by Afro-Americans
joined by ties of blood. To persons from Africa fall the final decisions
to realize those goals; we who perforce speak from an outside position
forget this crucial truth at the peril of all. Notwithstanding these
limitations, outside vantage points may be useful to those within to
describe the shape of the forest so that the plenitude of trees gives
neither false hope nor despair. Also, as the history of African legal
education has shown, some outside resources may be necessary to
realize these goals,"5 necessitating coordination among differing vantage points of diverse legal educators, and therefore putting a premium on clear and empathetic communication.
STRATEGIES OF AFRICAN LEGAL EDUCATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

The Current State of InternationalLegal Education
To somewhat anticipate a conclusion from this discussion, the
training of international lawyers in Africa seems to be either a nonstarter and therefore a problem, or else a problem to which solutions
might be underway but are so far largely buried by circumstances. If
the training of adequate numbers of qualified international lawyers
is taken as one possible objective of African legal education, substantial ambiguity arises in tracing the trends of inquiry in this area.
On October 20-24, 1968, the Conference on Legal Education in
Africa was held in Addis Ababa to discuss objectives and strategies
of producing African lawyers." Participants included both academics
(who predominated) and those holding official legal positions in African government; owing inter alia to difficulties of scheduling, Anglophonic Africa was more widely represented than the Francophonic
states. 7 That Conference, a major top-level Africawide assembly in
legal education, is notable for a more or less general omission of
references to a need to train international lawyers in Africa. This was
especially true regarding the main trends of discussion. However,
there were some references to the desirability of lawyers in Africa.
This was especially true regarding the main trends of discussion.
However, there were some references to the desirability of lawyers
15. I refer here primarily to the apparent necessity, now diminishing, for African
lawyers to be trained abroad in their countries' initial post-independence years, and
for the heavy expatriate staffing in many African law schools.
16. Proceedings, supra note 4.
17. States represented were: Somalia, the United States, Malawi, Tanzania,
Cameroons, Egypt, Uganda, Zaire, Nigeria, Sudan, Kenya, Ghana, Faculty of LawUniversity of Botswana, Lesotho & Swaziland, Liberia, Zambia, Ethiopia.
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being available to confront certain international problems, and these
can be mentioned under two categories: (A) Pan-African relationships; and (B) relationships with the larger international community.
The references under (A) were closely linked with a clear Conference trend toward increasing regional cooperation among law schools
to maximize resources, and toward increasing regional focus in legal
education planning in regard to the availability of research materials,
research priorities and the desirability of working towards unification
of African national legislation in specific areas. These references were
stronger and more numerous than those that referred to category (B)
activities.
Thus the Minister of Justice from Ethiopia stated, "we should
direct our efforts to the search for rules which can be applied through
the whole Continent."' 8 More specifically, Dr. Jacques Vanderlinden,
Rapporteur of the Conference, discussed research needs towards unification of African law. He noted that the national differences among
legal systems that were being asserted stemmed largely from the
stresses of decolonization, but that such assertions conflict with PanAfrican efforts in other fields and with a growing trend towards unification of laws at the international level. In this connection, comparative research to discover similarities in law is a possible pathway
towards unification. 9 These sentiments were echoed in a more precise
context by Recteur Mabika Kalinda of the National School of Zaire.
His final priority in discussing research and publications priorities in
African law, on a list of three was:
Comparative study on the pan-African level of a) traditional legal orders,
especially the customary law of persons, property and obligations; b)
study of the impact of acculturation of family and society in both urban
and rural conditions.'*

These proposals were closely followed by that of Professor Max
Rheinstein to establish a Pan-African law research center to act as a
clearing house for research done anywhere on the Continent in
printed or unprinted form, needed because of the Continental scope
of many African problems which require coordinated study. The
Rheinstein proposal was subsequently adopted as one of eight proposals made by the Conference for Pan-African and regional cooperation
among law schools, and was the nearest mention made to the formulation of objectives for international legal training in the context of
such cooperation." However, Dean Zaki Mustafa of the Faculty of
Law, University of Khartoum, a strong advocate of regional law
school cooperation, linked that concept with that of international
18. Proceedings, supra note 4, at 9.
19. Id.at 97.
20. Id.at 117.
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legal education in spelling out a proposal to expand existing limited
cooperation among law faculties at Addis, Khartoum and Dar. He
projected the benefits of such cooperation might include "establishing regional training programs in law, with special reference to such
matters as Economic Development, Foreign Investment, some areas
of International Law, etc.""
This connection returns us to category (B), the need to train
international lawyers to deal with problems in African relationships
with the outside international community. As was noted, there were
a few such references over the course of the Conference, but they
seemed to be almost peripheral asides and were not given the extensive consideration received by subjects such as the incorporation of
customary law into statutory legislation. For example, in the course
of a general discussion of goals of African legal education, Dean
James Paul noted:
Lawyers are needed for. . . vital roles in the process of national development. . . . Development means expanded economic activity, and that
means an increasing amount of contractual negotiations with foreign
business concerns and foreign governments. .. ."

There was a passing notation in discussion of some movement of law
school graduates into Ministries of Foreign Affairs." Professor Harrison Dunning, in discussing possible new problem-areas for courses in
organizing a law school curriculum, noted that one such problem-area
might be "foreign assistance." 25 Further, Dean Mustafa proposed
that law schools might give "service courses" to respond to the wish
of government departments and business concerns to give members
of their staffs legal training in a special field to raise their efficiency
or to enable them to be promoted. A Special Diploma in Commercial
Law was already being offered at the University of Khartoum. And a
Diploma in International Law and Relations or a Course on the Legal
Problems of Economic Development and Foreign Investment were
examples of what might be done. 6
However, in group discussion, the other side of this issue appeared. The general sentiment was that promotion criteria (for members of African law faculties) and publication priorities must be made
more relevant to African legal development. In this connection,
"[An elementary textbook on national contract law may be far
more desirable than a not-specifically-African international law trea21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at

101-102, 140-41.
Appendix, 26.
14.
60.
66.
Appendix, 43.
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tise, or even than field research that does not have currently relevant
objectives."7 Relatively little consideration then is being given at the
Pan-African level to the goal of training international lawyers. Additionally, there is seemingly even less consideration of this subject by
those formulating policy for the American aid process as it relates to
legal education in Africa, a process with major inputs into African
legal education at the Pan-African level.
The foregoing is not meant as a criticism of the 1968 Conference
which reflected the priorities in legal education as expressed by those
most directly involved, and seems an accurate indicator of trends of
thinking on the Pan-African level about African legal education.
However, this relative omission does indicate that formulating goals
and objectives and then implementing strategies to produce international lawyers in sufficient quantity and quality to meet both PanAfrican needs and national African state needs might be a task of
some magnitude. Having said this, we must note that there remains
considerable ambiguity about attitudes regarding international law
training in Africa at a more local level.
In contrast to the implications of the Pan-African attitudes, a
considerable amount of attention has been paid in individual African
law schools to international law, at least in terms of courses in their
curricula. Higher educational facilities in Africa have expanded
greatly during the past decade and legal education has shared in this
expansion. There are now 31 African universities with faculties of
law, excluding the 12 in South Africa." Of these, 24 offer international law or international organization courses in three year degree
programs. Within this group 14 make at least one course in international law a requirement for graduation, while 14 offer one or more
international law courses as electives. The subject-matter of these
courses includes public international law, private international law,
international institutions, international trade, and the law of foreign
investment. 9
The conclusion seems sensible that some degree of importance
is attached to international legal training by individual deans and
faculties throughout sub-Sahara Africa. These curriculum decisions
may represent, at least in part, a local level response to a general
Africa-wide need for international legal training and international
lawyers, though it is uncertain how intensely this need is felt.3 An
27. Id. at 104.
28. Johnstone, American Assistance to African Legal Education, 46 TULANE L.
REV. 657 (1972).
29. Compiled from J. BAINBRIDGE & T. WOOD STUDY AND TEACHING OF LAW IN
AFICA 181-342 (1972).
30. However, relevant also is the absence of data indicating whether the inclusion
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accompanying partial reason for the presence of international law
courses in curricula may be that they are holdovers from Europeanderived curricula. However this would seem a diminishing probability for law schools relatively long in existence.
African InternationalLegal Education and Outside Aid
Most aid to African legal eduation from outside governments has
been provided by former metropolitan European states, especially
Britain and France, and by the United States." Little aid has been
provided by international organizations, 2 and this absence would
seem to be an area for inquiry towards increasing available resources.
The attitudes involved in donors' policies for providing such aid are
germane to our discussion here, if only because of the often close
interaction between those policies and the final local policies formulated that employ such aid. This inquiry will concentrate, with admitted selectivity, on aid from the United States as it relates to
international legal education in Africa.
In a major article in 1972, Professor Quintin Johnstone argued
generally that the focus of American aid to African legal education
should change its emphasis from teaching to research.13 It is noteworthy that this article, which includes a comprehensive review of aid
programs and recommendations for future policies, makes virtually
3
no reference to education in Africa in international law. 4
3
The two references which do appear are passing and indirect.
The omission of substantive discussion of this topic may illustrate:
(1) a lack of identification of international law as a manpowertraining priority in African legal education by those involved in the
American aid process; or (2) a covert rejection by the same decisionmakers of a similar African-formulated priority. It is suggested, however, that such non-identification of international legal education as
of international law courses in curricula across Africa is a trend that has gained or lost
momentum since the Conference of 1968, since the above statistics were compiled as
of 1972.
31. Johnstone, supra note 28, at 662.
32. Id. at 663.
33. Former Dean of the Faculty of Law, Haile Sellassie I University, Addis Ababa.
34. It is also noteworthy that the fairly comprehensive bibliography on African
legal education that he sets out at the beginning of his article, supra note 28, at n.1,
contains no reference to even one article about the teaching of international law in
Africa. This lack, I believe, is in no way attributable to Professor Johnstone's scholarship but is an accurate reflection of the state of the current literature. Further, Professor Johnstone has wide experience in African legal education and has been a key
participant in American aid to African legal education over the last decade. In this
major review of trends, his questions and concerns would seem indicative of those of
academics and decision makers in this area.
35. Johnstone, supra note 28, at 689, 691.
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a possible priority might do a disservice to apparent needs of each
African country and those of Continental Africa generally, as indicated in part by the above discussion of local law school curricula.
We can speculate that this absence connotes either a lack of
identification of a real priority or a rejection of the same priority.
Professor Johnstone is seemingly writing out of a primarily Anglophonic African experience. 3 6 The English tradition of providing international legal advice to government, as it has generally been transposed to Africa, is that such advice should be of a limited non-policymaking nature, and should flow from the Office of the AttorneyGeneral, at least in principle, as part of his responsibility to advise
all government ministries on legal problems. This tends to mean
centralization of legal advice, actually and organizationally, and the
provision of "technical" rather than more policy-oriented advice.
This may be contrasted to an alternative system of providing to individual government ministries specialized legal advisers who become
more involved with the policy concerns of their ministries, which is
generally the American pattern. 37 There is some conflict within African governments over these alternatives. The impression is that the
English tradition remains predominant in Anglophonic Africa,
though undoubtedly being modified by individual governmental arrangements.
If the above is generally valid, it may follow as a consequence
that the demand for foreign aid to develop specialized international
legal talent would be perceived by the donor's aid officials as relatively slight. The demand instead would generally be for assistance
in training lawyers, some of whom might eventually become involved
in international legal matters. Further, the demand would be slight
because international law needs, under this administrative system
especially, tends to be seen as competing, in the context of a limited
amount of legal talent, with domestic legal needs of demonstrated
priority. Finally, an additional legacy of British colonial administration is the rotation of administrative personnel on an assumption of
"generalists" competence, irrespective of subject area, and a consequent eschewing of the development of in-depth specialties, attitudes
that dovetail with administrative expectations of centralized legal
advice to the entire government from the Attorney-General. It is
suggested that all of these factors taken together, plus others which
doubtless exist, might combine to "bury" both African and donor
governments' perceptions of a need for identifying international law36.
created
remain
37.

Language, distance, remnants of differing colonially-imposed cultures have
gaps in communication between Anglophonic and Francophonic Africa that
wide enough, relative to legal education, to be troublesome.
See H. MERILLAT, LEGAL ADVISERS AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 4-7, 19-22 (1964).
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training as a separate, and not a competing, priority of African legal
education. The former concept would imply developing a separate
pool of lawyers to combat international legal problems, as opposed
to pulling them from a general national pool of legal talent.
Even if aid policies are not involved, the impression is that the
above factors would continue to constitute somewhat of a barrier
within several Anglophonic African governments to designating the
training of international lawyers as a separate priority drawn from a
separate manpower pool. These factors may well be reinforced by aid
programs, but their genesis would seem to lie in the colonial and
recent history of each country. In this sense, donors' aid officials are
merely sharing local perspectives about international lawyers.
AN OUTSIDER'S OBSERVATIONS OF AFRICAN NEEDS FOR ADDITIONAL
INTERNATIONAL LAWYERS

It seems clear that African law schools are steadily becoming
more and more "nationalized" with respect to their teaching personnel. In other words, more and more Africans are joining law faculties
and fewer expatriates are to be found in the same positions. It also is
apparently the case that those international law courses 8 offered in
law curricula have been largely taught by expatriates.39 To this extent, a first "need" for designating the production of international
lawyers as a manpower-priority would seem to be that of ensuring
enough future teachers of international law for present and evolving
requirements, unless, that is, African governments are willing to
carve out a significant "exception" to the Africanization of law faculties and continue to desire expatriates to teach these subjects. The
latter would seem unlikely. This need for teachers and scholars would
appear basic to meeting the other long-term needs of individual African states for internationally-trained lawyers.
To explore further needs, it is convenient to return to our earlier
categorization of international legal problems differentiating those
arising in relationship between individual African states and the
extra-African world community, from such problems arising in a PanAfrican context.
The World Community
In discussing the legal profession in Africa, Professor L.C.B.
Gower has indicated that Africa has an urgent need for international
lawyers, commensurately greater perhaps than that of industralized
countries, in regard to both the above categories. 0 The problem of
international relations with the outside international community can
38. Johnstone, supra note 28, at 674-75.
39. See id. at 665.
40. GOWER, supra note 10, at 40-41, 102-103.
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be specifically discussed in terms of four areas. First, references at the
1968 Conference on African Legal Education to the need for lawyers
to handle growing problems of foreign investment and contractual
negotiations stemming from expanded economic activities with foreign business concerns and foreign governments have already been
noted. More specifically, increasing state participation in entering
foreign business enterprises, whether on a large scale, such as the
Zambian copper industry nationalizations in 1969, or on a smaller
scale, creates a need for international lawyers who are also expert in
the areas where domestic corporate and financial regulations intersect international law, as well as for corporate lawyers knowledgeable
in international legal process. 4 Additionally, international lawyers
are needed, in conjunction with economists and other relevant specialists, to spearhead the drive to institute African control over a
larger share of the invisible costs of African trade now largely in
European and American hands, such as shipping insurance, not to
mention to advise in the ongoing effort through UNCTAD, GATT,
and other forums to gain African products the equitable share of the
world's markets that now escapes them. Expectations are being generated through the O.A.U. on the pan-African level that common
African negotiating positions should be established on these questions.4 2 This latter would seem to imply programs of education in
transnational law, dealing with a wide range of international and
domestic legal expectations. Of crucial importance would be the adaptation and rewriting of educational materials (reflecting legal problems from elsewhere than Africa) to the circumstances and imperatives of the African constituency served by each educational center
or law school.
Even following such adaptation, problems in the following areas
might be predicted as generally pertinent to African circumstances:
aliens in the context of the national legal system, including especially
their access to economic activities and the choice of law problems
arising therefrom; the intersection of the international legal process
with domestic legal processes, including alternatives of outside states
to protect within African states their individual access to economic
activities and the choice of law problems arising therefrom; questions
concerning the exhaustion of remedies, treaty interpretation, domestic jurisdiction; the development and validity of minimum international standards, especially regarding expropriation of alien property
41. See Thomas, Legal Education in Africa: With Special Reference to Zambia,
22 No. IRELAND LEGAL Q. 3, 22-23 (1971).
42. See, e.g., the O.A.U. African Declaration on Co-operation, Development and
A.24, A.25, A.34,
Economic Independence, CM/ST.11 (XXI) 1973, Abidjan, esp. at
A.36, A.39, B.2, B.3 (iii, v, ix), C.3(i), C.4(i).
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and breaches of concession agreements; questions concerning the validity of pleading customary international law before national courts;
questions presented by international agreements under national law,
and the promulgation of national legislation for transnational purposes on a reciprocal basis.
Other areas covered in such a program of study would include
questions concerning the appearance of foreign sovereigns before local
courts, including those of sovereign immunity and act of state, questions of practice and procedure such as the service of summons in
foreign countries, the enforcement clauses, and procedures for obtaining evidence in foreign countries. Finally, of particular and increasing
importance would be questions concerning the transnational reach of
national economic regulation and criminal legislation, plus transnational reach of national economic regulation and criminal legislation,
plus transnational aspects of income taxation including double taxation agreements, as well as questions of economic regulation through
international organizations such as G.A.T.T., the I.M.F., the E.E.C.,
43
and UNCTAD.
A second area, relative to African relationships with the outside
world community, is the need for adequate numbers of international
lawyers and supporting staff to ensure that African states have an
equivalency of legal talent at the bargaining table in negotiations
where international legal claims are useful to gain or preserve leverage. Usual sources of leverage in international negotiations include
the traditional indicia of state power, such as large standing armies,
a highly educated cohesive population, a rich and growing manufacturing economy, a highly efficient managerial sector, and long experience in international affairs and the use of power. When one nation
party to bilateral negotiations lacks some or most of these usual
sources of leverage, as is often the case of African states vis-a-vis rich
industrialized countries or even the larger multinational corporations, the capacity of the weaker party to exercise leverage in such a
situation tends to depend more on the wits in the heads of the negotiators and on their ability to quickly mobilize their personal skills
43. The foregoing discussion relies heavily on Steiner & Vagts' excellent casebook,
MATERIALS ON TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS (1968). It and other similar texts could
well serve as points of departure for devising curricula to inquire into problems of
transnational law, but it must be emphasized that the content of such curricula will
depend peculiarly on whether the curriculum is serving a national law faculty or an
institution that is pan-national in orientation. To be most effective in producing lawyers and scholars with the most useful skills, the curriculum materials dealing with
transnational problems must be prepared reflecting the current and projected categories of legal problems facing the governments and institutions whom the lawyers'
products of the curriculum are most likely to serve.
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of persuasion around agreed principles. In such a situation the skill
of an international lawyer in identifying agreed principles and expectations binding on both sides, and effectively framing claims advantageous to his government around such principles becomes invaluable. The impression is that African states and organizations may yet
be short in the numbers of such lawyers available.
A third area concerns the value of international lawyers advising
on the maximum utilization for the needs of his country of resources
available from international organizations, and simultaneously, advising on the most efficient route that his government may take to
secure such resources. This latter is written having in mind the unfortunate competition for aid resources from international organizations
(and state donors) that exists among developing countries." With the
increased multilateralization of aid resources through international
organizations, these problems promise to grow in complexity. We
may also again mention here the growing volume of trade negotiations, through UNCTAD, GATT and other bodies, especially the
competition for major markets for African products. Further the drive
to comba(pollution and introduce ecology controls, symbolized by
the recent Stockholm Conference, is now giving rise to a new group
of international organizations, and these concerns promise to overlap
and interact with those of aid, trade and more traditional development factors." The frontier question of the utilization of resources
from the oceans' floor, crucial especially for the majority of African
states which do not sit on a coastline, is already generating proposals
for organizational structures of varying jurisdiction in which African
states must play an equitable role." There is a new consciousness of
the relationship of world monetary policy to the development of African and other third world states, and a consequent need for African
expertise and for international lawyers skilled in financial matters to
monitor and more effectively participate in these organizations, formerly the nearly exclusive domain of the rich countries, such as the
International Monetary Fund." And last, of continuing importance,
there is the need for additional international lawyers to advise on
mobilizing and protecting African interests in the United Nations
General Assembly, Security Council and related agencies. The
African Caucus in the Assembly in conjunction with the Afro-Asian
bloc has been quite effective, but always more can be done, in line
44. See generally Asher, InternationalAgencies and Economic Development: An
Overview, 22 INT'L ORG. 432 (1968).
45. See O.A.U. CM/Res (XIX) 1972.
46. See O.A.U. Resolution on the Law of the Sea, CM/Res. 291 (XIX) 1972;
CM/Res. 238 (XVI) 1971.
47. See CM/Res 213 (XIV) 1971.
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with previous observations on the need of African states to mobilize
the international community. For all of the above tasks, one problem
has been that the posting of an international lawyer abroad or his
assignment at home exclusively to these tasks has created a pinch in
manpower of scarce legal talent needed for other development-related
assignments. The training of additional international lawyers would
alleviate this pinch.
The reference to the General Assembly brings us to a fourth area:
the advocacy and formation of doctrines and principles of international law favorable to African states. International lawyers, most
likely those in law faculties in coordination with their counterparts
in government, with an understanding of the law-formation processes
in the international community (especially as this occurs in major
international organizations), are needed to advise their governments
on accelerating these processes in directions favorable to national
development by recommending modification of international law
principles to reflect African interests, as opposed to great power and
European interests." This modification represents a phenomenon already underway; the emergence of third world states as a group has
had a visible impact on the international legal process.49 Some evolution has occurred from stimuli largely African, such as in revising the
doctrine of treaty succession by legitimizing a system of notification
to other parties in order to give African states a leeway period to
evaluate colonially-concluded treaties without the risk of being
bound thereby in perpetuity, and with arguably diminished obligations thereunder during the evaluation period.
A more significant example concerns expectations of international protection of human rights, especially as such rights relate to
the situations of apartheid in South Africa. Through a combination
of actions over two decades in the International Court of Justice, the
Security Council and the General Assembly principles of the protection of human rights were released from their bondage to that of
domestic jurisdiction in Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter,
and finally joined to the responsibility of all states under the Charter
to maintain international peace and security 0 The consequent increase in legal leverage thus acquired for the protection of human
rights in a racial context, both domestically and internationally, can
be traced largely to African efforts. In this connection, an emerging
48. See R.

HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THRU THE POLITICAL

1963.
49. ANAND, supra note 12.
50. See generally, Bleicher, The Legal Significance of Re-Citation of General
Assembly Resolutions, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 444 (1969); McDougal & Reisman, Rhodesia
and the United Nations: The Lawfulness of InternationalConcern, 62 AM. J. INT'L L.
1, (1968).
ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
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frontier appears from current African efforts to affect the amendment
of the Geneva Conventions, during the forthcoming Diplomatic Conference on Humanitarian Law, in a manner most advantageous to the
liberation movement. The O.A.U. has set in motion measures to identify African interests for that Conference. 5 Further, a major continuing objective would seem that of mobilizing similar strategies to
achieve international economic equalization, a task requiring the detailed attention of African international lawyers.5
These five areas of need have confronted each African state since
its independence, obviously in varying degrees, in its attempt to realize development objectives while maintaining a viable international
posture. All African governments have recognized the general need
for international legal advice and moved to acquire it, with varying
degrees of success. However, capacities among them in this respect
vary: from the government's international lawyers being able only to
provide intelligence to their government about international legal
trends, all the way up to the capacity to participate in meaningful
recommendation, prescription, appraisal, and termination of significant international legal policies. The capacity of each African state
and the extent to which each has adopted the easing of these needs
as objectives to be implemented must be ascertained by detailed
inquiries of each government, beyond the scope of this essay. It may
be desirable, however, for each state or cooperating group of African
states to develop through their international lawyers the greatest
possible ability to affect the intelligence-gathering, recommending,
prescribing, invoking, and application of policies in the international
legal process, as well as to influence the authoritative appraisal of
ongoing policies and the termination of those not in the best interests
of Africa or the world community.
The need to develop such a capacity exists even under the most
pessimistic appraisal of the potential for Pan-African cooperative action by sustained international strategies during the foreseeable future. If more optimism is allowed, this capacity along with a maximum of trans-African coordination would seem crucial in order to
develop African positions on major international issues. The realism
of such optimism, however, depends heavily on coordinating the realization of the five areas of need for international lawyers with policies
of African legal education on both the Pan-African and the national
levels, to which we now turn.
PAN AFRICAN CONSIDERATIONS

From the 1968 Conference was noted a growing Pan-African con51. O.A.U. CM/Res. 307 (XXI) 1973.
52. See Richardson, Speculations on the Relevance of International Law to the
Needs of Black Southern Africa, 1 UFAHAMU 22 (1970).
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sciousness with respect to African legal education as manifested in
proposals for projects to unify and harmonize bodies of national law,
for comparative law studies useful as a basis for sharing legal solutions to development-related dilemmas, and for increased regional
and continental cooperation in legal education and research. On that
basis, a few additional observations are pertinent here.
The rationale for comparative law studies is generally that they
will and have served as a basis to unify national legal rules in various
subject-areas on a regional or continental basis, and as a basis on
which African legal communities can share with each other legal
strategies for similar problems. 3 Much of the push behind this move
towards comparative law is provided by the Pan-African ideal that
the differences on the Continent among nations should be minimized
by developing similar legal responses to similar problems. These perceived similarities, in turn, are then available to African legal scholars and decision-makers to assist in developing an African position
on crucial legal doctrines with transnational and international significance. One example would be the extent to which the act of state
doctrine would be recognized as doctrine of deference within African
national courts. Some distinction, for example, might ultimately
wish to be made between act of state claims arising from transactions
occurring in other African states, as against transactions from outside
states. In any case, such African positions on these doctrinal questions, from a vantage point of relative unity, may be either coordinated with other views of the same questions in the world community, or used to confront them, or both. In this sense our two
categories-African relationships with the international community
and Pan-African relationships-merge.
The pursuit of this rationale, these similarities and this basis of
unity would seem to require lawyers with a particular set of perspectives. It would be advantageous were he trained in international law,
because the unrolling of this Pan-African scenario involves (1) transnational concerns-those problems that must be solved across state
boundaries, and (2) international concerns of Africa as separate
states and increasingly as a Continent-that is, the legal problems
involved in maintaining Africa's world position. The same lawyer,
however, would also need to be trained in comparative law research
and have some knowledge of problems such as the relative advantages of pursuing a solution by concluding a treaty versus by
legislating unification of laws. 54 The advantage conferred by identity
of personnel in a context of overlapping objectives is another point
at which Pan-African and international concerns merge. A few such
53. Proceedings, supra note 4. And see GoWER, supra note 10, at 94-95.
54. Cf. id. at 40.
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lawyers have undoubtedly appeared, some by training and some by
accident plus their own initiative. To ensure sufficient talent to
pursue Pan-African objectives, it would seem that their training
should be an explicit priority.
Expectations of Pan-African legal cooperation generally, and
implicit expectations of inter-African communication on matters of
international law, are emerging from the Organization of African
Unity. Arguably a political consensus on the importance of these
kinds of cooperation is evolving which will buttress whatever institutional initiatives are taken in this area of legal education and research. The O.A.U. Council of Ministers has reaffirmed the importance of and the need for legal cooperation between African States,
especially on the necessity of concluding a treaty or treaties on interAfrican legal cooperation between member states. Consultation on
this subject is currently underway, and a nine member committee of
experts is studying the problem and drafting a convention. The impression is that the alacrity among member states in submitting
suggestions on such a treaty could be greater. 5 Further, the idea of
publishing an African Yearbook of International Law, unanimously
welcomed by all member states, is under consideration in both the
O.A.U. Secretariat and the Council of Ministers."
There appear to be organizational initiatives, beyond those noted
in connection with the 1968 Conference, being taken to establish
research centers which would provide, inter alia, research facilities,
university-government coordination facilities, and opportunities for
problem-solving to African international lawyers. The Legal Research
Center in Dar-es-Salaam (whose activities were suspended in 1970),
the proposed West African Legal Research Center in Accra, the Law
Development Center at Kampala, the Center of Islamic Legal Studies of Ahmadu Bello University, and the Center for Documentation
and Research of the National School of Administration at Kinshasa
all appear to focus on research on domestically-oriented problems of
law and development and on possibilities of Pan-African cooperation
in their solution.
On the other hand, the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies at
the University of Lagos seems to offer more promise of providing a
research capacity in international law.17 It was founded subsequent
to the 1964 Conference of Nigerian Law Teachers, with the aim of
providing a single institute for postgraduate research and supervision
which would be fed by the undergraduate Nigerian law schools and
55. CM/Res. 107 (IX) 1967, CM/Res. 198 (XIII) 1969, CM/Res. 226 (XV) 1970.
56. CM/Res. 228 (XV) 1970.
57. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 29, at 100-107.
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would be a joint enterprise of all the universities involved. The individual law schools would grant their own doctoral degrees, but the
research would be done largely at the Institute where appropriate
facilities, including an extensive library, would be centered. Byproducts of such an arrangement would include avoidance of duplication of library facilities on the advanced level and the bringing of the
four Nigerian faculties of law into closer harmony. The establishment
of the Institute was suspended by the Biafran War, but the Federal
Government has now agreed to provide the necessary funds and opening is reported ready for late 1973 or early 1974. The program of the
Institute is reportedly to conform to the original aims and purposes
and will be interdisciplinary in approach. 5 It is significant that the
Institute will most probably have a deliberately organized international law research capacity which could stimulate international legal
studies at each of the law faculties." Its interdisciplinary focus should
facilitate the training of the international lawyer with comparative
law skills necessary to integrate solutions to problems encompassing
legal issues of both Pan-African and world community relationships.
One question, however, is the realistic availability of these facilities
to scholars from other parts of Africa.
A second recent initiative in international legal studies is the
recent proposal by Dean Toye Barnard of the Louis Arthur Grimes
School of Law, University of Liberia, Monrovia. Dean Barnard proposes the establishment of a Pan-African Research Institute of International Law, to be located in an African country (Liberia, perhaps)
"and financed principally by all the African states where scholars
could converge periodically either on sabbatical leaves or under a
grant to pursue legal research in the area of International Law." 0
Similar to the Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, the
Institute here proposed would complement and not replace various
national law schools, and would not only serve as a research center,
but also provide technical services and advice to African governments
58. Id. at 41-42.
59. This was indicated by remarks made by Chief Justice T.O. Elias of the Nigerian Supreme Court at the recent World Peace through Law Conference at Abidjan,
Aug. 26-31, 1973. The Chief Justice was a principal initiator and supporter of the
Institute. In the course of the same remarks he also indicated that the Organization
of African Unity had by recent resolution endorsed the idea of an African research
institute for international law, and that the international legal research capacity of the
Institute was closely related to the spirit of that resolution. The text of the resolution
is yet unavailable to this writer.
60. Barnard, The African Challenge in International Legal Education 13-14
(paper presented to the Panel on Legal Education in Africa, World Peace through Law
Conference, Abidjan, Aug. 30, 1973, under the auspices of the Section of Legal Education).
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when requested, in addition to serving as a source of information on
education in international law to African states and to the wider
international community.'
The Barnard proposal, if implemented, is wider in scope than the
Nigerian Institute in that (1) it aims to serve the needs in this area
of not one but several African states; and (2) it aims to serve not only
the needs of scholars but also to provide technical assistance to several African governments for international legal problems as well as
to provide information on legal education in the field. But, this proposal appears narrower in that that Institute is to concentrate on
international legal studies as opposed to a focus including, e.g., comparative law and research towards legislative unification. However,
such comparisons must be placed in context. The Nigerian Institute
will almost certainly be in operation first and for that reason, plus
the cumulative influence of the Nigerian Bar, may serve as a model
for other similar institutes. Its practice may influence the procedures
of the Liberian Institute and subsequently organized facilities elsewhere. We may recall from the 1968 Conference that there is already
momentum towards Pan-African cooperation in establishing research
arrangements to explore problems of comparative law, incorporation
of customary law, conflicts of law and harmonization of legal procedural rules. The aims and arrangements, to the extent they are
known, of the Nigerian Institute seem well within the flow of this
momentum which implies (1) that there may be potential within the
Institute to train scholars in combination internationaltransnational-comparative law specialties; and (2) that there may be
some pressure on the directors of the Institute to admit scholars from
a wider interstate pool than that provided by the four Nigerian law
faculties, and that the Institute may in time respond affirmatively.
On the other hand the Liberian Institute may well (1) begin or accelerate a trend towards specialized international law research institutes; but (2) also feel the pressure to expand its scope somewhat to
produce scholars with, as above, international-transnationalcomparative law combination specialties. The pre-existing PanAfrican momentum in the area of legal education and research and
resulting expectations ought to provide a substantial basis for cooper62
ation between these two Institutes if such is desired.
61. Id. at 14-15.
62. The timetable for the realistic implementation of the Barnard proposal is
unknown. A discussion at the World Peace through Law Conference between Chief
Justice Elias and Dean Barnard, in which the writer was privileged to participate,
indicated the real possibility of substantial cooperation between two such Institutes,
with such a nexus then creating expectations of success and other supportive resources
to establish additional institutes for research in international law elsewhere in Africa
where feasible.

1974

LEGAL EDUCATION IN AFRICA

The lawyer-scholars produced by such institutes are also needed
to advise in situations where the Pan-African ideal of interstate cooperation on a functional basis is already somewhat closer to actuality,
as well as for problem-areas previously mentioned. Law school regional cooperation promises to be one such area insofar as joint
international-comparative law curricular offerings are realized. Further, such lawyers are needed to advise African regional organizations
of economic cooperation, such as the East African Community, 3 and
to buttress the Organization of African Unity in terms of increasing
the coordinating and support role that it is attempting to play relative to development problems across the Continent.
Finally, there is the emerging possibility of coordinating trends
in African legal education towards international lawyers with various
specialties with new Afro-American initiatives in the United States
to use international law both in aid of the pursuit of liberation in
South Africa and liberation in the United States. Substantial expectations exist, on several levels, with historical validity, that policy
coordination and reciprocal inspiration between Afro-America and
Black South Africa will increase rather than diminish in the near
future. 4 And some American law schools are beginning to directly
participate in the effort to enforce United Nations resolutions on
South Africa. 5 This general direction would seem especially promising on a research basis, at least, for law faculties in those countries
most directly involved in the South Africa struggle."
Conclusion
African legal education has a role to play in producing African
lawyers trained in international and transnational law. It is suggested
that this role could be larger than it appears at present in that,
particularly, legal education priorities could be set and strategies
mapped on national, regional and pan-African levels aimed at training such lawyers, quite possibly as an extension of other Pan-Africanoriented legal education programs. This would complement and expand current local efforts in international law training, as illustrated
by the widespread presence of such courses in law school curricula.
63. See T. JACKSON, GUIDE TO THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN EAST AFRICA 83-84 (1970).
64. See generally Gwendolen Carter, Black Initiatives for Change in Southern
Africa (The Eleventh Melville J. Herskovits Memorial Lecture, Centre of African
Studies, Edinburgh University, March 9, 1973).
65. For instance, selected faculty and students at New York University Law
School played a key initial role in the effort, ultimately unsuccessful, to block the
importation of Rhodesian chrome ore into the United States in violation of Security
Council Resolutions 232, 253, and 314. See Diggs v. Schultz, 470 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1972).
66. See Thomas, supra note 41, at 32.
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Such an approach would seem to promise the training not only of
African lawyers capable of applying international law to African circumstances, but who, more importantly, are capable of developing an
African standpoint in the international legal process.

OPEC IN THE

CONTEXT OF THE GLOBAL POWER
EQUATION
JAHANGIR AMUZEGAR*

I.

INTRODUcTION

The name of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
has been on thousands of lips around the globe in recent months. The
Organization's initials-OPEC-have filled thousands of newspaper
pages the world over. To the people in the oil-importing countries, the
word OPEC is a frightening one, reminding them of high oil prices,
gas station lines and fuel shortages. OPEC has been called many
names, the nicest of them being "international cartel;" it has been
accused of many things, the mildest of them being "monopoly pricing.'" Yet few of OPEC's critics, and fewer of its followers, know what
OPEC really is or what its purposes are. Briefly, OPEC is an association of twelve full-member plus one associate-member countries, dedicated to the protection of their national interests in the production
and export of oil. OPEC was originally established by five oilproducing countries as a "mouvement de resistance" (defense league)
against arbitrary and unilateral decisions of the major oil companies.
At this point, a bit of oil price history is highly illuminating. In
1947 the "posted price," or the price on which royalties and taxes are
based, of a barrel of Persian crude was $2.17. During the 1950's, while
other prices were rising, the oil price was stable or on the decline. In
February 1959, the "posted price" of Persian Gulf crude was officially
lowered by the major oil companies, who gave as their reason a glut
in world oil supply, to $1.90 a barrel. The oil exporters, who were
economically poor and politically divided, could not and did not do
anything to stop these losses per barrel. Instead, the exporters strove
for increased output to maintain their total income. The companies,
in turn, lowered the price to $1.80 in August 1960. Of this, 80 cents
was the exporter's share. 2 Since most of the exporters were depending
principally on oil income for their foreign exchange needs, the companies' disregard of these needs and the exporters' other aspirations
resulting from repeated reduction of oil prices served as the turning
point in the history of OPEC.
* Ambassador-at-Large and Chief of the Iranian Economic Mission in Washington, D.C.
1. For the history and background of OPEC see Z. MIKDASHI, THE COMMUNITY OF
OIL EXPORTING COUNTRIES (1972).
2. Hearings on S. Res. 40 Before the Senate Subcomm. on Antitrust and
Monopoly, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt.1, at 437 (1969). Another source puts oil prices at
$2.22 per barrel for 1947. H. FRANK, CRUDE On. PRICES IN THE MIDDLE EAST 30 (1966).

222

JOURNAL

OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND

POLICY

VOL. 4:221

The five countries involved (Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia
and Venezuela) formed OPEC in September 1960. Later, Algeria,
Ecuador, Indonesia, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar and the United Arab
Emirates joined the group. Gabon was recently accepted as an associate member. OPEC's victories were hard and long in coming. Despite the members' resolve to prevent an oil price decline, the countries' policy of unrestrained production to obtain larger revenues and
foreign exchange kept pushing prices down. These policies were imposed on the countries by the companies against the exporters longterm interests, and against technical requirements for prudent and
efficient exploitation. Although the official posted price, under OPEC
pressure, remained at $1.80 a barrel throughout the 1960's, significant
discounts (of 40 cents to 55 cents a barrel from the posted price on
the producers' own offtake) were not unusual. A barrel of offtake
crude was often sold by the Persian Gulf producers at $1.25 in the
world markets-with the prospects of the blissful "$1.00 a barrel"
3
gleefully contemplated by the companies and net oil-importers.
Then, success came suddenly. Following the Caracas Resolution
of December 1970,1 a conference was held in Tehran between OPEC
representatives and those of the oil majors in February 1971. After a
series of long and difficult negotiations, an agreement was reached
whereby the posted price was increased to $2.30, and provisions were
made for (a) small annual increases in that price, and (b) allowance
for inflation in the major oil importing countries. 5 With this significant triumph in hand, other successes followed. In January 1972, a
new concession was obtained by the oil exporters in terms of adjustment allowances in their incomes (received in U.S. dollars) against
dollar devaluations.' In March 1972, the principle of "participation"
by producer-governments in the operation of the oil companies was
accepted. 7 In October 1973, after weeks of unsuccessful negotiations
with the companies, the oil-exporting governments declared their
intention to establish oil prices among themselves, free from the obstructionist tactics of the companies in bilateral bargaining.8 The
3. FRANK, supra note 2, at 116.

4. OPEC Resolution XXI. 120 Calling for Negotiations and Forming ThreeMember Negotiating Committees, Dec. 1970, 10 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 240-42 (1971).
5. Tehran Agreement Between Six Gulf States and Oil Companies Operating in
Their Territories, Feb. 14, 1971, 10 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 247-54 (1971). Thus between
1947 and 1972 the posted price of crude oil in the Middle East rose only from $2.17 to
$2.30. When inflation is taken into account, the real price was actually fifteen percent
lower over twenty-five years.
6. Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries: Agreement Between Oil Companies and Six Persian Gulf States on Increased Payments, Jan. 20, 1972, 11 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 554-60 (1972).
7. See L. MOSLEY, POWER PLAY: OIL IN THE MIDDLE EAST 388-411 (1973).

8. N. Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1973, at 16, col. 1.
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posted price was raised to $5.11,1 and finally, in December 1973, when
the crude oil auction price in the free market had risen to over $22 a
barrel, the posted price in the Persian Gulf was raised to $11.65 a
barrel. 0
II. REASONS FOR THE RISE OF OPEC
The intriguing question is: How could OPEC, which for ten long
years had been largely helpless in promoting the interests of its members, suddenly succeed in bringing the oil majors to their senses, so
to speak, and in making the whole world take notice of the Organization's aims and strengths? The answer lies in a multitude of forces,
long in the making, which have suddenly converged on the scene.
Eight interrelated factors can be distinguished as contributing to
OPEC's recent rise in prominence.
The first factor relates to a change in the world's basic balance
of politico-economic power. The nature and source of OPEC's bargaining strength in dealing with the major oil consuming nations and
the oil majors are a part of this change in the global power equation-a reflection of the growing power and independence of the
Third World. The essence of world power in the last two decades has
undergone two fundamental changes: (a) away from originally bipolar, and later triangular, hegemony of the Super Powers; and (b)
in favor of the less-developed countries (LDC's). International bargaining, a dynamic process, has thus undergone significant changes
in its participants, its scope, and its dimensions. The bargaining
leverage possessed by OPEC is a manifestation of the emergence of
the Third World as a Third Force."
Several basic features of this new global power equation can be
easily underlined. The new U.S.-U.S.S.R. detente, for example, has
ushered in greater tolerance by both major powers of neutralism, nonalignment, and the pursuit of political independence; non-alignment
no longer necessarily connotes hostility toward the left or the right.
Then, there has been a multilateralization of power bases, following
the rise of Japan and the EEC to the position of Super Powers in the
world. Furthermore, new international politico-economic alliances
have been formed on the basis of functional and geographical rather
than political and ideological considerations. For example, the Soviet
Union and the United States have entered into a number of technical,
cultural, scientific and even economic treaties and relationships with
countries possessing different political ideologies. The membership
9. N. Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1973, at 61, col. 1.
10. N. Y. Times, Dec. 24, 1973, at 1, col. 8.
11. For a succinct analysis of the new developments see S.

BROWN, THE CHANGING

EssENCE OF POWER (1973) and G. BERGSTEN, THE THREAT FROM THE THIRD WORLD

(1973).

224

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY

VOL. 4:221

composition of such international bodies as UNCTAD, GATT, the
Arab League, and the Organization of African States, groupings in
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and other
similar mixtures present vivid examples of pragmatic and apolitical
coalitions.
These criss-cross coalitions have been stimulated and fostered by
the Super Powers' need for votes in various international forums
which, in turn, have stimulated and nurtured the emergence of the
Third World as a significant force favoring cooperation rather than
coercion in international relations. "Gunboat diplomacy" has been
gradually replaced by relatively polite official debates and skillful
informal lobbying in the corridors of international agencies. Finally,
the emergence of the People's Republic of China as the new champion
of the Third World has significantly strengthened the LDC's hand in
their bargaining with the richer countries.
The second factor responsible for OPEC's rising power and influence has been the geopolitical strength of the OPEC members. For
example, six major OPEC countries are located around the Persian
Gulf, a strategic area for all Super Powers. The Soviet Union's historic desire for access to the warm waters of the Gulf and the Indian
Ocean," the United States' special commitments to the State of Israel plus her vast investments in the Middle East oil fields, and SinoSoviet rivalry in this part of the world for its own sake and as a
gateway to Africa-all have given the Persian Gulf region its geopolitical significance.
The third factor operating in OPEC's favor has been the Organization's control over oil reserves and exports on the one hand, and the
industrial countries' dependence upon imported petroleum on the
other. By 1985, more than half of world energy consumption (estimated at 145 million b/d of oil equivalent) will be supplied by crude
petroleum. Considering that more than sixty per cent of the world's
proven oil reserves and about eighty-five per cent of world oil exports
are in OPEC's hands, the Organization's actual and potential clout
is not difficult to recognize.'"
The fourth factor accounting for OPEC's mounting significance
and power is solidarity among the exporting countries. History records many exporting organizations of bygone days which faded away
in a short span of time due to short-sightedness, secretive competition, and the pursuit of "beggar-my-neighbor" policies. In the case
of OPEC, however, in spite of differences in ideology and political
12. In this connection see L. LANDIS, POLmCS AND OIL: MOSCOW IN THE MIDDLE
EAST (1973).
13. R. MILLER, THE ECONOMICS OF ENERGY: WHAT WENT WRONG AND How WE CAN
Fix IT (1974).
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philosophy among member countries, there has been a strong harmony of economic action among members, a harmony which has
remained largely immune to countervailing maneuvers of both the
big oil companies and the consuming nations.1 4 Above all, OPEC's
leadership has remained in the hands of moderate countries which
have succeeded in avoiding useless and unproductive confrontations
with the consuming nations.
The fifth element underlying OPEC's success has been the existence of conflicting interests among certain major consuming countries, despite their similar political philosophies and orientations.
OPEC members, notwithstanding their dissimilar political regimes,
have found it advantageous to follow certain common economic goals.
Western Europe, the United States, and Japan, on the other hand,
continue to follow what they themselves call "cannibalistic competition" in the economic arena. The United States, primarily relying on
its own relatively rich domestic oil resources, 5 has recently vowed to
follow a policy aimed at self-sufficiency by 1980. The United States'
policies and prospects are thus vastly different from Japan's, a country which is totally dependent on foreign oil. In case of an emergency,
the United States can maintain her levels of employment, income,
and living reasonably well by adopting energy-saving policies which
might necessitate only small sacrifices on the part of her people. But
without foreign oil the Japanese economy would be in total chaos.
The economic interests of EEC members also vary. England hopes to
attain self-sufficiency and an exporting position in oil by 1980, a hope
which cannot be shared by her other partners in the Community.
Italy, France and Germany have thus found it necessary to follow
their own national self-interest in attempting to obtain long-term
supplies of foreign petroleum."6
The sixth element contributing to OPEC's strength has been the
greater self-confidence among members as a result of a series of consecutive successes in the international economic scene. The expression "nothing succeeds like success" has never been more clearly
manifested than in this case. OPEC members had endeavored to
14. See

MOSLEY,

supra note 7, at 388-411; Mikdashi, CooperationAmong Oil

Exporting Countries with Special Reference to Arab Countries, 28 INT'L Oao. 1, 9-10

(1974). For examples of discord among OPEC countries see Mikdashi, supra note 1,
at 12-17 and Note, From Concession to Participation:Restricting the Middle East Oil
Industry, 48 N. Y. U. L. REV. 774, 791-93 (1973).
15. Even during the economic boom of 1972-73, only one-third of the United
States' oil consumption was imported, but the figure for Japan was close to 100 percent.
16. The virtual abandonment of the Netherlands by other EEC countries in the
face of the Arab oil embargo after October 1973 is another example of European
disunity when national interests are at stake.
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obtain their due shares since 1960, but their early setbacks in negotiations with oil companies repeatedly weakened their hand. Then they
had their first success in February 1971 under the guidance and leadership of Iran's Shahanshah. From then on, one success led to another. The 1971 victory provided not only the psychological selfconfidence needed by OPEC negotiators, but also the politicoeconomic underpinnings for future bargains. Once assured of their
annual foreign exchange needs, the oil producers could negotiate from
a position of financial strength and ultimately political power.
The seventh factor leading to OPEC's successful negotiations
with the oil companies' skilled and sophisticated negotiators has been
the ample supply of indigenous talent from the oil-producing countries. The exporter's representatives today are a group of wellinformed and experienced individuals who fully match their Western
counterparts in political skill and bargaining ability. They are
equipped not only with their own courage and their governments' full
support, but with reams of statistics and a number of arguments
carefully selected and meticulously worked out by their technical and
professional deputies. Oil bargaining sessions are no longer an exercise in favors humbly requested by the producers and magnanimously
bestowed on them by the oil majors. The relationships are now conditioned by sovereign states bent on optimizing returns from their exhaustible resources and their customers. The West and the oil companies have come to understand these facts, and their relations with the
Third World and the oil producers have significantly changed.17
The eighth factor responsible for OPEC's remarkable recent
achievements has been the developing governments' success in following independent national policies free from the insidious influences of the oil companies or their governments. The majority of the
people in the Third World have obtained greater confidence in their
leaders now, and are willing to endure greater sacrifices to ensure the
attainment of their national goals. At the same time, the political and
administrative influence of the oil majors over both their own governments and those of the producing countries has considerably diminished. I"
The success in oil negotiations and the acquisition of substantially vast sums of revenues have enabled national leaders in the oilproducing nations not only to give their people greater material
amenities and increased economic welfare, but to prove to them their
leadership ability and governing capacity. The rank and file, in turn,
have not only become relatively more comfortable and thus more
17. R. VICKER, THE KINGDOM OF OIL/THE MIDDLE EAST: ITS PEOPLE AND ITS POWER
(1974).
18. MOSLEY, supra note 7.
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content; they have come to believe, more and more, their leaders'
promises of higher material standards of living and enhanced national political prestige for their countries. This increased popular
support has, in turn, strengthened the leadership's hand, allowing
them to stand up to foreign politico-economic pressures and to resist
oil company dictates.
THE WEAPONS OF OPEC
11.
Having discussed the foundations of OPEC's economic strength
and political power, we may consider the means through which this
politico-economic power can be used in negotiating with international oil companies and Western consuming countries. The so-called
"weapons" in OPEC's hands can be classified into two categories: (1)
negative sanctions, and (2) positive stiumuli, which can be used alternatively vis-a-vis foreign interests. In resisting intolerable demands or intransigences of the oil-importing countries or companies,
OPEC members may retaliate by resorting to such negative sanctions
as:
1. Withholding part or all of the oil supply from all
or selected customers through (a) nationalization or threat
of take-over of oil and/or other foreign investments, and (b)
temporary embargoes on exports;
2. Using its "embargo" power to demand and receive
increasingly higher prices for crude oil-naturally to the
extent that consumer resistance, the development of substitutes, and retaliatory measures by the oil importing
countries (e.g., import quotas, foreign investment restrictions, denial of aid, and other retaliation) may permit;
3. Regulating domestic operation by foreign oil companies through such requirements as greater local participation in production and/or distribution; further changes
in internal "value-added" in oil production and marketing; and increased local purchases, restricted company
imports, etc.;
4. Switching huge export earnings from some foreign
currencies and countries to others depending on type of
cooperation and attitude, or denying foreign investment in
"hostile" countries;
5. Making discriminatory price concessions, or engaging in unfavorable price discrimination vis-a-vis selected customers, or dumping other export products in
"unfriendly" countries;
6. Retaliating against industrialized creditors by the
repudiation or re-scheduling of foreign debts; and
7. Shifting alliances and coalitions in trade, investment and military agreements between cooperative and
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non-cooperative nations (including threats of withdrawing
from membership of regional pacts or closing military
bases).
The possibility of using these negative sanctions is only part of
OPEC's strength. Part of its power also resides in the offer of positive
stimuli or incentives for cooperation. These incentives may include
such things as:
1. Giving special concessions to foreign private
investors for the purpose of exploiting domestic national
resources which are outside the scope of existing contracts;
2. Promising cooperation in the reform of international monetary, fiscal and trade systems; and
3. Investing in joint ventures for the development of
energy sources and/or other investment projects with cooperative and accommodating partners.
These positive and negative "weapons" have been used in the
past and are more likely to be used in the future when circumstances
warrant. Like all destructive weapons, however, the significance of
the negative sanctions lies, partly at least, in their potential deterrence rather than actual use.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In the final analysis, the very existence and occasional use of
these weapons-even those which are retaliatory in nature-are not
only in the interest of the Third World, but also to the advantage of
the whole international community. The possibility of using the negative weapons will ensure greater economic justice among the rich
and poor; reduce inferiority complexes of the developing nations (particularly the previous colonies) when dealing with the industrial
countries; enhance their self-reliance and self-confidence; narrow existing political, psychological and economic gaps between the large
and small countries; and pave the way for a better world. The productivity and beneficial prospects of the positive stimuli, in turn, open
up vast horizons of cooperative endeavors between oil producers and
oil consumers in efficient use of fuel supplies and in the search for
newer sources of energy.

FACULTY COMMENT
WEAPONS REGULATION, MILITARY NECESSITY AND
LEGAL STANDARDS: ARE CONTEMPORARY
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE "PRACTICES"

INCONSISTENT WITH LEGAL NORMS?
JORDAN J. PAUST*

Editors Note:
On January18, 1974, Leonard Niederlehner,Acting General Counsel
of the Department of Defense, responded to Representative Donald M.
Fraser's letter of November 14, 1973, concerning the "appropriateness
under international law of the M-16 rifle. "' In that response, which addressed itself to the propriety of the M-16, Mr. Niederlehner cited as
authority paragraph4 of Article 23 of the 1907 Hague ConventionNo. IV.,
which provides, in part, that it is forbidden "to employ arms,projectiles,
"The followor materials calculated to cause unnecessary suffering ..
ing article is a comment on Mr. Niederlehner's interpretation of that
language.

Pentagon representatives have recently marie statements about
the law and legal criteria utilized for decisions concerning the legality
of weapon systems or their actual use in a particular context which
do not adequately reflect previous U.S. or international legal standards. Whether there has been an inadvertent use of ambiguous
words, a deliberate attempt to shift the standard, or something in
between these two poles of subjectivity, is not known.
What is readily discoverable, however, is that recent Pentagon
statements to the House Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements are inconsistent with a complete map of U.S.
and international legal policies as reflected in the authoritative U.S.
Army Field Manual, The Law of Land Warfare.' And what is at stake
in this inquiry is not merely the inconsistency, but the dangers to a
proper serving of legal policy through use of the phrases disclosed
below. On the one hand, there is a danger that acceptance of these
phrases will contribute to a wider use of violence, death and destruction. And on the other, there is a danger that certain phrases may
push the subjective standard of criminal culpability to an extreme
* Associate Professor, designate, University of Houston; J.S.D. Candidate, Yale.
1. Department of Defense, OSD Corres. 17018. Pertinent excerpts of Mr.
Niederlehner's letter can be found in Rovine, Contemporary Practiceof the United
States Relating To InternationalLaw, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 504, 528-30 (1974).
2. U.S. DEPT. OF THE ARMY, FM 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE (1956)
[hereinafter cited as FM 27-10].
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level of specific intent to do something which is unnecessary-an
intent which has never been the threshold and which, if adopted as
the level of criminal culpability, could substantially thwart efforts to
discipline soldiers or sanction violations of the law.
Here, several statements and implications contained in Mr.
Niederlehner's letter to Representative Fraser, Chairperson of the
House Subcommittee, about the "appropriateness under international law of the M-16 rifle ' 3 are used as a focus. There is no attempt
to refute Mr. Niederlehner's conclusions about the legality, per se, of
the M-16, since no detailed analysis of relevant legal policies and
ballistics and medical effects has been completed by the Department
of Defense.' His letter is merely used as a widely publicized example
of recent Pentagon thinking about weapons regulation, and comments on his actual or inferable misstatements of law are offered to
avoid a public confusion in regard to actual U.S. and international
legal standards.
The first discrepancy involves subjective standards and criminal
culpability. Mr. Niederlehner states that the phrase "calculated to
cause," as contained in the English version of Article 23(e) of the
Annex to the Hague Convention No. IV (1907), will place within the
content of the prohibition of the use of weapons which cause "unnecessary suffering" some "element of intent." 5 This is an erroneous
interpretation if, by that, Mr. Niederlehner means to create some
new "element of intent" beyond an intent to do an act which causes
unncessary death, destruction, injury or suffering in a circumstance
where one of "reasonable" make-up could reasonably foresee that
such an act could cause such a death or injurious outcome.
It is by no means clear what Mr. Niederlehner actually meant.
He qualifies his requirement of an "element of intent" with the following language: "such that members of the Armed Forces cannot
justify the use of weapons inconsistent with attaining a legitimate
military objective." 6 But even this language is insufficient for clarity.
One does not know whether he subscribes to a mens rea standard of
the "calculated to cause" or "inconsistent with" variety This writer
feels that something in between the two is the proper test, and it
hinges upon the proverbial "reasonable man" and the actual condi3. See Rovine, supra note 1, at 528-30.
4. In regard to possible illegality see INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS
(ICRC), REPORT ON THE WORK OF EXPERTS ON WEAPONS THAT MAY CAUSE UNNECESSARY
SUFFERING OR HAVE INDISCRIMINATE EFFECTS (1973) [hereinafter cited as ICRC REPORT
OF EXPERTS].

5. Rovine, supra note 1, at 529.

6. Id.
7. See also id. ("intentionally superfluous").
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tions of decision.8 What is clear, however, is that no higher subjective
standard (i.e., commission of an act or adoption of a weapon system
"calculated" to cause unnecessary injury or which is "intentionally
superfluous") is contained in this prescription.
The French text of the 1907 Hague prohibition does not contain
the word "calculated," and the French wording is the only authoritative wording.' The French text, moreover, retained the exact wording
of the earlier 1899 Hague Convention No. H, Annex, Article 23(e)
prohibition. The relevant language is as follows: ". . . of a nature to
cause superfluous injury" (" . . . propres a causer des maux superflus"). Custom has also retained the original meaning and textwriters now merely refer to the principle of unnecessary suffering. 0
This writer feels, however, that although weapon illegality must substantially hinge upon effects, not upon subjectivities, a criminal prosecution for design, adoption or use of illegal weapons must address
the common mens rea standard of culpability which is based upon a
"reasonable man," foreseeability and actual circumstance. But Mr.
Niederlehner is plainly wrong if it is his contention that Article 23(e)
has been violated only when a weapon or conduct causes suffering or
injury which is "intentionally superfluous."" Since he uses this language along with an exposition of the postulated "element of intent"
theory, one must infer that it is his standard and, then, denounce it
as unsupportable by proper legal analysis.
There is another misstatement of law implied in Mr.
Niederlehner's letter. It is the implication that the Department of
Defense now subscribes to the repudiated "Kriegsraison" theory of
the German war criminals. At the outset it must be emphasized that
it has never been an accepted international legal standard in modern
times that armed forces can employ any form or intensity of violence
which is consistent with or helpful in the attainment of a legitimate
military objective. Such an approach is far too broad. It amounts to
a military "benefit" test as opposed to a military "necessity" test, 2
and the military benefit or "Kriegsraison" theory was expressly repu8. See Paust, The Nuclear Decision in World War II-Truman's Ending and
Avoidance of War, 8 INT'L LAW. 160 (1974).
9. See FM 27-10, supra note 2, at i.
10. See ICRC REPoRT oi EXPERTS, supra note 4, at 14, para. 21; and infra note
11.
11. Rovine, supra note 1, at 529. For a contrary DOD/DA view see FM 27-10, supra
note 2, at 3 (paras. 2a and 3a), 18 (paras. 34b and 36), 19-20 (para. 41) and 23-24 (para.
56); see also id. at 178 (para. 501) and 182 (para. 509).
12. See Paust, supra note 8, at 163-66, 168-69 n.31; Comment, 26 NAVAL WAR
COLL. REV. 103 (1973); Paust, My Lai and Vietnam: Norms, Myths and Leader
Responsibility, 57 MIL. L. REv. 99, 149-53 (1972). See also the remarks of Aldrich in
Proceedings of the American Society of International Law, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 148
(1973); the remarks of Paust, id. at 162; the remarks of Rubin, id. at 165.
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diated at Nuremberg in the Von Leeb case.13 One could infer that Mr.
Niederlehner adopts the military benefit test through use of the
phrase "use of weapons inconsistent with attaining a legitimate military objective" by implying that he feels that any weapon usage
which is merely consistent with attaining a legitimate military objective would be lawful. But it is not clear that he subscribes to such an
implication, although, for clarity, such an implication must be emphatically denounced.
What is also disturbing, however, is that this sort of implication
(of a new DOD "Kriegstaison" theory) seems consistent with recent
statements made before the same Congressional body by Major General George Prugh, the Judge Advocate General, U.S. Army. General
Prugh stated that "loss of life and damage to property must not be
out of proportion to the military advantageto be gained" (emphasis
added)." Actually, the rule is that loss of life must not be out of
proportion to what is militarily "necessary" under the circumstances,
and damage to property must not be out of proportion to what is
"imperatively demanded by the necessities of war."' 5 Although it is
true that General Prugh's words reflect a partial reading of paragraph
41 of the U.S. Army Field Manual,'" that paragraph also reiterates
the "necessity" test through the phrase: "demanded by the exigencies of war," and paragraph 3 of the Army manual makes it clear that
the military benefit or "advantage" test is not the legal standard.
That paragraph states that the law of war "requires that belligerents
refrain from employing any kind or degree of violence which is not
actually necessary for military purposes. . ." (emphasis added). The
same paragraph states that military necessity also involves the use
of measures "which are indispensablefor securing the complete submission of the enemy as soon as possible" (emphasis added). In regard to property, "[tihe measure of permissible devastation is found
in the strict necessities of war."' 7 It is clearly not enough that the
measure is advantageous to, beneficial to or consistent with military
needs. The test is "necessity," not "Kriegsraison."
Another implication in Mr. Niederlehner's letter is that the prohibition of "dum-dum" bullets only applies to bullets which are not
13. See also Ul U.S. DEPT. OF THE AaRMy, PAMPHLEr No. 27-161-2, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 248 (1962), quoting from United States v. Von Leeb, XI TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS
541 (1948) and rejecting the "right to do anything that contributes to the winning of a
war."
14. Statement of Major General Prugh, HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Int'l.
Organizationand Movements of the Comm. on ForeignAffairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.,
at 102 (1974).
15. See FM 27-10, supra note 2, at 3 (para. 3a), 19 (para. 41), 23 (para. 56) and
24 (para. 58).
16. Id. at 19.
17. Id. at 23 (para. 56) (emphasis added). See also id. at 24 (para. 58).
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"fully jacketed.""8 Such an implication would also be clearly erroneous, since the very purpose of the customary 1899 Declaration on
Expanding Bullets 9 was to prohibit certain effects of any bullet
within the human body and not merely certain specific configurations
of bullets. 0 That declaration prohibited "bullets which expand or
flatten easily in the human body, such as bullets with a hard envelope
which does not entirely cover the core or is pierced with incisions."',
The listing of partially-jacketed bullets and bullets pierced with incisions was merely illustrative. Moreover, it is clear that the proscribed
effects can be caused by partial-jacketing, a flat top (bullet tip),
cutting off of the tip of a bullet, scoring the surface of the jacket, a
hollow-point, soft lead, a weak jacketing and/or a tremendous increase in velocity. 22 As the Army Field Manual sets forth, usage has
established the illegality of "irregular-shaped bullets . . . and the
scoring of the surface or the filing off of the ends of the hard cases of
bullets." More recent Army publications reiterate these prohibitions. Army Subject Schedule No. 27-1 states that these principles
"have established the illegality of the use of irregular-shaped bullets
such as dum-dum bullets...",u And Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 27-200 states:
. . . irregular shaped bullets (dum-dum) and projectiles filled with glass
are examples of weapons considered to be illegal per se; that is, they may
never be used ... Misuse of a legitimate weapon, such as cutting of the
points of issued ammunition, is a violation of the law of war."

An older United States Naval War Code (1900) had also declared
that:
it is forbidden . . . (2) To employ arms, projectiles, or materials calculated to cause unnecessary suffering. Entering especially into this category are . . . bullets with a hard envelope which does not cover the core
2
entirely or is pierced with incisions.
18. See Rovine, supra note 1, at 529, "The M-16 projectile is fully-jacketed and
does not, therefore, violate the prohibition on 'dum-dum' bullets."
19. Declaration on Expanding Bullets, Dec. IV, 3, July 29, 1899, Reprinted at 1
AM. J. INT'L L. 155 (Supp. 1907).
20. See, e.g., Paust, Does Your Police Force Use Illegal Weapons?-An Approach
to Decision-MakingA bout Weapons Regulations, (forthcoming article); ICRC REPORT
OF EXPERTS, supra note 4. See also Connecticut Civil Liberties Union News Release,
July 26, 1974; Controversy Swirls Over Use of Bullet, The Middletown Press (Connecticut) Aug. 3, 1974, at 1; The FirstDumDum Use Stirs Connecticut Controversy, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 26, 1974 at 33, col. 1.
21. Declaration, supra note 19.
22. See supra note 14; FM 27-10, supra note 2, at 18 (para. 34b); U.S. Dept. of
the Army, Pamphlet No. 27-161-2, supra note 13, at 45.
23. FM 27-10, supra note 2, at para. 34.
24. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Hague Convention No. IV. of 1907, at 6
(1970) (unpublished material).
25. The Law of Land Warfare-A Self Instructional Text 5 (1972) (unpublished
material).
26. See VI G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 455 (1943).
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The U.S. position at the 1899 Hague Conference was that it should
be forbidden to use "bullets inflicting wounds of useless cruelty, such
as explosive bullets, and in general all kinds of bullets which exceed
the limit necessary for placing a man hors de combat... , but the
U.S. position was not adopted by the Conference." What was clearly
adopted, however, was a focus on the effects of bullets within the
human body rather than upon specific bullet configurations. Moreover, it is because of the basic prohibition of unnecessary suffering,
cruelty, torture, unusual injury, aggravation of wounds beyond what
is necessary, the rendering of death inevitable and other such outcomes that legal guidance in this matter must necessarily consider an
interrelated set of norms that are generally referred to as human
rights.
. A fundamental norm of human rights which is relevant to this
sort of inquiry is Article 5 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.2 It states: "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." This prohibition
applies in time of armed conflict or in time of relative peace-through
all levels of human violence and circumstanices of state or public need
and military necessity. Moreover, the fundamental prohibition contained in Article 5 of the Universal Declaration significantly matches
the legal policies that are articulated in Geneva law. Common Article
3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, applicable in time of an internal
armed conflict, also prohibits summary execution (the denial of a
right to a fair trial), inhumane treatment, murder, mutilation, torture, and cruel treatment. 0 To the extent that these policies are
relevant in any given inquiry into the legality of a weapon system or
weapon usage, they should be considered by legal decision-makers so
as to maximize the serving of legal policy. And these legal policies are
certainly going to be relevant in most cases. In regard to norms contained in the law of war, the author agrees with Mr. Niederlehner that
these norms apply to "all weapons" and all bullets, and that the U.S.
is bound by each of these norms.
On a related matter, I also feel that Mr. Niederlehner's letter
about the effects of the U.S. M-16 and the Soviet AK-47 is unduly
kind to the Soviet Union's position. It is alleged, prior to completion
27. This was General Crozier's amendment. See Davis, Ameliorationof the Rules
of War on Land, 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 75, 75-77 (1908). The U. S. and Great Britain also
expressly intimated accession to the 1899 Declaration during the 1907 Hague Confer-

ence. See J.
CONFERENCES

OF

79 (1911); A.
495-97 (1909). See also supra note 18.

SPAIGHT, WAR RIGHTS ON LAND

HIGGINS, THE HAGUE PEACE

28. See U.S. DEPT. OF THE ARMY, PAMPHLET No. 27-161-2, supra note 13, at 44.
29. U.N. G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doe. A/810, at 71 (1948).
30. See, e.g., 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 6 U.S.T 3516 (1955). See also J. BOND, THE RULES
RIOT-INTERNAL CONFLICT AND THE LAW OF WAR (1974).
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of comprehensive tests, that "the lethality-or wounding impact-of
the [M-161 does not differ from weapons such as the Soviet Union's
AK-47." '3' It is also stated that the "wounds inflicted" are "not substantially different." However, the International Committee of the
Red Cross report of experts discloses the fact that although the muzzle velocity of the Soviet AK-47 projectile is slower than that of the
U.S. M-16, the kinetic energy is much greater for the Soviet projectile.32 Since the Soviet AK-47 projectile has almost 23 percent more
energy for transfer to the human body, it seems that it can cause
greater death, injury and suffering. Thus, it would seem to differ from
the U.S. M-16 projectile in terms of effects within the human body.
But actual tests may prove that although the Soviet AK-47 has more
energy for transfer it actually transfers about the same amount of
energy to the body as the M-16. We await further tests.
In conclusion, what should be stressed is that the test for permissibility or impermissibility in regard to a weapon system or a weapon
usage hinges upon military "necessity" and not some "benefit,"
"advantage," "consistency" or "Kriegsraison" theory. Since I do not
seriously believe that there has been a change in U.S. or DOD policy,
or that Mr. Niederlehner's letter fairly expresses that policy, I continue to regard as violative of international law the employment of
"any kind or degree of violence which is not actually necessary for
military purposes..."3
31. Rovine, supra note 1, at 529.
32. See ICRC REPORT OF ExPERTs, supra note 4, at 42 (Table III.1
Ballistic features). The muzzle velocity of the AK-47 is 720 m/sec., and that of the M-16 is 980
m/sec. But the kinetic energy for transfer to the body is 2100 for the AK-47 at point of
release and 1700 for the M-16 at point of release; or 1600 for the AK-47 at 100 meters
and 1300 for the M-16 at 100 meters. Thus, the AK-47 has over 23 percent more kinetic
energy for transfer.
33. FM 27-10, supra note 2, at para. 3a.

STUDENT COMMENTS
LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF INDIAN NUCLEAR
DEVELOPMENT
On May 18, 1974, India detonated a nuclear explosive device
in the desert area of Rajasthan, about forty miles from the IndoPakistani border. This development has caused grave concern not
only among India's neighbors, but also among many other nations of
the world.' It is the purpose of this comment to assess the legality of
India's actions under present standards of international law. In so
doing it shall be necessary to examine: 1) the status of nuclear nonproliferation as an international legal norm, 2) other principles of
international law that are applicable to India's nuclear explosion, 3)
the Indian position on the legality of the development of nuclear
explosive devices by non-nuclear weapon states, and 4) conclusions
regarding the legality of India's actions and their impact upon the
international legal system.
I.

NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AS AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL NORM

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty2 entered into force on
March 5, 1970. The treaty represents the most advanced and comprehensive attempt yet made to control the spread of nuclear weapons.
The obligations of the treaty are divided between two categories
of states: nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states.'
Nuclear weapon states are prohibited from transferring "to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices." 5
They are also bound not to assist or encourage any non-nuclear
weapon state from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring such de1. See 27

PAKISTAN AFFAIRS

No. 11, June 1, 1974, at 3; Id. No. 12, June 16, 1974,

at 2; Id. No. 13, July 1, 1974, at 2; Id. No. 14, July 16, 1974, at 3.
2. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done July 1, 1968, 21
U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839 [hereinafter cited as NPT].
3. The treaty entered into force with 97 signatures and 47 ratifications. Smith,
NA TO Nuclear Information Sharing Arrangements and the Non-ProliferationTreaty:
Collective Defense Confronts Arms Control, 13 ATowc ENERGY L.J. 331, 341 (1972).
As of January 1, 1974, ratifications, accessions, or notifications of successions had been
deposited by 82 states. TREATIES IN FORCE, Jan. 1, 1974, at 366.
4. Under the treaty, "a nuclear weapon State is one which has manufactured and
exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967."
NPT, art. IX, para. 3.

5. Id. art. I.
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vices.6 In addition to these two specific prohibitions, nuclear weapon
states are generally obligated to facilitate the development of nuclear
energy throughout the third world' and to make available to the nonnuclear weapon states "the potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions." ' Finally, nuclear weapon states are
obligated to negotiate in good faith on measures designed to end the
nuclear arms race with the eventual goal of complete disarmament.,
In contrast, the non-nuclear weapon states-are bound not only
to refrain from acquiring or manufacturing nuclear explosive devices,10 but also to accept international safeguards and controls on
their peaceful nuclear programs." The requirement is designed to
prevent the diversion of source or special fissionable material to the
manufacturing of a nuclear explosive device. Under the treaty the
safeguards are to be administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)."
Thus, India's actions as a non-nuclear weapon state were clearly
violative of the two most critical provisions of the treaty: 1) the prohibition against the fabrication of a nuclear explosive device, and 2) the3
application of international controls to peaceful nuclear programs.'
6. Id. The Non-Proliferation Treaty makes no distinction between nuclear weapons and "peaceful" nuclear explosives. From a technological point of view there is no
meaningful difference between a bomb and a "plowshare" device. In order for the NonProliferation Treaty to be effective, therefore, controls must be applied to all nuclear
explosive devices. M. WILLRICH, NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY: FRAMEWORK FOR NUCLEAR
ARMS CONTROL 69-70 (1969); Firmage, The Treaty on the Non-Proliferationof Nuclear
Weapons, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 711, 722 (1969); Bunn, Nuclear Non-ProliferationTreaty,
1968 Wis. L. Rxv. 766, 772; 27 PAKISTAN AFFAIRS, supra note 1, at 3. See generally,
Gorove, Distinguishing "Peaceful" from "Military" Uses of Atomic Energy, Some
Facts and Considerations,30 O.S.L.J. 495 (1969).
7. NPT, art. IV, para. 2. The obligation to aid the nuclear development of the
third world also applies to advanced non-nuclear weapon states such as Canada.
8. Id. art. V.
9. Id. art. VI.
10. Id. art. II.
11. Id. art. Ill.
12. Id. See generally Questor, Nuclear Non-ProliferationTreaty and the InternationalAtomic Energy Agency, 24 INT'L ORG. 163 (1970). The treaty does not set forth
specific safeguard requirements. It merely requires that non-nuclear weapon states
conclude safeguard agreements with the IAEA. The agreements must be designed so
as to provide effective monitoring of the use and production of source (natural uranium) or special fissionable material (enriched uranium).
13. India has consistently resisted international controls over the peaceful nuclear
programs of the non-nuclear weapon states. In the Indian view:
Institution of international controls on peaceful reactors and power stations is like an attempt to maintain law and order in a society by placing
all its law-abiding citizens in custody while leaving its law-breaking elements free to roam the streets.
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Since India has never signed or ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty,
the legality of India's nuclear explosion hinges on whether the NonProliferation Treaty represents customary international law to such
an extent that its provisions are binding even upon states that are not
a party to the treaty.
Treaties, especially multilateral treaties, are commonly cited by
writers, judges, and lawyers as evidence of customary international
law. 4 A treaty may be either declaratory of customary international
law as it already exists, or it may, in itself, be the formulation (fons
et origo) of a new legal norm.' 5 The validity of a declaratory treaty
as evidence of customary international law can be tested by examining the practice of states prior to the formulation of the treaty. Conversely, a treaty which attempts to create a new legal norm must
achieve a high level of adherence before that norm can be considered
a part of customary international law. The Non-Proliferation Treaty
deals with an uncertain area of international law and thus contains
elements of both types of treaties. It is necessary, therefore, to examine both state practice prior to the formulation of the NonProliferation Treaty and the degree of adherence to the treaty.
Also, the subject matter of a treaty has a significant effect upon
how quickly that treaty becomes a part of customary international
law. Accordingly, the purposes of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and
the motives of its chief proponents, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. must
be considered.
A. State Practice
State practice as evidence of customary international law in the
area of nuclear non-proliferation must be weighed carefully. The decision to go nuclear has been in the past and, for the foreseable future,
will be a decision that is based upon economic, military, and political
factors rather than upon legal analysis. The practice of the large
majority of nations which have no nuclear capability whatsoever
must be discounted accordingly. Nevertheless, state practice before
and after the Non-Proliferation Treaty came into force indicates that
there may be an emerging norm of international law against the
development of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear weapon states. The
practice has generally taken the form of 1) unilateral declarations, 2)
Statement by the Representative of India to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference, Aug. 12, 1965, ENDC/PV. 223, at 5-21; quoted in M. WILLRICH, supra note 6,
at 124.
14. On multilateral treaties as sources of international law, see W. COPLIN, THE
FUNCTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 8-10 (1966); Baxter, Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of Customary International Law, 41 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 275 (1965-66).
15. Baxter, supra note 14, at 277.
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the de-nuclearization of certain geographic areas, and 3) limitations
upon the testing of nuclear weapons."
1. UnilateralDeclarations
The most significant renunciations of the right to manufacture
nuclear weapons have been made by West Germany and India. The
West German pledge was made in connection with that country's
entry into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1954.17 The
pledge, however, prohibits only the manufacturing of nuclear weapons. It does not prevent their acquisition by other methods. Also, the
continued legal validity of the pledge has been open to question in
recent years.' 8
The Indian renuncation of nuclear weapons has taken the form
of general pronouncements by various government leaders.19 The primary thrust of these statements is that India will develop nuclear
energy for exclusively peaceful purposes. It is true, however, that such
promises cannot be taken as irrevocable commitments that are legally binding upon future Indian governments." Also, India makes a
distinction between peaceful nuclear explosives and nuclear weapons,
a distinction not generally made by the great majority of nations.'
Nevertheless, India's declarations had created expectations among
the nations of the world and to ignore these expectations is a serious
breach of trust, if not of international law, by India.2
2. Nuclear Free Zones
Another important development in the area of nuclear nonproliferation has been the emergence of "nuclear free zones." The
zones have been created by multilateral treaties which have received
widespread support. The first such area was created by the Antarctic
16. See generally M. WIuLLICH, supra note 6, at 53-66; G. DELCOIGNE & G. RUBIN-

57-80
(1970).
17. M. WILLRiCH, supra note 6, at 53.
18. Id. See also Willrich, West Germany's Pledge Not to Manufacture Nuclear
Weapons, 7 VA. J. INT'L L. 91 (1966).
19. See India News, June 14, 1974, at 3, col. I for comments on the development
of nuclear weapons by Prime Minister Nehru (1957), President Prasad (1958), Prime
Minister Shastri (1964), and Prime Minister Gandhi (1968). See also STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE NEAR-NUCLEAR COUNTRIES AND THE NPT
22-23 (1972); S. WILLIAMS, THE U.S., INDIA AND THE BOMB 39 (1969).
20. Kapur, Nuclear Weapons and Indian ForeignPolicy: A Perspective, 27 WORLD
TODAY 379, 380-81 (1971).
21. India insists that its development of a nuclear explosive device is for peaceful
purposes and therefore cannot be considered a weapon. India News, June 14, 1974, at
3, col. 3. Most countries contend that given the state of nuclear technology no such
distinction can reasonably be made. See note 6 supra.
22. Wall Street Journal, May 31, 1974, at 10, col. 2.
STEIN, NON-PROLIFERATION DES ARMES NucLEAIRES ET SYSTEMES DE CONTROLE
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Treaty of 1959 which prohibited all nuclear explosions in that region.2 3 A second nuclear free zone was established by the Treaty
Governing the Use and Exploration of Outer Space, which entered
into force in 1967. The treaty prohibits the placement of nuclear
weapons in orbit around the earth, on celestial bodies, or on space
stations. The third nuclear free zone was created by the Treaty
Prohibiting the Placement of Nuclear Weapons or Other Weapons of
Mass Destruction on the Seabed. 5 The treaty entered into force in
1972 and differs from the other two treaties in that it was specifically
designed as an arms control agreement.
Each of the three multilateral treaties deals with areas generally
considered to be international in character. They represent the joint
efforts of the two countries who have the technology and resources to
carry out nuclear activities, the United States and the Soviet Union.
The almost universal acceptance of the three treaties by nuclear and
non-nuclear weapon states alike has probably already elevated the
treaties to the status of customary international law.
There have also been significant attempts to create nuclear free
zones in Latin America and Africa. The Latin American effort can
be traced to a working resolution concerning the de-nuclearization of
Latin America that was introduced in the United Nations General
Assembly by Chile, Bolivia, Brazil, and Ecuador in 1962.6 Following
a General Assembly resolution endorsing the de-nuclearization of
Latin America,2 negotiations among the Latin American states produced the Treaty of Tlatelolco which was opened for signature on
February 14, 1967.2 s The provisions of this treaty are stricter than
those of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in that the parties to the Treaty
of Tlatelolco may not permit the deployment of nuclear weapons by
other states on their territory. Also, parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco
may not aid any other state (nuclear weapon state or non-nuclear
23. The Antarctic Treaty, art. V, para. 1 [19611 1 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780,
402 U.N.T.S. 71 (1961). See also G. DELCOIGNE, supra note 16, at 61-63.
24. Treaty on the Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, done Jan. 27,
1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347. See also, G. DELCOIGNE, supra note 16, at 6364; M. WILLRCH, supra note 6, at 57.
25. Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other
Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor, done Feb. 11, 1971,
23 U.S.T. 701, T.I.A.S. No. 7337. See also G. DELCOIGNE, supra note 16, at 64-65.
26. G. DELCOIGNE, supra note 16, at 58.
27. G.A. Res. 1911, 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. 15, at 14, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1963).
28. G. DELCOIGNE, supra note 16, at 59. As of 1970, the treaty had been signed by
22 states and ratified by 15. Id. at 183-84. The text of the Treaty of Tlatelolco may be
found in 22 U.S.T. 762, T.I.A.S. No. 7137.
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weapon state) in the manufacturing of nuclear weapons."9 The NonProliferation Treaty permits the deployment of nuclear weapons on
the territory of non-nuclear weapon states and allows a non-nuclear
weapon state to aid a nuclear weapon state in the manufacturing of
nuclear weapons. 0
The provisions under which the Treaty of Tlatelolco will come
into force, however, are almost impossible to fulfill. 3 The treaty cannot enter into force for the entire zone until it is ratified by all states
of the region.32 Similarly, the treaty cannot enter into force until all
nuclear weapon states ratify Protocol II, whereby these states pledge
not to use nuclear weapons against parties to the treaty nor to encour3
age or participate in any violation of the treaty. 1
The Treaty of Tlatelolco, however, recognizes that signatory
states "have the imprescriptable right to waive, wholly or in part,"
the conditions under which the treaty comes into force.34 Fourteen
states of Latin America have exercised this right and for these states
the treaty is now in force.3 5
Efforts have also been made to create a nuclear free zone in
Africa. At first, these efforts centered around African concern over
French nuclear testing in the Sahara desert.3 6 With the passing of
French Algeria, the focus moved toward a general de-nuclearization
of Africa. As a result, two resolutions were passed by the United
Nations General Assembly which called upon all states to respect
Africa as a nuclear free zone. 3 Despite these efforts, no further prog29. Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 28, art. I.
30. M. WILLRICH, supra note 6, at 57; G. FISCHER,
NUCLEAR WEAPONS

THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF

60 (1971).

31. M. WILLRICH, supra note 6, at 56. The conditions under which the Treaty of
Tlatelolco takes effect are set forth in Article 28 of the treaty.
32. Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 28, art. XXVIII, para. la. The requirement
that ratifications of the treaty be unanimous implicitly acknowledges that the treaty
cannot be imposed as customary international law upon non-consenting states.
33. Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 28, art. XXVIII. The treaty defines a nuclear
weapon as "any device which is capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled
manner and which has a group of characteristics that are appropriate for use for
warlike purposes." Id. art. V. Under this definition India's device is a nuclear weapon.
India, therefore, must sign Protocol II before the treaty can come into force.
34. Id. art. XXVIII, para. 2.
35. G. DELCOIGNE, supra note 16, at 183-84.
36. Id. at 59.
37. Id. at 59-60, 161-162. The resolutions are G.A. Res. 1652, 16 U.N. GAOR Supp.
17, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1961) and G.A. Res. 2033, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. 14, at 9,
U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965). The former resolution passed by a vote of 55-0 with 44
abstentions. The latter resolution also passed without opposition, 105-0, with 3 abstentions. The change in the voting pattern reflects the change in attitude of the United
States and the Soviet Union with respect to nuclear non-proliferation. G. DELCOIGNE,
supra note 16, at 60-61.
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ress has been made toward the de-nuclearization of Africa. The failure probably reflects African concern over the policies3 8 of the Union
of South Africa in regard to nuclear non-proliferation.
3. Limited Test Ban Treaty
A final element of state practice in regard to nuclear nonproliferation is the Limited Test Ban Treaty. 39 Although the treaty
is primarily an arms control measure with environmental overtones,
it has served to restrain the proliferation of nuclear weapons by making their development much more costly. 0 The treaty is also significant because, unlike the outer space and seabed treaties, it is applicable to several states who have the capability and motivation to conduct the proscribed activities. The inability of the international legal
system to prevent French defiance of the treaty indicates the necessity of complete adherence to such treaties. In this respect, Indian
disregard of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is analogous to French violations of the Limited Test Ban Treaty.
B. Adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty
The Non-Proliferation Treaty can be traced to a United Nations
General Assembly resolution on the "Prevention of the Wider Dissemination of Nuclear Weapons" which was unanimously adopted on
December 4, 1961. 41 After several years of U.Si-U.S.S.R. negotiations under the auspices of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference, the final draft of the treaty was presented to the General
Assembly for consideration. The Assembly approved the treaty on
June 12, 1968 by a vote of 95 to 4, with 21 abstentions. 43 The treaty
was opened for signature on July 1, 1968 and entered into force on
March 5, 1970 with 97 signatures and 47 ratifications.4 4 At the present
time 82 states have acceded to or ratified the treaty. 45 To date, only
India has violated the treaty's ban on the manufacturing of nuclear
explosives by a non-nuclear weapon state. The widespread acceptance of the treaty must be considered persuasive evidence that the
38. The Union of South Africa has not ratified or acceded to the Non-Proliferation
Treaty. TREATIES IN FORCE, Jan. 1, 1974, at 366.
39. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space
and Under Water, done Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S.
43.
40. M. WILLRICH, supra note 6, at 55.
41. Id. at 61.
42. For a legislative history of the treaty see M. WLLRCH, supra note 6, at 61-66;
PREVENTING THE SPREAD OF NucLEAR WEAPONS 52-62 (C.F. BARNABY ed. 1969).
43. G.A. Res. 2373, 22 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16A, at 5-7, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1968).
44. See note 3, supra.
45. TREATIES IN FORCE, Jan. 1, 1974, at 366.
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treaty has attained at least some measure of independent juridical
status as customary international law.
Many of the non-adherents to the Non-Proliferation Treaty,
however, are those nations which have the technology and resources
to go nuclear in a relatively short period of time. Countries such as
Brazil, India, Japan, South Africa, Pakistan, West Germany, Egypt,
and Israel have refused to give up their nuclear option by ratifying
the Non-Proliferation Treaty." The People's Republic of China and
France have not become parties to the treaty, although both have
indicated that they will abide by its general terms. 7 Since the success
of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is dependent upon near unanimous
adherence to its provisions, the practice of these states is crucial. The
decision of India to exercise its nuclear option will put political pressure on other states, particularly Pakistan, to go nuclear. At the same
time, India's actions have made it easier for other states to argue in
favor of the legality of the development of nuclear explosives by nonnuclear weapon states. India's nuclear blast is therefore a serious
blow to the formation of nuclear non-proliferation as a norm of customary international law.
C. Purposes of the Treaty
Humanitarian treaties, because of their universal nature, become norms of customary international law more quickly than do
those treaties which are based upon political or economic bartering.'"
Although the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is certainly beneficial to all mankind, it would appear that the driving force behind the
Non-Proliferation Treaty was primarily political and not humanitarian. The main proponents of the treaty, the United States and the
Soviet Union, see the treaty as a means of freezing the nuclear status
quo." The failure of the United States and the Soviet Union to reach
meaningful agreement on disarmament measures brings into question their motives in proposing the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It is
unlikely, therefore, that the near-nuclear states that are not parties
to the Non-Proliferation Treaty will feel bound by its provisions as
long as the expansion of nuclear arsenals by the nuclear weapon
states continues.

II.

OTHER PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

In addition to arguments based upon a general legal norm
46. Id.
47. Smith, supra note 3, at 341-42 n. 40.
48. Baxter, supra note 14, at 286.
49. G. FISCHER, supra note 30, at 67; Ehrlich, The Non-ProliferationTreaty and
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Explosives, 56 VA. L. REv. 587, 588-89 (1970).
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against nuclear proliferation, India's nuclear explosion has been attacked on several other grounds. It has been suggested that India: 1)
violated bilateral agreements with Canada concerning nuclear aid, 2)
violated the Limited Test Ban Treaty by allowing radioactive fallout
to enter Pakistan, and 3) disregarded universal humanitarian principles by expending large amounts of money on nuclear explosives
while a great number of Indians live in poverty.
A. CanadianAgreements
Canada has been the most important contributor of foreign aid
toward the development of Indian nuclear technology. The agreements under which this aid was made available to India were concluded several years prior to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. They do
not provide for strict controls over Canadian supplied materials.
India has merely agreed that the materials shall be used for exclusively peaceful purposes.5
India asserts that it has not violated the aid agreements for two
reasons: 1) the materials used for the nuclear explosive device were
completely indigenous, 51 and 2) the explosion was conducted for
peaceful purposes. While it is technically correct that the materials
for the device were totally indigenous, the plutonium used in the
blast was produced by CIRUS, a 40 megawatt research reactor jointly
built by Canada and India. 52 Also, it is indisputable that India was
aware of Canada's position that there is no difference between a
nuclear explosive device and a nuclear weapon. 3 Canada's position
was made clear in a letter from Prime Minister Trudeau to Prime
Minister Gandhi:
The use of Canadian supplied material, equipment and facilities in
India that is at CIRUS, RAPP I and RAPP II or missile material from
these factories, for the development of a nuclear explosive device would
inevitably call on our part for a reassessment of our nuclear co-operation
arrangement with India, a position we would take with any other non50. Sullivan, Indian Attitudes on InternationalAtomic Energy Controls, 43
PAcInc AFFAIRS 353, 358 (1970); See generally, Gorove, Control over Atoms-for-Peace
under Canadian BilateralAgreements with other Nations, 42 DENVER L. CEN. J. 41
(1965).
51. Press Release No. 5/74, Information Service of India, May 21, 1974, at 3; Press
Release No. 7/74, Information Service of India, May 31, 1974, at 1; Press Release No.
8/74, Information Service of India, June 17, 1974, at 2 (text of Ambassador Kaul's
address to the National Press Club); Id. at 5 (text of the question and answer session
following Ambassador Kaul's speech).

52.

NEWSWEEK,

June 10, 1974, at 45.

53. See the remarks of Canadian Foreign Minister Mitchell Sharp reprinted in
FOREIGN AFFAIRS PAKISTAN at 38-40 (unpublished material available from the Embassy
of Pakistan).
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nuclear weapons State with which we have co-operation arrangements in
the nuclear field.
There is, of course, the possibility (contemplated in the NonProliferation Treaty) that arrangements acceptable to the international
community will be developed for the provision of peaceful nuclear explosive devices. In such an event we would of course have no cause for
concern if such service (without the transfer of technology relating to the
nuclear explosive device itself) were made available to India by existing
nuclear weapons States using their own nuclear material or plutonium
provided by India for this purpose.'

Prime Minister Gandhi's reply evaded the issue of nuclear explosive
devices by stating:
The obligations undertaken by our two Governments are mutual and they
cannot be unilaterally varied. In these circumstances it should not be
necessary now in our view to interpret these agreements in a particular
way based on the development of a hypothetical contingency. 5

Nevertheless, the beginnings of this "hypothetical contingency" occurred less than a year later when, in the summer of 1972, Mrs.
Gandhi ordered scientists to begin work on India's first nuclear explosive device. 51 It must be concluded, therefore, that India has at least
violated the spirit, if not the letter of the agreements with Canada.
This evaluation is borne out by Canada's swift suspension of nuclear
aid to India following the detonation of India's nuclear device."
B. Limited Test Ban Treaty
The Limited Test Ban Treaty, to which India is a party, prohibits underground nuclear tests that would cause "radioactive debris to
be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose
jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted."58 India claims
that the test was "clean" and that no radioactivity was detected by
a helicoptor flying 100 feet above ground zero thirty minutes after the
blast. 59 The assertion has been challenged by Pakistan and United
States intelligence sources. 0 Thus, the facts are in dispute. However,
even if it could be conclusively shown that India had violated the
Limited Test Ban Treaty in this instance, such a result would not bar
India from detonating other nuclear explosive devices. Only if India
54. Id. at 41-42.
55. Id.
56. NEWSWEEK, supra note 52, at 42.

57. FOREIGN AFFAIRS PAKISTAN, supra note 53, at 38; New York Times, May 21,
1974, at 1, col. 2; Id. May 23, 1974, at 1, col. 4.
58. Limited Test Ban Treaty, supra note 39, art. I, para. 1.
59. NEWSWEEK, supra note 52, at 45; Press Release No. 7/74, supra note 46, at 13.
60. FOREIGN AFFAIRS PAKISTAN, supra note 53, at 56; 27 PAKISTAN AFFAIRS No. 12,
supra note 1, at 4; NEWSWEEK, supra note 52, at 45.
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were unable to provide adequate safeguards against radiation leakage
would the Limited Test Ban Treaty be a significant legal deterrent
to India's development of nuclear explosive devices.
C. HumanitarianPrinciples
The humanitarian argument against the Indian nuclear blast is
based upon the incongruity of developing nuclear explosives in a
nation that has so many economic and social problems." Translated
into legal terms, the argument would require that a nation expend its
resources to fulfill the basic human needs of its populace before any
of those resources could be allocated to other areas. Although humanitarian principles of international law have made great progress in the
past few years, a norm governing the expenditure of internal resources has not yet emerged. The concept is too far-reaching in that
it would prevent a nation from allocating its resources to those projects which that nation, through its own decision making process,
concludes must be undertaken. The level of military expenditures in
the world is ample proof that such a norm of customary international
law does not exist.
The argument is particularly weak when it is applied to India's
nuclear program. India spends only about one percent of its national
budget on nuclear research. The cost of developing the nuclear explosive was less than $400,000.2 In addition, as early as 1968 opinion
polls showed that over 75 percent of the Indian public was in favor
of making the decision to go nuclear. 3 In view of these facts, the
expenditure of $400,000 must be regarded as a conscious national
decision to pursue the possible benefits of nuclear explosive devices.
However the logic of the decision may be criticized, the legality of the
act in regard to humanitarian principles of international law cannot
be questioned.
III.

THE INDIAN POSITION

India's defense of its nuclear explosion is based on three arguments: 1) the Non-Proliferation Treaty is discriminatory and therefore has no legal effect on states not a party to that treaty, 2) the
61. For a good sampling of this attitude in the American press, see AMERICAN
AND INDIA'S BOMB, a series of six pamphlets published by the Embassy of Pakistan.
62. Press Release No. 8/74, supra note 51, at 7-8. The figure of $400,000 reflects
only the cost of building the explosive device. The research and development was a
"free spin-off" of the Indian nuclear power program. The hole for the nuclear device
was dug by hand. Malloy, Critical for the Masses, The National Observer, August 24,
1974, at 16, col. 2.
63. Kapur, supra note 20, at 381.
MEDIA
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Indian nuclear program is for peaceful purposes only, and 3) India,
as a matter of self-defense, has a right to retain a military option in
conjunction with its nuclear program. 4 Each of these points will be
discussed in turn.
A. DiscriminatoryNature of the Non-Proliferation Treaty
It has been a long-standing position of the Indian government
that any nuclear non-proliferation treaty must embody an acceptable
balance of mutual obligations between the nuclear and non-nuclear
powers, be a step toward the achievement of general and complete
disarmament, and be void of any loopholes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear powers to proliferate nuclear weapons in any
form. 15 In the Indian view, the Non-Proliferation Treaty is discriminatory because it fails to meet any of the three requirements.
Concerning the mutuality of obligations, India's greatest objections are to the international controls over the peaceful nuclear programs of the non-nuclear weapon states." The objection is merely one
in a long line of Indian objections to any system of international
nuclear controls that does not encompass all countries, including
nuclear weapon states. 7 India opposed the formation of the International Atomic Energy Agency and has consistently attempted to
make its own nuclear program as independent as possible from foreign assistance and safeguard measures. This attitude is reflected
in India's preference for loose bilateral agreements concerning nuclear foreign aid. 9
7
Also, the vast amount of inspection experience is in the West. 0
The emerging nations of the third world are distrustful of such agencies as the International Atomic Energy Agency which might easily
be dominated by inspectors from the developed countries. 7' In addition, keeping the proper records and maintaining nuclear facilities in
such a manner that inspections can be thorough and effective are very
costly to the host nation." The cost of the safeguard program is not
dealt with directly in the Non-Proliferation Treaty and therefore pro64. See S. WILLIAMS, supra note 19, at 45.
65. These provisions are part of G.A. Res. 2028, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. 14, at 7-8,
U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965). Prime Minister Gandhi has stated that the Non-Proliferation
Treaty is unacceptable to India because it does not conform to the mandate of Resolu-

tion 2028.

S. WILLIAMS,

supra note 19, at 44.

66. Sullivan, supra note 50, at 355-56.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 356-58.
69. Id.; S. WILLIAMS, supra note 19, at 61.
70. Questor, supra note 12, at 167.
71. Id. at 165.
72. Id. at 164-65.

1974

IND1AN NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT

vides a legitimate cause for concern among nations such as India that
are trying to develop their nuclear industries as quickly as possible.
A second aspect of the mutuality of obligations problem is that
the Non-Proliferation Treaty imposes a policy of non-armament on
the non-nuclear weapon states while allowing nuclear weapon states
to continue the arms race.73 From the Indian viewpoint, the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty concerning disarmament by the
nuclear weapon states are too vague to be considered a quid pro quo
for India's relinquishment of its nuclear option." It is the Indian
position that for a disarmament provision to be effective it must have
a specific time limit within which all nuclear weapon proliferation
will be halted. The wording of the provision must be sufficiently clear
to create a definite juridical obligation for the nuclear weapon
states. 5 In this respect, the Indian position inextricably links nuclear
non-proliferation with disarmament on the part of the nuclear
6
weapon states.
B. Peaceful Nuclear Explosive Devices
The second major Indian objection to the Non-Proliferation
Treaty is the treaty's failure to distinguish between peaceful nuclear
explosive devices and nuclear weapons.7 7 India views the failure as an
attempt by the nuclear weapon states to extend their monopoly on
nuclear weaponry to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy."8 At the
present time, peaceful nuclear explosives are still experimental.79 Article V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty which guarantees that nuclear
explosive devices for peaceful purposes will be made available to nonnuclear weapon states could be thwarted simply by the foot-dragging
of the nuclear weapon states in the area of nuclear explosives research. In effect, the non-nuclear weapon states' access to the possible benefits of peaceful nuclear explosives would be dependent upon
the willingness of the nuclear weapon states to allocate funds for
nuclear explosives research. 0 This type of technological subservience
73. Sullivan, supra note 50, at 366; S. WILLIAMS, supra note 19, at 50.
74. S. WILLIAMS, supra note 19, at 46-48.
75. Id. at 47-48.
76. Id. at 46. India's disarmament proposal includes 1) a comprehensive test ban
treaty that provides for the international control of peaceful nuclear explosives, 2) a
freeze on the production of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, and 3) a
reduction in existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons. Id.; Press Release No. 8/74, supra
note 51, at 6-7.
77. STOCKHOLM PEACE INSTITUTE, supra note 19, at 21; S. WILLIAMS, supra note 19,
at 57-60. See also note 6, supra.
78. S. WILLIAMS, supra note 19, at 59.
79. Brooks & Myers, PlowshareEvaluation, in NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: PROSPECTS
FOR CONTROL 87, 101 (B. Boskey & M. Willrich ed. 1970).
80. G. FiscHER, supra note 30, at 117-18.
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is particularly distasteful to nations such as India, which have already developed an advanced nuclear industry."'
The Indian position on the distinction between peaceful nuclear
explosives and nuclear weapons has been joined by several other nonnuclear weapon states." In their view, the use of nuclear energy for
economic development is an inalienable right.83 Any derogation of
this right, therefore, must be non-discriminatory in order to have the
force of customary international law.
C. Nuclear Military Option
The third Indian objection to the Non-Proliferation Treaty is
that there are inadequate security guarantees for the non-nuclear
weapon states.84 Because of India's insistence that its nuclear program is for exclusively peaceful purposes, the objection is rarely
raised in connection with India's refusal to sign the Non-Proliferation
Treaty. Nevertheless, national security considerations have played
an increasingly greater role in decisions concerning India's nuclear
5
development.
The problem of security guarantees for the non-nuclear weapon
states was recognized at an early stage in the negotiations on the
Non-Proliferation Treaty." The United States successfully resisted
incorporation of security guarantees into the treaty itself.87 To remedy
the deficiency, the Security Council passed the following resolution
on June 19, 1968:
The Security Council,
Noting with appreciationthe desire of a large number of States to
81. Sullivan, supra note 50, at 355. In assessing this attitude it must be remembered that India views nuclear energy as the key to its economic development. See
India News, June 7, 1974, at 1, col. 1; Malloy, supra note 62, at 16, col. 1. The energy
crisis has hit India particularly hard. See Malloy supra note 62, at 1, col. 2; Crippling
Shortage, TIME, April 29, 1974, at 88; Press Release No. 8/74, supra note 51, at 7.
82. Comment, Non-Proliferation Treaty and Peaceful Applications of Nuclear
Explosives, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1030, 1031 (1968).
83. See the Final Document of the Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States,
Resolution J in U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 35/10,at 16-17. The Treaty of Tlatelolco also makes
a distinction between nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices as long as these
devices are under strict international control. Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 28, art.
XVIII.
84. See generally, Kapur, supra note 20; Kapur, Peace and Power in India's Nuclear Policy, 10 ASIAN SURVEY 779 (1970); S. WILLIAMS, supra note 19, at 50-56; Coffey,
Nuclear Guarantees and Non-Proliferation, 25 INr'L ORG. 836 (1971); Coffey, Threat,
Reassurance, and Nuclear Proliferation in NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: PROSPEcTS FOR
CONTROL, supra note 79, at 119.
85. Sullivan, supra note 50, at 369; Kapur, supra note 20, at 381; Kapur, supra
note 84, at 783-784; NEWSWEEK, supra note 52, at 42.
86. M. WiuaLicH, supra note 6, at 166-67.
87. Id. at 167.
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subscribe to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
and thereby to undertake not to receive the transfer from any transferor
whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any
assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,
Taking into considerationthe concern of certain of these States that,
in conjunction with their adherence to the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons, appropriate measures be undertaken
to safeguard their security,
Bearing in mind that any aggression accompanied by the use of
nuclear weapons would endanger the peace and security of all States,
1. Recognizes that aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of
such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon State would create a situation in which the Security Council, and above all its nuclear-weapon
State permanent members, would have to act immediately in accordance
with their obligations under the United Nations Charter;
2. Welcomes the intention expressed by certain States that they will
provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter,
to any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons that is a victim of an act or an object
of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used;
3. Reaffirms in particular the inherent right, recognized under Article 51 of the Charter, of individual and collective self-defense if an armed
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace
and security."

India immediately rejected the resolution as being nothing more
than a restatement of the nuclear weapon states' obligations under
the U.N. Charter." As such, it does not constitute a reasonable quid
pro quo for a non-nuclear weapon state's renunciation of nuclear
weapons.9 0 Also, the resolution is so ambiguous that it is almost useless as an effective legal obligation. It does not, for instance, define
aggression or the threat of aggression." It does not assure immediate
action, since the guarantees are to be enforced through the mechanism of the Security Council. 2
88. S/Res./255, 23 U.N. SCOR 1430th meeting in U.N. Doc. S/PV 1430 (1968).
89. S. WILLIAMS, supra note 19, at 44; Coffey, Nuclear Guarantees and NonProliferation,supra note 84, at 837.
90. S. WILLIAMS, supra note 19, at 44.
91. Lenefsky, U.N. Security Council Resolution on Security Assurances for NonNuclear Weapon States, 3 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POLITIcs 56, 61 (1970). The recent U.N.
paragraph defining aggression may remedy the deficiency.
92. Id. at 62-63. The point is particularly relevant since China became a permanent member of the Security Council. China could prevent the Security Council from
taking any action in a dispute between itself and India through the use of its veto
power.
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The inadequacies of the resolution, coupled with the inability of
India to obtain effective unilateral guarantees, 3 has placed India in
a precarious military situation. India is flanked by two hostile neighbors, Pakistan and the People's Republic of China. Indian military
planners regard Pakistan as a significant but short term threat. 4
From the Indian point of view, the most disturbing aspect of the
Pakistani threat is that nation's membership in SEATO. 5 The Indian concern was shown to be justified by the United States support
of Pakistan during the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war.
The long term threat to Indian security is posed by China. 6
China has the ideology and the military capability to seriously
threaten the independence of India. The war between India and
China in 1962, Chinese nuclear development since 1964, and Chinese
support of Pakistan have caused India to re-evaluate its position with
respect to a nuclear weapons program. 7 Fear of Chinese nuclear
blackmail and the probability that within a short time India will have
fallen far behind China in the development of nuclear explosives have
gradually increased pressure upon the Indian government to make
the decision to go nuclear." Indeed, an opinion poll conducted after
the Indian nuclear blast indicates that almost two-thirds of the educated Indian populace want to use India's nuclear technology to manufacture nuclear weapons. 9 It is also interesting to note that India has
been developing a modest space program in recent years.' °° The technology from the space program could be used as a basis for developing
a nuclear weapons delivery system.10' In view of the fact that the
feasible use of peaceful nuclear explosives is probably many years
away, 02 it must be concluded that Indian technological development
has been designed to give India an effective nuclear military option
that can be utilized in a relatively short period of time. India's neighbors are justified in regarding India's nuclear blast with suspicion,
despite the pronouncements of Prime Minister Gandhi. 03
93. Noorani, India's Quest for a Nuclear Guarantee, 7 ASIAN SURVEY 490 (1967).
94. Kapur, supra note 84, at 784.
95. W. Wentz, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 97-98 (1968).
96. Kapur, supra note 84, at 784; Kapur, supra note 20, at 382; W. Wentz, supra
note 95, at 97.
97. Kapur, supra note 20, at 381.
98. STOCKHOLM PEACE INSTITUTE, supra note 19, at 21; Kapur, supra note 20, at
380-381.
99. Rocky Mountain News, Aug. 3, 1974, at 38, col. 4.
100. STOCKHOLM PEACE INSTITUTE, supra note 19, at 19; India News, July 5, 1974,
at 5; Malloy, supra note 62, at 16, col. 6.
101. Malloy, supra note 62, at 16, col. 6.
102. Brooks & Myers, supra note 79, at 101.
103. Pakistan regards the verbal assurances of the Indian government as
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IV.

CONCLUSIONS

A.

Legality of Indian Development of Nuclear Explosive Devices
There is substantial evidence of a slowly developing norm
against nuclear proliferation. Prior to the enactment of the NonProliferation Treaty, significant steps had been taken toward the
creation of nuclear free zones and against the indiscriminate testing
of nuclear explosive devices. The Non-Proliferation Treaty itself has
received a wide measure of support, both through formal ratifications
and state practice. The provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty
must be presumptively considered as part of customary international
law.'" The legality of India's actions, therefore, rests on the validity
of its objections to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
The objection to the discriminatory nature of the treaty is well
founded. The Non-Proliferation Treaty places no burden whatsoever
upon the nuclear weapon states. The United States and the Soviet
Union never had any intention of transferring nuclear weaponry to
other nations. 0 5 Also, the ineffectiveness of the treaty's provisions on
disarmament have been demonstrated by the failure of the nuclear
weapon states to achieve meaningful progress in the area of arms
control. There is no adequate compensation given to the non-nuclear
weapon states by the treaty for the obligations which they are required to undertake. 0 6 As a result, the control provisions of the NonProliferation Treaty cannot be considered a part of customary international law. The requirements are violative of a basic, peremptory
norm of international law that all nations are equal in the international legal system. 07 A conclusion to the contrary would institutionalize in juridical form the inherent inequality between the nuclear
weapon states and the non-nuclear weapon states.
The objection to the Non-Proliferation Treaty's failure to distinunpersuasive of that country's peaceful intentions. See 27 PAKISTAN AFFAIRS No. 12,
supra note 1, at 1. In the Pakistani view, "it is a question not only of intentions but of
capabilities." Press Release, Embassy of Pakistan, text of the reply of the Prime
Minister of Pakistan to the letter of the Prime Minister of India, June 5, 1974, at 1.
104. Baxter, supra note 14, at 290, 299. The Non-Proliferation Treaty is both
declaratory of existing customary international law and legislative in that it adds to
the law of nuclear non-proliferation. The writer has chosen to treat the NonProliferation Treaty as presumptively representative of customary international law
(ie., as a declaratory treaty) because it is for the most part a continuation and extension of previous efforts in the area of nuclear non-proliferation.
105. G. FISCHER, supra note 30, at 67.
106. Sullivan, supra note 50, at 369.
107. The concept that any non-proliferation treaty must respect the sovereign
equality of the non-nuclear weapon states was articulated in Resolution A of the
Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States, supra note 83, at 5-6.
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guish between peaceful nuclear explosives and nuclear weapons is not
convincing. It is a simple technological fact that there is no difference
between such a device and a bomb. 08 Nuclear capability is just as
destabilizing as actual possession of nuclear weapons. 09 It must be
concluded that a non-discriminatory non-proliferation treaty which
placed all nuclear explosive devices under international control
would be binding upon states not a party to that treaty.
However, it must also be concluded that India's objection to the
nuclear weapon states' monopoly on nuclear explosives is valid.
Given the right of states to use nuclear energy for economic development, any restriction on the use of nuclear explosives must be universal in order to have binding legal effect."'
The most important objection to the Non-Proliferation Treaty is
the one based on national security grounds. The basis of the objection
lies in the Indian desire to retain a military nuclear option. The
argument, therefore, does not challenge the narrow discriminatory
provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty but rather confronts the
assertion that there exists a general international legal norm against
the development of nuclear weapons. It does not apply to the recent
Indian nuclear explosion, which was for allegedly peaceful purposes.
Instead, it is limited to the possibility that India may some day make
the decision to develop nuclear weaponry."'
It is a peremptory norm of international law that all nations have
the right of self-defense." 2 No multi-lateral treaty, therefore, which
leaves a state not a party to that treaty bereft of reasonable security
guarantees can be legally binding upon that state. The security guarantees accompanying the Non-Proliferation Treaty are inadequate
with respect to such states as India."3 Also, after a reasonable attempt, India found that it could not obtain satisfactory unilateral
guarantees without sacrificing its non-aligned status.", There can be
no doubt that China represents a legitimate nuclear threat to India."'
Given the military situation in which India finds itself today, India
108. See note 6, supra.
109. See note 97, supra. The maxim that the threat is often more powerful than
its execution is quite applicable to this situation.
110. See note 83, supra.
111. In concluding that states not a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty have
the right, as of the present time, to develop peaceful nuclear explosives as their economic needs warrant, the writer has limited the argument to nuclear weapons only.
112. U.N. Charter art. LI.
113. Pakistan also considers the security guarantees embodied in the Security
Council resolution inadequate. 27 PAKISTAN AFFAIRS No. 12, supra note 1, at 4.
114. See Noorani, supra note 93.
115. S. WILLIAMS, supra note 19, at 29; W. Wentz, supra note 95, at 97.

1974

INDIAN NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT

would be justified under present standards of international law in
building a nuclear weapons force designed to counter the Chinese
threat."'
B. Legal Impact Upon Pakistan
It is the saddest and most dangerous aspect of nuclear proliferation that the acquisition of nuclear capability by one state, even for
legitimate reasons, leads inevitably to the need of another nation to
acquire that same capability. Just as India was pressured to go nuclear by the Chinese nuclear development, so too is Pakistan now
being pressured to explore a nuclear option.
Pakistan, however, has a much less developed nuclear industry
than India."17 As a consequence, Pakistan has taken a positive attitude toward the Non-Proliferation Treaty" ' (although it is not a party
to the treaty) and has actively sought security assurances from the
United States and China." 9 Given Pakistan's membership in
CENTO and SEATO, and its cordial relationship with the United
States and China, the security assurances of these two countries
against Indian nuclear aggression should be adequate at the present
time. Nevertheless, by applying the same rationale to Pakistan as
was applied to India in the above arguments, it is difficult to see how
Pakistan can be legally restrained from developing a nuclear explosive device. In view of India's hostile attitude toward Pakistan in the
past thirty years, Pakistan would be legally justified in maintaining
nuclear parity with India.
C. Future of the Non-ProliferationTreaty
The Non-Proliferation Treaty does not represent customary international law to such an extent that its provisions are binding upon
states not a party to that treaty. The reason for this unhappy result
probably lies in the fact that the concept of non-proliferation cuts
across the conflicting political and economic goals of the nations of
the world. Translated into legal terms, the Non-Proliferation Treaty
as it is now constituted is basically incompatible with two peremptory norms of international law: the equality of states in the international legal system and the inherent right of self-defense. If the NonProliferation Treaty were made to work it would in effect create a two
tiered international system in which there would be no movement
between the two levels. 1 The handful of nuclear weapon states would
116. See Coffey, Nuclear Guaranteesand Non-Proliferation,supra note 84, at 844.
117. STOCKHOLM PEACE INSTITUTE, supra note 19, at 25-26.
118. Id. at 26.

119. Id. at 25. See also 27

PAKISTAN AFFAIRS

13, at 3.
120. Sullivan, supra note 45, at 366.

No. 12, supra note 1, at 4; Id., No.
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dominate the entire system. In view of Secretary of State Kissinger's
recent successes in Moscow and Peking, such a possibility is not so
far-fetched in the eyes of the third world. In this scenario the NonProliferation Treaty would work because the basic international legal
concept of the equality of states would be discarded in favor of a legal
system that reflected and legitimized the political, economic, and
military inequality of states in the late 1960's.
A second alternative would be complete and total disarmament
in regard to nuclear weapons. In this way a new legal norm of nuclear
non-proliferation could be formulated. The norm would be binding
upon all states in that it would be universal in application and would
eliminate the need for security assurances. In contrast with the first
alternative, military reality would be changed so as to allow the NonProliferation Treaty to function within the peremptory norms of state
equality and national self-defense.
A final alternative would be the development of multilateral
regional nuclear forces throughout the world."' The need for general
disarmament by the nuclear powers would be eliminated and at the
same time credible security assurances would be available to all the
non-nuclear weapon states. International stability would be enhanced in that the number of nuclear actors would remain low and
relatively constant.
Since none of the above alternatives are likely to come about in
the near future, it must be concluded that nuclear non-proliferation
is a problem that will be handled within the political arena. 22 International law and the system of nuclear weapons control put forth in
the Non-Proliferation Treaty are basically incompatible. The prevention of nuclear proliferation will, for the foreseeable future, depend
upon the ability of our political leaders to find a just and equitable
solution to this problem.
James R. Walczak
121. Kahn & Dibble, Criteriafor Long Range Nuclear Control Policies, 55 CAL.
L. REV. 473, 479-81 (1967).
122. For other predictions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty's fate see Kaplan,
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Its Rationale, Prospects, and Possible Impact on
International Law, 18 J. PUB. L. 1, 10 (1969); Kahn, supra note 121, at 479.
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brought a growing concern with overpopulation and a continuing
decline in the number of caucasian babies available for adoption.
This situation, in combination with an increased awareness of the
plight of orphaned children in other countries, has led to a greater
demand for intercountry adoptions.
Intercountry adoptions pose all the problems common to domestic adoptions. For example, the family's suitability for adopting a
child must be determined; a child fitting their general desires must
be found; legal and documentary requirements must be met; and a
new family must be created. In addition, because the child is coming
from a foreign country, he or she must enter the United States in
accordance with its immigration laws.
The realm of immigration which pertains to foreign adoptions
can be most complex and perplexing. Statutes, regulations and procedures are imposed and interpreted by the foreign countries, the
United States, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS),
the United States consulates overseas, the individual states, and the
various state and county departments of welfare. At every level, the
officials involved are vested with great discretionary power and can
interpret rules in a myriad of ways to suit the individual official or
case. These authorities may be most helpful and sympathetic, as the
vast majority are, or they may be indifferent, unavailable, and excrutiatingly slow.
A further difficulty may arise as a result of the reluctance of
many countries to give their children up to an alien country. Sometimes this is due to a lack of understanding of our culture and motives
for adopting foreign children, or to an understandable fear that the
relinquishment may be interpreted as an unwillingness or inability
adequately to care for their own children. Sometimes it is due to an
ethnocentric bias, a reaction little different from that which most
Americans would display upon seeing our own orphaned children
taken away to be raised in a non-American society.
These regulations, interpretations and feelings can occasionally
result in difficult problems whose speedy solution can be crucial in
determining whether a child will live long enough to get to the adopting parents. Unfortunately, overcoming these difficulties may not be
easy, because the necessary information is not readily available., This
article will aggregate the present laws involved in the immigrationadoption process, delineate the more pervasive pitfalls, and indicate
1. Perhaps the most complete and up-to-date reference on the subject of immigra-

tion is the two-volume treatise, C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND
PROCEDURE (1971, Cum. Supp. 1973) [hereinafter cited as GORDON & ROSENFIELD]. The
reader may also wish to consult F. AUERBACH, IMMIGRATION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES
(2d ed. 1961, Cum. Supp. 1964). However, this text is now out of date in some respects.
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some possible solutions. It will focus primarily on United States immigration laws and procedures and, to a lesser extent, on the effects
of selected state requirements.
Adoptions initiated and completed through a licensed agency are
generally thought to be more protective of the best interests of both
the child and the adopting parents than are private adoptions. Furthermore, private adoptions by parents going abroad to select the
child they want are actually contrary to policy in many countries,
2
including Vietnam, where the practice was once quite prevalent.
Major problems affecting intercountry adoptions may also arise
out of regulations concerning severance and release of the child, and
out of immigration and procedural requirements prescribed by the
foreign state. These issues will be covered by this paper only in passing, because adequate coverage is far beyond the scope of this comment.
Two caveats should be kept in mind: (1) Some of the content of
this article is not the official viewpoint of the Immigration Service or
the Department of State; rather, it is based upon the working experience of many people who have been very active in foreign adoption.
Their experiences may not always reflect the official policy. (2) Some
sections may be incomplete and, therefore, misleading, as a result of
modifications imposed by state or foreign requirements and interpretations. Since it is beyond the scope of this paper to cover all these
modulations, it is suggested that the state laws be read carefully, and
that the welfare and adoption agencies be consulted regarding any
questions.
A. Adopting a Child from Another Country3
An overall summary of the adoption process may help the reader
to understand how and where immigration problems can arise. The
procedure outlined below was chosen primarily because it is the most
2. Interview with Wendy Grant, Director of Adoption, Friends for All Children.
A theme recurrent in several letters received by the author from state departments of
welfare (e.g., Indiana, North Carolina, Wisconsin) is that procedural problems arise
only very rarely when the placement is made through a licensed agency. Problems are
quite common, however, when the parents attempt to secure a child through a private
individual, or to complete the processing themselves without agency help. See infra
notes 140, 141.
3. This section is based mainly upon unpublished material provided through the
courtesy of the Foreign Adoption Center of Boulder, Colorado; J. Oltragge, Steps in
Foreign Adoption, March, 1974; A. Renzo, 1-600 Filing Procedure, April, 1974; Checklist of Steps in a Guatemalan Adoption Through the Foreign Adoption Center. A letter
received from the Holt Adoption Program, Incorporated, July 16, 1974, in response to
questions concerning procedures was also most helpful in analyzing the step-by-step
procedure.
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common.4 Slight variations will occur with the use of other avenues
of adoption.
A family seeking to adopt a child from abroad first applies to a
licensed international adoption agency working in the country in
which the family is interested.' The agency, or in some cases the state
welfare department, conducts a "home study" of the potential adoptive parents and family;6 on the basis of this home study, the agency
may or may not approve the couple for adoption.
If it does approve the couple, the agency contacts them, as soon
as it learns of the availability of a child who meets their general
desires, and provides them with a social and medical history of the
child. If the parents determine that they want to accept this child,
they must agree to accept and care for the child as their own and
must sign a power of attorney, which is sent to the United States
consulate in the child's country.7 They must satisfy all the preadoption requirements of their state, the United States and the foreign
country8 and should file an 1-600 preliminary visa application as soon
as possible, so that INS can begin processing them.
During this time, the agency, working in conjunction with the
foreign attorney who has been given the power of attorney, obtains
4. These procedures are for the 1-600 Petition to Classify Orphan as an Immediate
Relative (i.e., to grant the orphan the status of a child of the adopting parents for
purposes of adoption). The petition is currently available only to married United
States citizens, although this may be changed shortly. See infra note 61.
5. Most international adoption agencies are licensed in only a few foreign countries and American states; in those states in which they are not licensed, they work
through local agencies. The majority of these agencies are most active in Korea and
Vietnam. Only the Foreign Adoption Center works actively in Latin America. A very
few of the agencies which may be consulted are:
a. Pearl S. Buck Foundation, Incorporated, 2019 Delancey Place, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103;
b. Foreign Adoption Center, Incorporated, P.O. Box 2158, Boulder, Colorado 80302;
c. Friends for All Children, 445 South 68th Street, Boulder, Colorado
80303;
d. Holt Adoption Program, Incorporated, P.O. Box 2420, Eugene, Oregon 97402;
e. WAIF, Children's Division, Travelers Aid International Social Service of America, 345 East 46th Street, New York, New York 10017.
6. If the state preadoption requirements do not include a home study, the Immigration Service will conduct one.
7. The power of attorney is given to an attorney in the foreign country and to the
agency director or representative in that country. These people "stand in" for the
parents. Interview with Suzanne Johnson, Assistant Director of Adoption, Friends for
All Children.
8. Immigration and Naturalization Act §101(b)(1)(F) (1965) [hereinafter cited as
I.N.A.], 8 U.S.C. §1101(b)(1)(F) (1965). These preadoption requirements are discussed briefly in III infra.
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the child's birth certificate and forms releasing the orphan for adoption. 9 These documents, translated and notarized by the United
States consulate, are sent to the adoptive couple. The couple takes
the birth certificate, release form, and whatever supporting documents were not submitted with the 1-600 petition to the INS office.
The Service runs a criminal check on the parents, completes the
processing, and sends all the documents to the consulate. The formal
adoption process begins when these documents are received.
It should be pointed out that in most cases the child is actually
adopted twice:' 0 the foreign country usually requires that the child be
adopted in the home country, before he or she will be issued an exit
visa. This adoption is for the purposes of the foreign state and has
little relationship to the subsequent adoption (or "readoption") in the
United States." Nevertheless, this requirement of an initial adoption
overseas can greatly delay the child's trip to the United States, if the
necessary forms are not sent early. Therefore, it will help if the parents send second originals of the notarized support documents directly to the foreign country, rather than waiting for the Immigration
Service to process and send these papers.
In order to receive the visa necessary for entry into the United
States, the orphan must undergo an "overseas check," including a
medical examination, to determine whether he or she is admissible.
This check was formerly conducted by an Immigration officer, who
made only infrequent trips to some countries. However, it may now
be made by a United States consular official in the country in which
the child is living and, consequently, takes much less time.'" In addition, the state of proposed residence must certify to Immigration that
its preadoption requirements have been met and that the home has
been approved for this particular child.
Once the visa is issued, the child's escort takes it and the child's
passport and accompanies the child to the United States, where the
visa is surrendered in exchange for a "border crossing identification
card," designating the place of final destination. The stateside adoption or readoption takes place in the child's new state of domicile,
according to its laws, and may be finalized in one month to one year,
9. The person having legal custody of the child (the natural parent(s) or the
orphanage) must sign a document transferring the child into the custody of the agency,
before the child can be adopted for emigration purposes.
10. This paragraph is based upon the Foreign Adoption Center paper on Guatemalan Adoption, supra note 4. See text at note 56 infra.
11. Upon finalization of this foreign adoption, the adoption papers are translated,
notarized, and sent to the adoptive parents.
12. See text at note 2 infra; see also II(B)(2) infra. Form 1-604, Request for and
Report on Overseas Orphan Investigation, is filled out by the consular or Immigration
officer in conjunction with this overseas examination.
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depending on the state involved."
This is the normal procedure and usually takes from two to five
months from the time the home study is approved until the child
arrives." Complications will, of course, lengthen this time period.
B. Visas and Visa Applications
A brief discussion of the entry visa will obviate the necessity of
mentioning these general steps and comments in each of the following
sections.
Although a nonimmigrant visa may sometimes be used in certain
emergency situations,' 5 for adoption purposes the entry visa is nearly
always an immigrant visa. In either case, the alien must submit a
formal application for the visa.'" Careful compliance with all the
documentary requirements
prescribed by the statutes and regula7
tions is essential,
[flor an alien who comes without documents or with defective documents may find the gates shut when he seeks entry. And if such a person
succeeds in passing the portals, his right to continued residence may be
undermined, and he may be amenable to expulsion.' 8

The primary responsibility for obtaining the necessary information and materials, maintaining the file, and completing the applications rests with the adopting parents.' 9 The agency and Immigration
will render whatever aid may be necessary, but the burden of proving
facts and relationships claimed in the application is on the petitioner. 0
As was noted earlier, the Immigration Service, or the consulate
acting in its behalf, conducts an investigation of the child, to determine whether the child qualifies for the claimed status, whether he
or she has any ailments or handicaps which will require special care
or treatment, and whether there are any mental or physical afflictions
which may make the child inadmissible. If it finds any problems, the
Service notifies the petitioners, so that they can decide whether they
still wish to continue their petition for this particular child.',
13. Interview with Susan Evans, International Coordinator, Foreign Adoption
Center.
14. Id.
15. See II(D) infra.
16. I.N.A. §222(a), (c), 8 U.S.C. §1202(a), (c) (1965).
17. It is impossible to present a detailed review of all these requisites within the
limited confines of this paper. An applicant or a person seeking further information
should consult the Immigration Service, the adoption agencies, and treatises on
immigration, especially 1 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, §§2.29-.36.
18. 1 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, §2.29.
19. Id. §§3.7, 3.10, 3.11.
20. Id. §3.5g.
21. 1 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, §3.5e, at 3-27. The parents are usually
apprised of any such problems by the agency before this time, however.

1974

INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION

In many cases, the child may be in generally poor health, due to
an inadequate diet and a lack of proper care and attention."2 Usually
the parents understand this and decide to accept the child, despite
the problem. However, because the grounds for exclusion cannot be
disregarded by executive officers or the courts,2 the child may be
excluded, regardless of the parents' willingness to take him or her "as
is." Grounds for exclusion include mental retardation, ' "dangerous
contagious diseases," 2 5 and an INS determination that the petitioners
have not demonstrated that they will be able adequately to care for
2
a child with this particular mental or physical handicap.
One final comment: A child will not be granted a visa, unless it
has been released by the foreign state, the natural parent, or the
orphanage, and unless the applicable laws and procedures prescribed
27
by the adoptive parents' state of domicile have been observed.
II. AVENUES AVAILABLE FOR ADOPTION
The visas available for use in intercountry adoptions are commonly classified as "immediate relative" (the two kinds of immediate
relative visas are the 1-130 and the 1-600), "nonpreference," "visitor,"
and "parole." The terms refer to both the visa itself and the preliminary visa application.
An 1-130 petition to have an alien classified as a child of the
adoptive parents is filed by petitioners who have legally adopted the
child, while residing overseas. They may bring the child in under a
simplified procedure. The usefulness of this petition is somewhat
limited, however, due to custody and residency requirements.
The most often used petition for foreign adoptions is Form 1-600.
It is usually the most predictable method, results in the fewest delays
and risks, covers the greatest number of cases, and provides the greatest safeguards for the child, the parents, and the agency. For these
reasons, adoption agencies deal almost exclusively with it and resort
to the following three types of visas only when they have no other

choice .5
22. It must be stressed that this poor health is in no way due to a lack of effort
by the orphanage staff, who really do all they possibly can. However, they are greatly
hampered by a lack of funds, by insufficient staff, and by a perennial shortage of even
the most rudimentary "medicine cabinet" supplies.
23. 1 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, §2.32.
24. I.N.A. §212(a), 8 U.S.C. §1182(a) (1965).
25. Id.
26. 1 GORDON & RosENFIELD, supra note 1, §3.5e, at 3-27. The basic reason behind
these exclusionary provisions is a desire to avoid the spreading of disease or the bringing in of someone who will simply become a ward of the state.
27. See II(B)(2) infra.
28. E. Ratliff, Types of Visas Used in Intercountry Adoptions at 6 (unpublished
paper provided courtesy of the Foreign Adoption Center, Inc.) [hereinafter cited as
Ratliff].
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Parents and children who do not qualify for an immediate relative visa must usually rely upon the nonpreference visa. The greatest
single drawback of this method is the limited availability of such
visas; extremely long waiting periods can thus be expected.
In an emergency, when speed is especially important, a parole or
visitor visa may constitute the only practical or satisfactory method
of bringing the orphan into this country. However, because both of
these are nonimmigrant avenues, their use for purposes of adoption
creates substantial risks for everyone involved. Consequently, the
agencies are very reluctant to use them.
The following sections will analyze the five previously mentioned
visa types, the circumstances under which each may or must be employed, and the risks and procedures involved in their use.
A. Children Adopted by Parents Residing Abroad (1-130)
Parents residing overseas may bring in a child whom they have
adopted abroad, if that child has been adopted in accordance with
the laws of the foreign state and meets the statutory requirements
imposed by the Immigration and Naturalization Act.2"
The Act provides that:
immediate relatives, including the children of a citizen of the United
States... who are otherwise qualified for admission as immigrants shall
be admitted as such without regard to the numerical limitations in this
Act."

It further states that:
[any citizen of the United States claiming that an alien is entitled to
• . . immediate relative status . . . may file a [preliminary visa] petition for such classification. 3

The phrase "otherwise qualified for admission" means that, although
immediate realtives do not have to wait for a visa number before
applying for a visa, they still must satisfy the qualitative and documentary requirements found elsewhere in the Act, unless modifications are specifically prescribed. 32 Thus,
a child adopted while under the age of fourteen years, if the child has
thereafter been in the legal custody of, and has resided with, the adopting
parent or parents for at least two years,

may be accorded immediate relative status as a child of a United
States citizen.3
29.
is Form
Visa.
30.
31.
32.
33.

1 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, §2.18b. The form most commonly used
1-130, Petition to Classify Status of Alien Relative for Issuance of Immigrant
I.N.A. §201(b), 8 U.S.C. §1151(b) (1965).
I.N.A. §204(a), 8 U.S.C. §1154(a) (1965).
1 GORDON & ROSENFI.LD, supra note 1, §2.18a (Cum. Supp. 1973).
I.N.A. §101(b)(1)(E), 8 U.S.C. §1101(b)(1)(E) (1965).

1974

INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION

Administrative decisions have interpreted this statutory language as meaning that the two-year residency does not have to follow
the adoption. The requirement is satisfied, if the child lives with the
adoptive parent or parents for such time prior to the adoption.3
"However, the requisite two years of legal custody must follow the
adoption. '35 This means that, where the parents must leave the foreign country before the custody requirement has been met, the child
must remain behind for a period of time. However, because the legal
custody tolls whether or not the child is in residence with the parent,
he or she may come here, as soon as two years have elapsed from the
date of the adoption.
This avenue is available to single, as well as married parents;"
and "where there are two adoptive parents, it is unnecessary that the
child reside with both for two years. 3' 8 Thus a divorce or separation
does not preclude the use of this petition.
It is significant that, despite the statutory provision that the
person using the immediate relative visa must be a United States
citizen, the 1-130 petition may also be filed by a "lawful permanent
resident alien" of this country.39 This is one of the few avenues available to non-citizens for intercountry adoption. Furthermore, the parents need not meet the preadoption requirements of the state of intended domicile, 0 since the child has already been legally adopted in
accordance with our laws. A certified copy of the adoption decree
must accompany the petition."
The major disadvantages of this 1-130 petition are: (1) except
where the petitioner wants to keep a sibling group together, he or she
may not file more than two such petitions;'2 and (2) this avenue is
unavailable to parents of children over the age of fourteen at the time
they were adopted,' 3 or over twenty-one or married at the time the
petition is filed. 44 However, the parents have several rather unsatisfactory options in cases like these.
34. 1 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, §2.18b, n. 71.
35. Id.
36. Interview with Robert B. Neptune, Supervisory Immigration Examiner, Denver, Colorado, District Office, United States Immigration Service.
37. See text at note 33 supra.
38. 1 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, §2.18b, n. 71.
39. 8 C.F.R. 204.2; Form 1-130, Instruction No. 1.
40. See text at note 33 supra (this provision makes no mention of preadoption
requirements; See text at note 53 infra); North Carolina Department of Human Resources, Division of Social Services "Newsletter," August, 1973, at 8.
41. 8 C.F.R. 204.2(d)(F); Form 1-130, Instruction No. 4(b)(6).
42. I.N.A. §204(c), 8 U.S.C. §1154(c) (1965).
43. See text at note 33 supra.
44. 1 GORDON & Rosz-NFIELD, supra note 1, §2.18b, at 2-92; 8 U.S.C. §1101(b)(1)
defines "child" as "an unmarried person under twenty-one years of age ....
"
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If the adopted child was under the age of fourteen at the time of
the adoption, and if the custody-residency requirement has been
met, 5 the parents may file an 1-600 petition. 6 However, in order to
use this petition, they must meet the further requirement of having
gone abroad and personally seen the child." Alternatively, if the child
is a native of the Eastern Hemisphere, they may apply for a preference visa: 4 either first preference for "unmarried sons or daughters
of citizens of the United States"; or second preference, for "unmarried sons or daughters of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence"; or fourth preference, for married sons or daughters of
American citizens. 41 If the child was born in the Western Hemisphere,
the parents may use the alternative avenue of a special immigrant
(nonpreference) visa. In cases where the child was over fourteen years
of age at the time of adoption, the parents have no alternative but to
0
apply for a nonpreference visa.
Children Coming to the United States for Adoption (1-600)
1. Statutory Provisions Concerning an "Adoptable Child."
The statutory provision granting American citizens special privileges for bringing their immediate relatives to the United States 5'
applies not only to children adopted abroad, but also to children
coming to America for adoption. However, to gain any real benefits
under the 1965 Act by reason of adoption, the alien must qualify as
a "child" within the statutory definition of that Act. This requirement is rather easily satisfied under the present statute, since "child"
now includes an orphan who is:
B.

under the age of fourteen at the time a petition is filed in his behalf to
accord a classification as an immediate relative . . .and who is an orphan because of the death or disappearance of, abandonment or desertion
by, or separation or loss from both parents, or for whom the sole or
surviving parent is incapable of providing the proper care which will be
provided the child if admitted to the United States, and who has in
writing irrevocably released the child for emigration and adoption;" who
45. 1 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, §2.27e; interview with Robert B. Neptune, supra note 38.
46. This petition is discussed in detail in 11(B) infra.
47. See text following note 52 infra; interview with Robert B. Neptune, supra note
36. Some foreign states, such as Greece, require that the adopting parents go abroad
to see and adopt the child, before they will allow the child to emigrate. Letter to the
author from Elizabeth C. Taylor, Supervisor, Maryland Resource Exchange, Maryland
Social Services Administration, September 23, 1974.
48. Preference categories are available only to non-Western aliens; Western Hemisphere natives fall into one large "special immigrant" category.
49. I.N.A. §203(a), 8 U.S.C. §1153(a) (1965). The other preference categories are
inapplicable to children coming to the United States for adoption.
50. See H(C) infra.
51. See text at notes 29-31 supra.
52. However, the laws of the foreign state can significantly modify this require-
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has been adopted abroad by a United States citizen and his spouse who
personally saw and observed the child prior to or during the adoption
proceedings; or who is coming to the United States for adoption by a
preadopUnited States citizen and spouse who have complied with the
3
tion requirements, if any, of the child's proposed residence.

Gordon and Rosenfield point out that, where a child is coming
to this country for adoption:
the United States citizen and spouse must furnish assurances satisfactory
to the Attorney General that they will care for the orphan if he is admitted to this country and will [legally adopt the child]. It is the administrative view that the child can be adopted only by a United States citizen
and spouse; [and] that both parents must be living and validly married
54
.

As was noted previously, 55 if the parents do not go abroad to
adopt the child themselves, the agency representative adopts the
orphan for them by proxy. This proxy adoption is helpful in several
ways. In addition to satisfying the exit visa requirements, it also gives
the parents legal custody of the child during the months before the
stateside adoption is finalized; without it, the child would be in a
"legal limbo" during this iterim period." The proxy adoption also
provides the evidence of legal custody required by many states, before
they will allow the child to enter the state. It alone is sufficient to get
the child a social security number. 7
ment. For example, some countries (e.g., Vietnam) provide that "a child placed in an
orphanage will be regarded as abandoned, if the parents do not contribute to its
support, or otherwise indicate that they have terminated their parental obligation to
the child." 1 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, §2.18b (Cum. Supp. 1973). In a case
such as this, the orphanage has legal custody of the child, and a release by the orphanage is all that the foreign country requires; a release signed by the natural mother is
unnecessary. Furthermore, many countries do not accord the natural father any rights
with respect to the abandoned orphan. In Vietnam, for example, the father's name does
not even appear on the birth certificate, unless the parents were married at the time
of the child's birth; otherwise, the birth certificate is simply marked "father unknown." Interview with Wendy Grant, supra note 2.
These foreign laws should be accepted as binding upon American courts in an
adoption proceeding. Nevertheless, several states still require that the adoptive parents obtain a declaration of release from the natural parent, as well as from the
orphanage, before they will finalize an adoption decree. See also III infra.
53. I.N.A. §101(b)(1)(F), 8 U.S.C. §1101(b)(1)(F) (1965).
54. 1 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, §2.18b, at 2-98.
55. See text at note 10 supra.
56. Interview with Susan Evans, supra note 13.
57. Interview with Wendy Grant, supra note 2. This type of proxy adoption is not
the same as the "pure" proxy adoption, which is forbidden by Federal law. The Immigration Act, §101(b)(1)(F), 8 U.S.C. §1101(B)(L)(F) (1965), requires that the parents
physically see the child prior to or during the adoption proceedings. Therefore, where
an agency representative stands in for the parents during the overseas adoption, the
parents must readopt in their state; an adoption without this subsequent readoption
is a pure proxy adoption. This requirement means that the couple must first demonstate that readoption is permissible in their state. 8 C.F.R. 204.2(e)(3).
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The child is then "readopted" in its new state of domicile, in a
totally separate and unrelated proceeding. The primary purpose of
the readoption is to gain a United States birth certificate and certain
additional protection for the child, such as guarantees of inheritance
rights. The child is then protected by the adoption laws of its new
state and by the "full faith and credit" clause. 58
There are two major shortcomings to this otherwise most helpful
petition. The first is an arbitrary proviso that it-may not be used by
either a widowed or a single person.59 They must fall back on the
nonpreference visa, with its protracted waiting period, as their only
legitimate avenue of adoption. This predicament is made even more
vexacious by the fact that some states will rarely place foreign children with a single parent, because single parents do not qualify for
immediate relative visas. 0 However, legislation is now pending in
Congress to give single parents the same adoptive rights under 1-600
as are available to married parents."'
The second deficiency is the equally arbitrary provision that:
no more than two petitions may be approved for one petitioner in behalf
of a child. . unless necessary to prevent the separation of brothers and
2
sisters6

The restriction holds even if one of the two orphans dies immediately
following entry into the United States. 3 A resolution now in Congress
would grant immediate relative status to foreign orphans, regardless
of the number of 1-600 petitions previously submitted by the prospective parents, provided the state preadoption requirements have been
met." 4 However, until such time as this restriction is properly interred, couples seeking to adopt their third foreign child must rely
upon one of the following methods: (1) Use a nonpreference or other
visa type which does not carry this restriction; 5 (2) have a private bill
submitted in Congress to gain the privilege of bringing in the third
58. Interview with Anne K. MacLaughlin, Esq., Colorado Springs, Colorado.
59. 1 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, §2.18b, at 2-98. This restriction is
especially unfortunate, because it is aimed at those people who most often adopt the
older and handicapped children. Interview with Susan Evans, supra note 13.
60. Letter to the author from Martha Schurch, Agency Services Supervisor, Department of Health and Social Services, Division of Family Services (Adoption), Madison, Wisconsin, August 9, 1974.
61. The bill, H.R. 7555, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), is in the Senate Judiciary
Committee. Letter to the author from Senator William Proxmire, August 13, 1974.
62. I.N.A. §204(c), 8 U.S.C. §1154(c).
63. 1 GORDON & RoSENFiELD, supra note 1, §2.18b, n.84.
64. J.-Buchmeier, Immigration Processing Time Cut in Half (unpublished paper
provided courtesy of Organization for United Response, Minneapolis, Minnesota). The
bill is H.R. 8096, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
65. See II(C),(D) infra.
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child. 6 Because of the amount of time involved, neither of these
methods is really satisfactory.
Several unsuccessful attempts have been made to use a third
method. Because the 1-600 form provides for signatures by "petitioner" and "petitioner's spouse," in cases where both adoptive parents are United States citizens, it would seem possible that the husband could be the petitioner for two children, and the wife be the
petitioner for two more. However, the Immigration Service has
plugged this loophole by requiring that the petitioner be able to support the child himself or herself. 7 A subsequent attempt by two working parents who answered this requirement was thwarted by the interposition of the rule that the petitioner and spouse are considered
to be one unit and cannot switch." Thus it seems that this apparent
loophole is really a mirage.
2. Procedure for Filing the 1-600 Form.
It is appropriate to discuss in some detail the procedure for filing
this important petition. The adopting parents should submit the Petition to Classify Orphan as an Immediate Relative to the district
office of the INS as soon as possible after accepting a child.
The Petition supplies the Immigration Service with basic information regarding the residence, citizenship, and financial capabilities of the parents, the orphan's name, history and condition, and
prior adoptions by the parents. A number of supporting documents
must also be submitted. These include:
1. proof of United States citizenship of petitioner;
2. proof of marriage of petitioner and spouse;
3. proof of age of the orphan;
4. evidence that petitioner and spouse are able to support and care
for the orphan;
5. certified copy and translation of adoption decree, if the child has
been lawfully adopted abroad; or if the child is coming to the United
States for adoption, evidence that any preadoption requirements have
been met, and a statement that the couple will adopt the child in the
United States.
6. evidence that the natural parent has irrevocably released the
orphan for emigration and adoption, or that the child has been unconditionally abandoned to an orphanage which has so released him or her.
7. completed fingerprint cards, one for the petitioner and one for
petitioner's spouse."
66. Ratliff, supra note 28, at 3,8 (includes instructions for applying for a special
bill).
67. Interview with Arden Buck, Director, Foreign Adoption Center; interview with
Suzanne Johnson, supra note 7.
68. Interview with Karen Ratliff, International Liaison, Foreign Adoption Center.
69. 8 C.F.R. 204.2(e); Form 1-600 Instructions; A. Renzo, 1-600 Filing Procedure,
April, 1974 (unpublished material provided courtesy of the Foreign Adoption Center).
See also III(A) infra.
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It should be noted that the new form (revised April 1, 1974) does not
require a "biographic data form" for criminal and employment
checks on the applicants. Furthermore,
The INS can now begin the criminal check prior to receiving all the
supporting documents for the 1-600, but needs as a minimum the form,
the fees and as many supporting documents as possible. Minimum documents could be (for example) fingerprints, proof of citizenship and marriage, and [evidence of] ability to support the orphan. In cases where
the parents must go to the foreign country personally to adopt the child,
the INS will conduct this check in advance, given only the fingerprints
0
and a letter of explanation."

Because of these changes, once all the required documents have been
submitted, the ideal processing time (the time needed for a case with
no special problems) may be decreased from two months to three or
four weeks."
Once the petition has been approved the Immigration Service
forwards it to the consulate in the child's country, where it is used as
a part of the visa application.
C. Nonpreference and Special Immigrant Visas
Every immigrant is presumed to be a nonpreference or special
immigrant, until that person establishes to the satisfaction of the
immigration and consulate officers that he or she is entitled to an
immediate relative or preference status." Alien minors who do not
qualify as "children" within the statutory definition of that term
(because they are to be adopted by a single parent, or because they
are already over fourteen years of age, for example) cannot be brought
here as immediate relatives and thus must come in via another
method, either immigrant or nonimmigrant. The immigrant avenues
are the "nonpreference" and "special immigrant" visas, usually covered by the single term "nonpreference." ' "3 The nonimmigrant child
enters the United States via a visitor, a student, or a parole visa.
Alien minors coming to the United States on a nonpreference
visa are governed by the same rules which apply to the immigration
of any other immigrants. They must, therefore, meet the general
admissibility requirements of filing documents and taking mental
and physical examinations. They are subject to no controls, restrictions, or requirements which do not apply to all other general immi70. J. Buchmeier, supra note 64, Immigration Processing Time Cut in Half. See
also note 166 infra.
71. Id.
72. I.N.A. §203(d), 8 U.S.C. §1153(d) (1965); 1 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note
1, §2.27i.
73. Technically, however, the term "nonpreference" applies only to visas for natives of the Eastern Hemisphere; natives of the Americas are classified as "special
immigrants."
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grants. 4 "The special safeguards designed to protect the 'adopted
child' and the 'eligible orphan' do not apply in these cases,""2 and
there is no requirement of prior adoption or even of intent to adopt. 6
Preliminary visa applications are not required for special or nonpreference immigrants, since they are not trying to prove a relationship to a citizen or lawful resident alien. Thus the parent or agency
deals directly with the Department of State and the United States
consulate in the child's country in seeking these visas, rather than
with the Immigration Service." Early application for these visas is
vital, because the number of visas available is limited, and the order
in which the applications are processed is governed by the rule of
"first come, first served." 8
The use of a nonpreference visa may be preferable or even essential in situations:
1. where little or no waiting list exists,
2. where no home study exists,
3. where single parent adoption is anticipated,
4. where the child is over fourteen years of age,
5. where both adoptive parents are alien
6. where the allotted two "immediate relative petitions" have already
been used."

The adoptive parent or parents are required to submit an affidavit of support, in duplicate, accepting the full financial responsibility
for the child; a notarized statement, also in duplicate, from the parents' employer(s), setting forth work and salary prospects; a statement from a recognized school indicating that the child can be accepted as a full-time day student; and a financial statement from the
applicants' bank. 80 The special and nonpreference visas do not require a home study; however, the inclusion of one may well increase
the chances of a favorable review of the application, as well as speed
up the process. "The application may be further fortified with letters
of recommendation, especially if there is no home study,"8 and with
a statement showing that the parents' insurance policies will fully
cover the child.82
The parents must also obtain papers showing that the child's
74. F. AUERBACH, IMMIGRATION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, ch. 12, §6(a) (2d ed.
1961, Curi. Supp. 1964); Z. Jackson, America's Changing Immigration Policy, 4
LINCOLN L. REv. 72,74 (1969).
75. F. AUERBACH, supra note 74, ch. 12, §6(b).
76. Ratliff, supra note 28, at 4.
77. 1 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, §3.5a; Ratliff supra note 30, at 1.
78. 1 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, §3.7a.
79. Ratliff, supra note 28, at 6.
80. Id. at 4.
81. Id.
82. Interview with Doris Besikof, Friends for All Children. It is important that the
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surviving natural parent or parents, and/or the orphanage to which
the child has been surrendered, have released him or her for emigration and adoption.13 Full compliance with these requirements and
suggestions can prevent much anxiety and delay.
Once the consulate has approved the application, the child is
issued a visa, if there is no waiting list. However, since there are
usually more applicants than available visa numbers, the applicant
must await his or her turn in accordance with the date of filing the
visa. 4 This waiting period may last from twelve to twenty-seven
months, depending largely on the hemisphere of the child's origin
5
-the Western Hemisphere visa usually takes much longer,
1. The Eastern Hemisphere and Nonpreference Visas.
The 1965 Immigration and Naturalization Act provides that no
more than 170,000 immigrants, exclusive of immediate relatives, may
be admitted into the United States during any fiscal year from nations other than the independent countries of the Western Hemisphere. Although the number of immigrants from any single country
is limited to 20,000, the annual quota of 170,000 is otherwise established on a worldwide, rather than a country-by-country basis. 6
The Act sets up seven "preference categories" for these immigrants, based on special relationships to American citizens or permanent residents, or on special skills. Visa numbers for Eastern Hemisphere applicants are made available in the order of preference class
and in the order of application within each class. 7
However, even qualification as a member of a certain category
does not assure the immigrant of immediate consideration, since
within a category or country the demand for visas may be greater
than the supply. 8 Such a class or country is deemed to be "oversubscribed." The "cut-off date" for an oversubscribed category is the
filing or "priority" date of the first applicant who was unable to get
a visa. Only those who have a priority date earlier than the cut-off
date may be issued visas. All others are put on a waiting list. Visas
are made available in the lower preference categories only after the
parents actually read the policies, to determine whether they will cover the child and,
if so, when that coverage begins; they should not rely upon the word of their insurance
agent. See text at note 161 infra.
83. Ratliff, supra note 28, at 4; see supra note 52 and accompanying text.
84. 1 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, §§2.27i, 3.7a.
85. Interview with Robert B. Neptune, supra note 36. See infra note 93.
86. I.N.A. §§201(a), 202(a), 8 U.S.C. §1151(a), 1152(a) (1965); 1 GORDON &
ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, §2.27a. The limitation of 20,000 immigrants per country per
year applies to the Western Hemisphere, as well.
87. I.N.A. §203(a)-(c), 8 U.S.C. §1153(a)-(c) (1965).
88. 1 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, §3.7a.

1974

INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION

demand in the higher categories has been satisfied."
Nonpreference applicants are those who have no claim to a preference and thus do not fall into any of the seven preference categories.
Eastern Hemisphere children who do not satisfy the statutory definitions of "adopted child" or "eligible orphan" must, consequently,
come in as nonpreference immigrants. They must simply wait their
turn, in the chronological order in which they qualify, for any portion
of the "worldwide annual quota" which is not used by the preference
groups. 0
The problem confronting the parents and agencies is that this
worldwide quota is all too often fully used by the preference categories. Nothing is left for those who were forced into the nonpreference
category by rules prohibiting prospective single or alien parents from
filing immediate relative petitions, and limiting otherwise eligible
parents to only two such petitions. The long waiting period inherent
in the nonpreference method can lead to much anxiety, frustration,
and trauma, especially if the child dies before getting here. This
problem is also felt to an even greater extent by parents seeking a
child from this hemisphere.
2. Western Hemisphere Special Immigrants.
Aliens born in any independent country of the Western Hemisphere or in the Canal Zone are given special immigrant status, and
fall within an annual quota of 120,000 which is entirely separate from
the worldwide annual quota prescribed for all other immigrants.9
The statute imposes no preferences or priorities on applicants for
special immigrant visas. All applicants, including children, are simply considered in the order of their registration for visas. 2 Because of
the vast number of Mexican, and Central and South American natives who seek entry into the United States each year, parents seeking
to adopt a child from this hemisphere can expect to wait as long as
two years before their child can obtain an entry visa.
89. Department of State Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, Availability of
Immigrant Visa Numbers for December 1973 (provided courtesy of the Foreign Adoption Center). The current waiting period is about eighteen months. Interview with
Robert B. Neptune, supra note 36.

90. I.N.A. §203(a)(8), 8 U.S.C. §1153(a)(8) (1965); 1 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra
note 1, §§2.27i, 3.7a. Normally, a nonpreference immigrant is required to obtain from
the Secretary of Labor a certification stating that the immigrant's coming to the
United States will not adversely affect American labor. However, this certification
need not be filed for a child, as he or she will be supported by the adoptive parents.
91. 1 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, §2.20. The alien must actually be born
in the Western Hemisphere; special immigrant status is not acquired by naturalization.
92. Id. §3.7a.
93. Interview with Robert B. Neptune, supra note 36. Any advantage which may
otherwise have accrued from the absence of any preference categories has been offset
by the lower number of immigrant visas available in a fiscal year.
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Once established, a Western Hemisphere priority date, like a
nonpreference priority date, is retained by the alien even after he or
she makes a formal visa application by some means other than that
by which the priority date was originally established. 4 This means
that parents may apply for a nonpreference visa and, subsequently,
for a nonimmigrant or immediate relative visa. Since the child's
"rightful place in line" is retained despite this second petition, he or
she may still come in on a nonpreference visa, if one suddenly becomes available.9 5
D. Nonimmigrant Visas.
According to the Immigration and Naturalization Act, every
alien is:
presumed to be an immigrant, until he establishes to the satisfaction of
the consular officer ...
and the immigration officers ... that he is
entitled to a nonimmigrant status

within one of the ten nonimmigrant classes provided by this statute, 6
or until the alien is "paroled" into the United States via a special
dispensation which grants no legal resident status. 7
The major advantage of the nonimmigrant avenues is that there
are no restrictions on the number of nonimmigrants that may enter
this country each year; "8 thus getting such a visa is relatively easy, if
the documentary requirements are met. In several instances they
have been successfully used in intercountry adoptions. However,
there are several significant drawbacks: The visas are temporary,
rather than permanent; they are not issued in accordance with normal INS procedure and are subject to the interpretation of individual
State Department and Immigration Service officials; and most important, they are not designed for purposes of adoption-they skirt
the boundaries of illegality and, consequently, should be used in
emergencies only. 99
However, because of the long waiting periods that are often entailed in the use of nonpreference visas, in cases where getting the
child into America as quickly as possible is the most important consideration (for example, an actual or potential medical emergency),
94. Department of State Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, Availability of
Immigrant Visa Numbers for December 1973 (provided courtesy of the Foreign Adoption Center).
95. Interview with Robert B. Neptune, supra note 36.
96. I.N.A. §§101(a)(15), 214(b), 8 U.S.C. §§1101(a)(15), 1184(b) (1965). Unless a
different meaning is indicated, the term "nonimmigrant" contemplates a visitor, student, or parole status; the term "visitor" generally includes both student and "visitor
for pleasure" visas.
97. 1 GORDON & RosENFiELD, supra note 1, §2.54.

98. Id. § 2.56.
99. Ratliff, supra note 28, at 1,7.
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it may be best to use a visitor, or parole visa. Once here, the child's
status can be adjusted by petition to an immigrant visa. The parent
or parents should apply for a nonpreference visa number, as soon as
the child arrives.'00 Thus these two avenues may, under certain circumstances, present an alternative means of adoption for prospective
parents who cannot submit an immediate relative petition.
All nonimmigrants must conform to certain prescribed conditions. They are limited in the time they are allowed to stay and must
depart within the authorized time period, or when the Attorney General determines that the reason for their parole no longer exists. (Of
course, they may generally be granted extensions of their stay). They
must maintain their nonimmigrant status and may not engage in any
activities (such as employment) which are inconsistent with that
status. And they may be required to post a "departure bond," to
insure that they will leave when required.''
1. Visitor Status.
Of the ten statutorily prescribed nonimmigrant categories, only
two can be made applicable to purposes of adoption. A visitor visa
may be granted to "an alien . . . who is visiting the United States
temporarily for pleasure."' 02 This visa is issued by the consul at his
or her discretion. A student visa is available to:
an alien . . . who is a bona fide student qualified to pursue a full course
of study and who seeks to enter the United States solely for the purpose
of pursuing such a course of study at an established institution of learning
'
* . . approved by the Attorney General. a

In both cases, the visitor must be the resident of a "foreign country
which he has no intention of abandoning.' "' 0 Both these visa types
are issued by the United States consul abroad at his or her discretion.
Getting a standard visitor's visa requires little time or documentation. The procedures for getting a student visa are slightly more
involved. Both the school and the student must file petitions and
supporting documents.' 5 However, the Act sets no age limitation,
100. Interview with Anne K. MacLaughlin, supra note 58. Applying before the
child arrives will result in a denial of the petition for parole status. See text at notes
107 and 114 infra.
101. 1 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, §§2.6b, 2.54.
102. I.N.A. §101(a)(15)(B), 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(15)(B) (1965).
103. I.N.A. §101(a)(15)(F), 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(15)(F) (1965).
104. 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(15)(B),(F) (1965).
105. 1 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, §2.12b,d. The school must file a
petition for approval of the student; the prospective student (or the parents) must
demonstrate that he or she is entitled to the status, is otherwise admissible, has been
accepted by the school and has sufficient resources to attend, and that he or she has
whatever language skills are deemed necessary. See also 7 C.F.R. 214.3; 22 C.F.R.
41.45; Form FS-257.
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does not prescribe any minimum number of semester hours, and does
not elaborate on what is meant by "a full course of study." Furthermore,
the school itself normally determines and certifies whether a full course
of study is being undertaken, and this determination will not be questioned, unless it is manifestly unrealistic.Jm

Thus a student visa may also be obtained fairly easily.
However, because of the strong temptation to use these visas, it
must be reiterated that neither is legally available to a child who is
really coming here to be adopted. The visa applicant must necessarily
misrepresent the reasons for the entry and the lack of any intention
to abandon the native country, as the actual purpose is to immigrate.
Thus there is a certain degree of risk involved in the use of a visitor
visa, since the misrepresentation may constitute the ground for denial of a request for adjustment of status, for the deportation of the
child, and for the bringing of criminal charges against the parents. 07
Nevertheless, the visa may be obtained in an emergency situation, if
the consular officials are sympathetic.10°
2. Parole Visas.
Parole status may be granted a child in emergencies or for
humanitarian reasons, such as to enable the child to receive medical
treatment which is unavailable in the child's native country. Although the child is able to enter the country, it is important to note
that he or she receives no immigrant or legal resident status.'0 In rare
cases, the period of parole may be extended to a full two years; the
parents will then be able to fulfill the residency and custody conditions required for filing an immediate relative petition. Otherwise the
adjustment of status must be completed by means of a nonpreference
visa.1 0

The power to grant parole and to fix appropriate conditions is
discretionary and is vested in the Attorney General, who usually
delegates it to the INS district directors. The power is broad but not
unlimited, and where it appears that it was arbitrarily exercised or
withheld, it may be subjected to judicial review."'
106. 1 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, §2.12c.
107. See II(D)(3),(4) infra.
108. K. Sreedhar, Immigration Laws Concerning Adoption, November, 1973
(unpublished paper provided courtesy of the Foreign Adoption Center); interview with
Robert B. Neptune, supra note 36.
109. 1 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, §2.54; K. Sreedhar, Immigration Laws
Concerning Adoption, supra note 108. Polio does not constitute a ground for exclusion;
parole visas are generally available to polio victims. Interview with Doris Besikof,
Friends for All Children. See text at note 26 supra.
110. Interview with Robert B. Neptune, supra note 36.
111. 1 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, §2.54.
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Parole must be granted in advance of the child's departure for
the United States, since any carrier bringing an alien to a port of
entry without a proper visa is subject to a penalty."' Form 1-512,
Authorization for the Parole or Conditional Entry of an Alien into the
United States, setting forth the reasons parole is being requested and
the reasons a nonimmigrant visa cannot be obtained, must be submitted as a petition for parole status. Upon approval, the child is
13
issued Form 1-94, which states the method and period of admission.
It is important to note that a child may not legally use a parole
visa to come in for the purpose of a subsequent adjustment. The same
risks discussed in reference to visitor visas are applicable here, as
well."14 So if the only problem is an anxious, frustrated parent or
couple, the parole avenue should not be used. The legislation pending in Congress should soon eliminate most of the need for these
nonimmigrant visas, although it will do nothing to improve the situation of prospective adopting parents who are both aliens.
3. Adjustment of Status.
According to §245(a) of the Immigration and Naturalization
Act," a nonimmigrant child may adjust his or her status to that of
an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if the child meets
certain prescribed qualifications. Natives of the Eastern Hemisphere
may complete the adjustment during their nonimmigrant residence
in the United States. This privilege is not available to Western children, who must physically leave this country and return on an immigrant visa. However, they may arrange to obtain the visa in Canada
or some other adjacent country."'
An alien seeking adjustment must file a formal application. He
or she must be "eligible to receive an immigrant visa" and "admissible for permanent residence" in the same way as any other immigrant."' In addition, an immigrant visa must be "immediately available" at the time the application is approved."' In practice, this
means that the child must be eligible for immediate relative status,
or that a preference or nonpreference visa will be available within 90
days of approval. Where the child must apply for a preference or
nonpreference visa, he or she must receive an immigrant visa number
from the Department of State, before the application will be ap112. Interview with Robert B. Neptune, supra note 36.
113. 1 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, §2.54 at 107 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
114. Interview with Robert B. Neptune, supra note 36; see II(D)(3),(4) infra.
115. 8 U.S.C. §1155(a) (1965).
116. Id. §1155(c); 2 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, §7.7b; Z. Jackson,
America's Changing Immigration Policy, 4 LINcoLN L. REv. 72,79 (1969).
117. I.N.A. §245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1155(a) (1965); 2 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note
1, §7.7b, at 7-61.
118. I.N.A. §245(a), 8 U.S.C. §1155(a) (1965).
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proved. ' 9 Thus the parents should wait until just before a number is
available to file the petition for adjustment.
The procedure for adjusting a non-Western child's status is essentially the same as that involved in any other application for an
immigrant visa. The application is submitted on Form 1-485, Application for Status as Permanent Resident. A preliminary visa application for immediate relative or preferred status must be approved,
before a visa will be made available. The parents must also submit
all the supporting documents usually required for admission as an
immigrant. 0 If the child has not previously been inspected in conjunction with the issuance of the nonimmigrant visa, he or she must
be given a medical examination by an officer of the United States
2
Public Health Service. '
A Western Hemisphere child must go to a United States consulate in a foreign country and make formal application for readmission
as an immigrant. The procedural and documentary requirements for
either immediate relative or special immigrant status are otherwise
similar to those outlined for a non-Western child.
4. Discretion, Misrepresentationand Deportation.
The mere fact that the child meets the qualifications discussed
in the preceding subsection does not entitle him or her to an automatic change of status. Adjustment is at the discretion of the Attorney General (ie, the Immigration Service)'" and is granted only in
meritorious cases; but it will not ordinarily be denied in the absence
22
of adverse factors. The burden of proving merit is on the petitioner.'
The case of a child coming here on a nonimmigrant visa for
purposes of adoption raises many difficult issues. The statute
provides that:
[any alien who seeks to procure or has sought to procure a visa or other
documentation, or seeks to enter the United States, by fraud or by wilfully misrepresenting a material fact,

shall be barred from admission.'2 The provision applies to both im119. 2 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, §7.7e. Lists of quota availability are
issued monthly by the Visa Office of the United States Department of State. The
parents may obtain the current priority date and waiting period from the Immigration
Service, in order to determine when a visa will be available.
120. 2 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, §7.7e; Form 1-485, Instructions. Required documents include passport, temporary entry permit (Form 1-94), birth certificate, fingerprint chart, affidavit of support, and Biographic Information Form G-325A,
if the child is over fourteen years of age.
121. 2 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, §§7.7b, at 7-56.
122. I.N.A. §245(a), 8 U.S.C. §1155(a) (1965).
123. 2 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, §7.7d.
124. I.N.A. §212(a)(19), 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(19).
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migrants and nonimmigrants. 2 Because misstatements concerning a
child's purposes in coming obviously have a direct bearing on his or
her admissibility, they could well lead to the deportation of the child
and the prosecution of the parents and the adoption agency. In fact,
official U.S. immigration policy dictates that nonimmigrant visas
may never be used for intercountry adoptions. A child coming to the
United States in this manner will be here illegally from the very
beginning and, therefore, will not be granted an adjustment of sta26
tus.'
However, "the Attorney General is given broad discretionary
power to waive the substantive grounds for the exclusion of nonimmigrants,"' 27 and extenuating circumstances will be taken into account
in a review of the child's case. Such things as the child's health (past,
present and predicted), the need for immediate medical attention at
the time the nonimmigrant visa was obtained, the very long waiting
period involved with nonpreference visas, and the humanitarian intention of giving a good home to an orphaned child, may weigh heavily in favor of allowing the child to remain permanently in the United
States.'28 At the same time, deliberate and repeated violations by the
parents or agency will also be taken into account and may operate
to exclude the child; and continued use of these nonimmigramt avenues may result in the elimination of the sympathetic consular officials who are necessary to their successful utilization.
Ill.

THE EFFECT OF STATE LAWS ON INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTIONS

A.

State Laws as Impediments to Immigration
Most foreign adoptions initiated and completed through a licensed agency go very smoothly and without any significant problems
or delays. The occasional difficulties that do arise are rarely ascribable to the laws themselves.2 0 Usually they result from the varied
administrative interpretations of these laws and procedural requirements."2 ' For example, although United States immigration law determines which documents must be submitted before the processing
of an 1-600 petition can be completed, it is the INS district offices
125. GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, §§2.32b, 7.7d. A fact is "material" if
disclosure of the truth would have required the denial of the visa.
126. Letter from Walter V. Edwards, District Director, United States Immigration Service, to Susan Evans, International Coordinator, Foreign Adoption Center,
August 27, 1974.
127. 1 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, §2.53b.

128. Interview with Robert B. Neptune, supra note 36.
129. 2 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, §7.7d.
130. Two notable exceptions to this statement are the provisions restricting the
use of the 1-600 petition to married American citizens, and restricting the number of
such petitions to two.
131. Interview with Wendy Grant, supra note 2.
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that determine which documents must be submitted before they will
begin processing the application. Some of these officials impose very
minimal requirements. Others, despite the new policy, 132 may require
the submission of most or even all the documents before they will
initiate the investigation. This can delay the child's entry by as much
1 33
as two to three weeks.
Similar delays can occur in areas which have no INS office. If
Immigration for some reason (perhaps because the office has had
insufficient dealings with a particular welfare department) refuses to
accept an otherwise valid home study, they will not approve the visa
application, until they have sent a representative to interview the
family. 134 This may take several additional weeks. However, problems
resulting from actions of the Immigration Service are extremely rare.
The major problems encountered by the international adoption
agencies concern the release of the child for adoption and the consent
of the state to the adoption. If these problems arise before the child
enters the United States, they delay the immigration; if they arise
afterward, they affect the finalization of the adoption decree. This
section is concerned only with the former situation.
The ease with which the documents are obtained by the adopting
parties depends largely upon how the individual state department of
welfare 35 construes the United States immigration laws and the state
preadoption requirements. The state will not consent to the adoption,
and the child will not receive an entry visa, until welfare is satisfied
that the appropriate requirements have been met.
Wisconsin for several years provided an almost classic example
of how a state law and the construction of a federal law can delay an
orphan's entry for want of a consent to adopt. Federal law provides
that the state preadoption requirements must be met in the case of
an orphan "who is coming to the United States for adoption."' 13 The
parents and the Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services
were in a dilemma: Welfare felt unable to certify that the preadoption
requirements had been met, since if the child had already been lawfully adopted abroad, it could not be coming here for adoption, and
there were no longer any such requirements to meet. Since Wisconsin
had no provision allowing the readoption of a child adopted in another country, it held that the parents would have to be licensed as
132. See text at note 70 supra.
133. Interview with Arden Buck, supra note 67.
134. Interview with Suzanne Johnson, supra note 7.
135. In states which require a preadoption court hearing, the construction given
by the presiding judge is determinative. See note 149 infra and accompanying text.
136. I.N.A. §101(b)(1)(F), 8 U.S.C. §1101(b)(1)(F) (1965); see text at note 53
supra.
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foster parents. Immigration said that if the overseas adoption was
valid, that was enough for them; but the parents wanted to readopt,
in order to better protect themselves and their child. 37
The impasse was finally resolved when Social Services realized
that, since the overseas adoption is not consummated until long after
the child arrives in the United States, there really is no adoption
abroad, and the parents would be adopting, rather than readopting,
in Wisconsin. 3 ' This change in policy was facilitated by an amendment to the Wisconsin Children's Code, which reads:
A child whose adoption would otherwise be valid. . . may be readopted
• . .if such readoption3 is necessary under Federal law to permit the child
to enter this country.1 '

Preadoption requirements are imposed in order to insure that the
necessary documents are in order, that adoption will be possible, and
that the parents will have "the capacity to parent a child not born
to them."'' 0 Nearly all states who have preadoption requirements
require a home study, a medical and social report on the child, the
child's birth certificate, proof that the child is free for adoption, and
the consent of the state department of welfare (or of an agency acting
in its behalf) for the adoption of the child in question.'
The home study is intended to verify that the parents will be able
properly to care for the child. The specific documentary requirements
vary from state to state and county to county;' home study documentation may include a physical examination of the parents,4 3 information on the parents' finances,' 4 and an indication that the parents will be able to accept the child's culture and help the child
137. Interview with Martha Schurch, Agency Services Supervisor, Wisconsin
Department of Health and Social Services, Division of Family Services (adoption).
138. Id.
139. Wisconsin Children's Code §48.97, Wis. STAT. ANN. §48.97 (1971).
140. Letter to the author from Jane Stepich, Social Services Consultant, Indiana
Department of Public Welfare, July 29, 1974; letter to the author from Ava Snook,
Adoption Consultant, Colorado Department of Social Services, September 9, 1974.
141. This section is based primarily upon letters to the author from: Jane Stepich,
supra note 140; Sue Howard, Adoption Specialist, Kentucky Department for Human
Resources, July 25, 1974; Robin Peacock, Supervisor of Adoptions, North Carolina
Department of Human Resources, August 9, 1974; Martha Schurch, supra note 60.
142. Interview with Karen Ratliff, supra note 68. Because of economic and
personnel considerations, the adoption agency will rarely conduct the home study
itself. In Colorado, as in many other states, the investigation is usually completed by
either a county department of social services, or by a voluntary agency, such as the
Lutheran Service Society. However, some states (e.g., California) permit only the state
department of welfare to conduct the study. Interview with Ava Snook, Adoption
Consultant, Colorado Department of Social Services.
143. Letter from Jane Stepich (Indiana), supra note 140.
144. Letter from Sue Howard (Kentucky), supra note 141.
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"retain or obtain a knowledge of and pride in that culture."'' A few
states still make some efforts to match the child's and the parents'
religious faiths.'"
Several states have child importation laws, with or without the
provision that a "bond of indemnity" be posted by the parents or
agency.4 7 However, these laws usually cause few problems in agency
adoptions, since the bond either does not apply or may be waived in
the case of licensed child-placing agencies. 4 ' A few states hold a
"preadoption court hearing," designed to ascertain the family's
fitness to adopt, in cases where a preadoptive home study has not been
completed by an approved agency.'49
Delays may result from a judgment by the state department of
welfare that the agency report on the child's medical and social history is incomplete; the department will not send its certification to
the Immigration Service, until it gets more information. However, in
many cases this is impossible, because so little is known about the
child's origin or early history. The state must then be satisfied with
the agency and consulate evaluation of the child's present state of
health and prospects for the future. Almost all the states now understand this, and the problem is far less acute than it was even a year
50
ago.'
Recently, the major problems surrounding immigration have
centered around the question of whether the child has been properly
released for adoption. Sometimes a declaration of release for emigration and adoption has been obtained from the natural mother and the
orphanage, but the state wants a release from the child's father, as
well. 5' As was noted earlier, this is often impossible to obtain.'52
The more common problem involves satisfying the state department of welfare that the declaration of release is valid, or that the
person signing it has the proper authority to release children for adop145. Letter from Robin Peacock (North Carolina), supra note 141; letter from Sue
Howard (Kentucky), supra note 141.
146. See e.g., NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, NEW YORK STATE
LEGISLATION ON ADOPTION, Social Services Law §373, at 38 (3d ed. 1972).
147. See e.g., Wisconsin Children's Code §48.98(2)(a), WIs. STAT. ANN. §
48.98(2)(a) (Supp. 1974), amending Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.98(2)(a) (1957); KEN. REv.
STAT. §199.350 (1972).
148. See e.g., Wisconsin Children's Code §§48.63, .98, Wis. STAT. ANN. §§48.63,

.98;

KEN REV. STAT. §199.370 (1972).
149. See e.g., NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, supra note 146,

Domestic Relations Law §112, at 13. Ohio and Michigan have similar procedures.
Interview with Wendy Grant, supra note 3.
150. Interview with Karen Ratliff, supra note 68; interview with Suzanne Johnson, supra note 7.
151. Interview with Karen Ratliff, supra note 68.
152. See supra note 52.
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tion. This difficulty can usually be overcome by a statement, signed
and sealed by a government or consular official, attesting that the
53
person named therein has the authority to sign these declarations.
The underlying source of most of these problems is an unwillingness on the part of some states to apply to foreign adoptions, standards and criteria different from those prescribed for domestic adoptions. These states may want complete histories on the child or releases signed by all who have an interest in the child. Two approaches
have been employed to avoid the delays and frustration that often
result from these stiff demands: either the states have reformed their
laws or modified their construction of the laws to take into account
the needs and capabilities of the agencies and parents; or the agencies
have somehow satisfied the states that they have met at least the
essential requirements of the state laws, so that the states can feel
justified in giving their consent to the adoption.'
B. Eliminating Obstacles, Delays and Frustrations
The time required for the transfer and completion of paperwork
varies greatly from state to state and even from county to county, and
is dependent upon such factors as laws, policies, the amount of money
and number of personnel available for adoption work, and the degree
of interest exhibited by these personnel.'55 This section represents a
brief survey of the Colorado welfare and adoption system."" It is
designed only to outline some of the elements which have helped to
eliminate past problems and to make Colorado a state in which foreign adoptions are readily accomplished. It is not meant as an alchemical formula for success.
An obvious first requisite is the presence of "good" laws. In Colorado there are few problems with release and consent, because the law
imposes no significant barriers on the courts' or the department of
welfare's acceptance of legal documents from foreign jurisdictions. In
addition, the absence of a child importation law means that Colorado
requires no extensive written report on the child; children who are
otherwise admissible are not kept out for want of a detailed life history." 7 However, it also means that virtually anyone may bring a
child into the state. Therefore, it is essential that the Colorado De153. Interview with Martha Schurch, supra note 137.
154. Interview with Arden Buck, supra note 67; interview with Suzanne Johnson,
supra note 7.

155. Interview with Wendy Grant, supra note 2.
156. This section is based upon a series of interviews with: Wendy Grant, supra
note 2; Suzanne Johnson, supra note 7; Burr Ringsby, Foreign Adoption Center and
Supervisor of Substitute Care, Boulder County Department of Social Services, Colorado; Ava Snook, Adoption Consultant, Colorado Department of Social Services.
157. The Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children has augmented or
replaced the importation laws of about one-half the states. It is designed to assure
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partment of Social Services work very closely with the Immigration
Service and the international adoption agencies, in order to insure
good placements. The following discussion will explain how this cooperation is achieved.
Even more important than the laws themselves, in determining
the ease with which foreign adoptions are completed, is the role
played by those people who interpret the laws and formulate the
policy. As suggested in the preceding section, this function is most
often performed by the state welfare department.
Colorado has a rather unique system which can best be described
as a "state-supervised, county-administered" program. Two "adoption consultants" serve in a dual capacity as supervisors of child
placement policy, and as liaisons between the state and county departments of social services, the intercounty adoption agencies, and
the Immigration Service.
Under this arrangement, the Colorado Department of Social
Services sets the fundamental policy but leaves most of its implementation to the county departments who, in turn, strive to keep their
involvement in the actual adoption process to a minimum.' 8
The adoption consultants also serve as conduits for complaints
and questions from the agencies and county departments to the district INS office in Denver. This reduces the number of individual
communications and helps to maintain the Immigration Service's
great willingness to facilitate adoptions, by keeping at a tolerable
level the increased immigration workload which has resulted from the
burgeoning demand for foreign children.
It may be said with some accuracy that the Colorado program
recognizes that intercountry adoptions pose unique problems which
often intertwine two distinct legal and cultural systems, and that it
actually creates a separate legal and procedural system, designed to
eliminate what are recurrent difficulties in certain other states. The
adoption process moves smoothly, because major responsibilities are
placed in the hands of experienced, competent agencies, and because
interdepartmental overlap and tension are minimized. At the same
time, the system incorporates the safeguards which are so essential,
if the parents, the child, and the state are to be adequately protected.
IV.

RELATED NOTES AND COMMENTS.

This section will deal very briefly with several issues raised by
the foregoing discussion. The treatment given these topics is by no
uniformity in child placement laws from state to state and to protect and keep track
of children, as they cross state lines. The Compact is effective only in dealing between
two or more Compact states; it has not yet been adopted in Colorado.
158. See supra note 142.
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means exhaustive; much may depend upon the state, the foreign
country, and other circumstances involved in each case.
A. Legal Responsibility
The question of who has legal custody of and responsibility for
the child during the trip to the United States is of some concern to
all parties involved. The child remains a citizen of its home country
until such time as he or she is naturalized as an American citizen." 9
However, legal custody of the child is transferred from the orphanage
to the agency, and then from the agency to the parents. Generally,
the agency will "pick up the tab," if anything happens to the child
between the time he or she leaves the foreign country and the time
the parents take custody at the airport.8 0 After that, the child is the
responsibility of the adopting parents. Because the child will almost
always require medical treatment, it is important that the couple
determine whether their insurance policies will protect the child from
the time he or she first arrives, or only after the adoption is completed.1 '
B. Unidentified Children
"Unidentified child" can have two connotations. In its broader
context, it refers to almost all foreign-born orphans, because many
are abandoned and have no name or early history. These children are
examined by an orphanage or village official, who guesses at the date
of the child's birth and makes up a name. The name and "birthdate"
are then entered in a "birth judgment," the equivalent of a birth
certificate. 6 ' If the parents want a United States birth certificate for
the child, or if their state requires one, they must apply to Immigration for a search of INS records. Immigration has the birth judgment
3
in its files and uses it to draft and certify a new birth certificate.
The term can also refer to instances where one or both of the
adopting parents go abroad to select and adopt a child. Before leaving
the United States, the parents submit the usual 1-600 supporting
documents to the Immigration Service, which processes them and
sends the results of its investigation to the American consulate in the
foreign country. After selecting and adopting an orphan according to
the laws of that country, the parents complete the Form 1-600 by
filling in the child's name and any remaining information.' The
159. Interview with Robert B. Neptune, supra note 36.
160. Interview with Suzanne Johnson, supra note 7. Of course, acceptance of this
liability depends on the agency involved.
161. See supra note 82.
162. Interview with Susan Evans, supra note 13.
163. Interview with Robert B. Neptune, supra note 36. Form N-585, Application
for a Search of the Records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, is used to
obtain both a new birth certificate and a verification of birth status.
164. Ratliff, supra note 28, at 9.
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child's visa is then issued at the discretion of the American Consul
or an Immigration official. 6 5 This avenue is available only to parents
who actually go overseas, since only they can enter the child's name
and file the petition.'
C. Naturalization
Because most parents want their children to become United
States citizens, it should be pointed out that citizenship is never
conferred by adoption; it is acquired only by blood, place of birth, or
formal naturalization proceedings. Therefore, the child must be naturalized according to United States law. The Immigration and Naturalization Act" 7 provides that the child must be a permanent resident
alien in the full legal custody of its parents for two years, before it
can be naturalized. This means that the stateside adoption must be
finalized two years prior to the filing of the petition; and if the child
came here as a nonimmigrant, the two years is tolled from the date
his or her status is adjusted to permanent resident status. At least
one of the parents must be a United States citizen.'"
If the child is under the age of fourteen, its good moral character
is presumed; if the child is over fourteen, such character must be
demonstrated. Furthermore, regardless of the child's age, certain documents must be submitted, the child must appear for an interview,
two witnesses must appear in behalf of the child, and the child must
wait thirty days after the fulfillment of all other requirements before
he or she can be sworn in as an American citizen.'
D. Costs and Tax Rebates
The cost of an intercountry adoption can range from as little as
$250.00 to as much as $1200.00 exclusive of transportation, depending
upon the country and the agency involved. 7 ' Federal tax laws and the
tax laws of many States consider adoption to be a personal expense.
Consequently, there are no deductions for legal fees, medical and
transportation costs, or any other expenses incurred during the adoption process."'
165. Id.
166. Interview with Robert B. Neptune, supra note 36. An interesting question
might be whether this is not violative of equal treatment provisions, since only those
wealthy enough to afford the trip can take advantage of this law.
167. I.N.A. §323(a), 8 U.S.C. §1434(a) (1965); interview with J. Patrick Vandello,
General Attorney (Naturalization), United States Immigration and Naturalization
Service. The parents sponsor the child and take the oath for him or her.
168. Interview with J. Patrick Vandello, supra note 167.
169. I.N.A. §323(b),(c), 8 U.S.C. §1434(b),(c) (1965).
170. Current Information on Foreign Adoption, January, 1974 (unpublished material provided courtesy of the Foreign Adoption Center).
171. Letter to the author from Sue Howard, supra note 141.
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CONCLUSION

The growing interest in foreign adoptions and the humanitarian
concerns expressed by parents and by general United States immigration policy are resulting in an easing of the requirements imposed
upon both parents and children. Not only are the laws themselves
being liberalized (for example, the Wisconsin readoption law and the
1-600 restrictions), but the administrative interpretations of these
laws are increasingly taking account of the different laws and customs
prevalent in the foreign countries.
Nevertheless, problems still arise, either because the relevant
laws are too restrictive, or because an individual state or court applies
a too narrow construction to a law or procedural regulation. It is
hoped that this article will help to alleviate both types of difficulties.
Paul K. Driessen
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in International Economic Relations No. 8; ISBN 0-87014-262-3; LC
73-8544; xiv, 125 p.; tables, footnotes, glossary, index.
The authors review the record with respect to foreign holdings of
U.S. dollars, and reconcile the two conflicting trends in thinking
about the international monetary and payments problem. The authors conclude that the desire for use of the dollar both as an "intervention currency" (buying or selling dollars against other currencies
in the exchange market) and as a de facto standard of value requires
a restoration of confidence in the stability of the dollar in terms of
special drawing rights (SDR).
MURRAY, A., DEPRECIATION; International Tax Program, Harvard
Law School, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, (1971) $4.00; xii, 122
p.; LC 74-172243; tables, bibliography, footnotes. Tax Techniques
Handbook series.
Examines the basic rules and guidelines for computing annual
depreciation deductions: identification of depreciable property, the
determination of its depreciation base, the estimation of its service
life, and the selection of a method of depreciation, among others. This
book is part of the Tax Techniques Handbook series which provides
information on the experiences of countries around the world in drafting effective tax legislation. Each handbook focuses on the basic
structural problems of designing an income tax, presenting alternative solutions and their policy implications.

NORR, M., RESERVES FOR FUTURE INVESTMENT: A SWEDISH TAX

International Tax Program, Harvard Law School, supra,
(1974) $12.50; 114p.; footnotes. Also available from International

INCENTIVE;
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Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, Muiderpoort, Sarphatistraat 124,
Amsterdam-C, Holland; Selected Monographs on Taxation series.
The Swedish investment reserve system induces industry to
build up, out of retained profits, a pool of private capital which will
be available for use when increased business investment is deemed
appropriate. The study presents a technical analysis of the system
and a discussion of how Swedish businessmen and the government
have used it.
POPKIN, W., THE DEDUCTION OF BUSINESS EXPENSES & LOSSES;

International Tax Program, Harvard Law School, supra, (1973)
$4.00; ix, 102 p., foreward by 0. Oldman; index, bibliography, footnotes. Tax Techniques Handbooks series.
Popkin analyzes expenses and losses in terms of the various rationales underlying their deductibility: ability to pay, economic productivity, social utility, and administrative feasibility.
RAVENSCROFT, D., TAXATION AND FOREIGN CURRENCY; International Tax Program, Harvard Law School, supra, (1973) $50.00; xxiii,
861 p.; foreward by 0. Oldman; glossary, tables, bibliography, index,
footnotes.
An exhaustive study of the methods allowed by current law for
translating the income derived in foreign currency into a dollar taxable income. The volume considers significant problems encountered
when foreign income, expenditures, and losses must be valued in U.S.
dollars, including the treatment of unrepatriated income, income restricted by exchange controls, creditable foreign taxes, and hedging
transactions. The author also presents a digest of all relevant judicial
decisions, administrative rulings and provisions of the Internal Revenue Code and Regulations.

A., EFTA: RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS
Verlag Stampfli & Cie. AG, Bern, Switzerland, (1973)
approx. $20.00; ISBN 3-7272-0077-4; 270 p., footnotes, bibliography.
The author describes the work of the European Free Trade Association in the field of restrictive business practices, and considers
possible future uses for the formerly dormant Art. 15 of the Stockholm Convention of the EFTA. Legislation of member countries and
their individual interpretations of Art. 15 are also examined.
SZOKOLOCZY-SYLLABA,

PRACTICES;

UNITED NATIONS, COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL LAW, REGISTER OF
TEXTS OF CONVENTIONS & OTHER INSTRUMENTS CONCERNING INTERNA-

TIONAL TRADE LAW; U.N., New York, N.Y.; (Vol. I, 1971; Vol. II, 1973)
$4.00 per volume; U.N. Publication, sales no. E.71.V.3 and E.73.V.3;

Vol. I: v, 285 p.; Vol. II: iv, 193 p.
A convenient source of international agreements relating to
trade. Vol. I covers international sales of goods and international
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payments. Vol. II. contains the texts of agreements relating to international commercial arbitration and international legislation on
shipping. Every businessman or attorney who engages in international work should obtain the set.
YUDKIN,
L., A LEGAL STRUCTURE FOR EFFECTIVE TAX
ADMINISTRATION; International Tax Program, Harvard Law School;
(1971) $4.00 LC 78-172244; xi, 110 p.; footnotes. Tax Techniques
Handbook series.
The basis for a complete administrative tax code is presented in
this book. The author discusses the establishment of tax liability, tax
collection, tax offenses, and means for helping the public to understand and deal with the tax system.

InternationalLaw
BISHOP, W., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES & MATERIALS;

Little,

Brown & Co., 34 Beacon St., Boston, Mass. 02106, (3d. Ed. 1971)
$17.50, LC 75-87780; xlvi, 1122 p.; footnotes, appendices, index, table
of cases, bibliography.
Exhaustive text of international law presenting coverage of the
nature of international law, international agreements and organizations, states, recognition, jurisdiction, and war and peace.
CHAYES, A., EHRLICH, T. & LOWENFELD, A., INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
PROCESS: MATERIALS FOR AN INTRODUCTORY COURSE; Little, Brown &

Co., supra, (1968) $25.00 (2 volume set); LC 68-25009; Vol. I: xxiii,
704 p.; Vol. IT: vi, 693 p., footnotes.
The authors of this set present a slightly different approach to
the teaching of international law. Part I, Limits of Adjudication,
covers international law in national courts, sovereign immunity, and
the I.C.J. Part II, Economic Affairs, discusses international trade,
bilateral trade agreements, regulation by international organizations,
the international monetary system, and international investments.
Part I analyzes bilateral and multilateral treaties, the Cuban Missile
Crisis, intervention, U.N. peacekeeping, and U.N. sanctions.
CLARK, G. & SOHN, L., INTRODUCTION TO WORLD PEACE THROUGH
WORLD LAW; World Without War Publications, 7245 S. Merrill Ave.,

Chicago, Ill. 60649 (as revised by L. Sohn, 1973) $1.50; x, 118 p.;
footnotes, bibliography, table of related organizations.
In addition to the newly revised Introduction to World Peace
Through World Law by Clark & Sohn, this volume also contains Five
Approaches to World Order by R. Pickus & R. Woito; A First Step:
A Constitution for the Oceans by E. Borgese; Towards Consensus:
The Institute for World Order's Model World Orders Project by S.
Mendlovitz & T. Weiss; and Towards Consensus: UnilateralPeace
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Initiatives to Demonstrate Commitment and Induce Agreement, edited by R. Woito.
DELUPIS,

I., INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE INDEPENDENT STATE;

Crane, Russak & Co., Inc., 347 Madison Ave., New York, N.Y. 10017,
(1974) $23.00; xi, 252 p.; ISBN 0-8448-0317-0, LC 73-94048; index,
endnotes by chapter.
The author discusses the current need to modify the traditional
tenet of international law that a state could do'anything it wanted
within its own borders. International concern over human rights, pollution, and the need for adequate communication and trade between
nations has modified a state's right to act "independently," according to Delupis.
KREPP, E., SECURITY & NON-AGGRESSION: BALTIC STATES &
U.S.S.R. TREATIES OF NON-AGGRESSION; Estonian Information Center, Box 45030, S-10430, Stockholm 45, Sweden, (1973) 63 p.
The author discusses various attempts to create multi-lateral
non-aggression agreements between World War I and World War II.
The author cites numerous instances where norms of international
law were violated, and includes the texts of the relevant conventions
in a documents section.
SAHOVIC, M.

(editor), PRINCIPLES

OF INTERNATIONAL LAW CONCERN-

Oceana Publications, Inc.,
Dobbs Ferry, N.Y. 10522; (1973) $15.00; ISBN 0-370-00020-2, LC 738985; 450 p.; footnotes, appendices, index.
This volume, published in cooperation with the Institute of International Politics & Economics, Belgrade, presents a series of studies by Yugoslav scholars concerning the Declarationof the Principles
of InternationalLaw ConcerningFriendlyRelations and Cooperation,
adopted by the 25th General Assembly. Among the articles are K.
Obradovic, Prohibition of the Threat or Use of Force; A. Magarasevic, The Sovereign Equality of States; and 0. Sukovis, Principleof
Equal Rights and Self-Determination of Peoples.
ING FRIENDLY RELATIONS & COOPERATION;

InternationalOrganizations
M. (editor), BASIC DOCUMENTS OF ASIAN REGIONAL
Oceana Publications, Dobbs Ferry, N.Y. 10522
(1974), 4 volumes, $140 per set; ISBN 0-379-00177-2, LC 74-2248;
xxxi, 1544 p.; tables, bibliographies.
This set parallels BASIC DOCUMENTS OF AFRICAN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, compiled by L. SOHN. The tendency of Asian organizations
to develop around functionally specific lines is examined by Haas,
noting the emphasis on economic objectives and a decided downplaying of political ramifications. The contradiction between the
need for outside capital to finance the organizations' projects and the
desire for political and economic autonomy is also cited. In addition
HAAS,

ORGANIZATIONS;
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to the basic documents, Haas also provides conference proceedings,
annual reports, a listing of periodicals, technical publications, and
research studies for each organization.
EVERTS, P., UNESCO, INTERNATIONAL REPERTORY OF INSTITUTIONS
FOR PEACE & CONFLICT RESEARCH; UNESCO Publications Center,

P.O. Box 433, New York, N.Y. 10016; (1973) $3.30; ISBN 92-3101120-0 (English), 92-3-209920-4 (French), LC 73-281022; 91 p.;
tables, bibliography; Reports & Papers in the Social Sciences Series,
No. 28. Revision of earlier edition by Galtung & Ruge.
List of institutions and groups devoted to peace and conflict
research, with an introduction, Towards a Definition of Peace Research & Criteriafor the Selection of Institutions to be Included in
the Repertory (1966) & Postscript,by J. Galtung, and Developments
& Trends in Peace & Conflict Research, by P. Everts.
InternationalPolitics
ABBOUSHI,

W., THE ANGRY ARABS; The Westminster Press, With-

erspoon Building, Philadelphia, Pa. 19107; (1974), $8.95; 285 p.; foreward by D. Alloway; maps, endnotes.
The author provides an Arab view of Arab-Western relations
from the time of Mohammed to the present. Abboushi suggests that
the Western world's inability to understand the Arab position is due
to the fear of Western journalists of charges of anti-semitism, and
because of the difficulty of a non-Western culture in presenting its
case in terms the West can understand.
HALPERIN, M., with CLAPP. P. & KANTER, A., BUREAUCRATIC POuTICS AND FOREIGN POLICY; The Brookings Institution, 1775 Massachusetts Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036; (1974) $8.95 ($3.50 pa.);
xvii, 340 p.; footnotes, bibliography, index; ISBN 0-8157-3408-5, LC
73-22384.
The interplay of various interest groups and their effect on the
making of U.S. foreign policy is analyzed with the example of the
policy decisions relating to the ABM deployment. The authors clearly
indicate that a government should not be viewed as a single individual with a single purpose in the international arena. Various examples of bureaucratic maneuvers are shown, such as the "leak", or the
concept of "over-zealous implementation" used to irritate a foreign
government to the point where an official will be told to back off from
a position he secretly wished to avoid in the first place.

IONESCU, G. (editor), BETWEEN SOVEREIGNTY & INTEGRATION; A
Halsted Press Book, John Wiley & Sons, 605 Third Avenue, New
York, N.Y. 10016; (1974) $11.95; ISBN 0-470-42800-7, LC 19586; 192
p.; footnotes, index.
A set of nine papers presented at the 9th World Conference of
the International Political Science Association. The papers include:
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G. Ionescu, Between Sovereignty & Integration: Introduction; M.
Beloff, The Political Crisis of the European Nation-State; L. Dion,
Anti-Politics & Marginals;I. Ceterchi & K. Pomaizl, Two Views from
Eastern Europe; K. Deutsch, Between Sovereignty & Integration:
Conclusion.
KREPP,

E.,

THE BALTIC STATES:

A

SURVEY OF THE INTERNATIONAL

Estonian Information
Center, supra; (1968), 20 p.; bibliography.
Historical survey of the international relations of the Baltic
states, from the Middle Ages to the present.
RELATIONS OF ESTONIA, LATVIA & LITHUANIA;

RODNEY, W., How EUROPE UNDERDEVELOPED AFRICA; Howard University Press, 2400 Sixth St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20001; (1974)
$10.50; x, 288 p.; ISBN 0-88258-013-2, LC 73-88974.
The author examines the relations of Europe and Africa from the
fifteenth century to the end of the colonial period, discussing African
growth before and after the coming of the Europeans. The slave trade
is cited as a basic factor in African underdevelopment and technical
stagnation.
ROSEN, S.

& JONES,

W.,

THE LOGIC OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS;

Winthrop Publishers, Inc., 17 Dunster St., Cambridge, Mass. 02138;
(1974) $6.95; ISBN 0-87626-507-7, LC 73-22385; x, 390 p.; footnotes,
index.
International relations textbook that approaches international
politics in terms of the perspectives (or perceptions) of the Soviets,
Americans, Chinese, and Third World. The authors also discuss various power approaches and concepts of world order.
SNETSINGER,
ISRAEL; Hoover

J.,

TRUMAN, THE JEWISH VOTE, & THE CREATION OF

Institution Press, Stanford University, Stanford,
California 94305; (1974) $6.95; ISBN 0-8179-3391-3, LC 70-187267;
xv, 208 p.; index, endnotes, bibliography. Hoover Institution Studies
No. 39.
Snetsinger points out that Truman initially had an ambivalent
policy regarding the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine, and
it was the political power of the American Jewish community that
overcame the advice of the Departments of State and Defense and
finally determined his ultimate position. Decisions regarding foreign
policy are subject to the same pressure as other decisions of political
leaders, and in this case, the author asserts, domestic politics overcame the pressures of the oil lobby, and idealism was nowhere to be
seen.
SPANIER,

J.,

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY SINCE WORLD WAR I1;

Praeger Publishers, supra; (6th Ed. 1973) $8.50; LC 72-91350; xii, 305
p.; index, bibliography.
In the sixth revision since its first publication in 1960, Spanier
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has brought his analysis of American foreign policy up to the beginning of the second Nixon term. He extensively discusses the balance
of power concept, upon which he believes the ultimate stability of the
international state system depends.
InternationalProtection of the Environment
ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION

&

DEVELOPMENT, THE

EXPLORATION FOR AND EXPLOITATION OF CRUDE OIL AND NATURAL GAS

OECD EUROPEAN AREA, INCLUDING THE CONTINENTAL SHELF;
MINING & FISCAL LEGISLATION; OECD, 2 rue Andre-Pascal, 75775
Paris Cedex 16, France; distributed in the U.S. by OECD Publications Center, Suite 1207, 1750 Pennsylvania Ave. N.W., Washington,
D.C. 20006; (1973) $3.50; 71 p.; tables.
Introduction to and summary of relevant European laws regarding legal and financial aspects of developing oil and gas resources.

IN THE

TECLAFF, L. & UTTON, A. (editors), INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENLAW; Praeger Publishers, supra, (1974) $13.50; LC 73-15198; viii,
270 p.; index, footnotes.
The volume consists of various articles reprinted from law journals. The scope of the book is such that it would be excellent as a text
for a seminar in International Environmental Protection or as a reference for libraries and businessmen. Included are: I. Brownlie, A Survey of InternationalCustomary Rules of Environmental Protection;
L. Caldwell, Concepts in Development of InternationalEnvironmental Policies; M. Hardy, The U.N. Environmental Program; L. Teclaff, International Law & the Protection of the Oceans from
Pollution; and A. Utton, The Arctic Waters PollutionPreventionAct
& the Right to Self-Protection.
TAL

International Tribunals
STARKE,

J.,

THE NEW RULES OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF

Institute of Advanced Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia, (1973) $1.00; 19 p.; footnotes.
Analysis of the rules adopted May 10, 1972 by the I.C.J., set to
come into force on September 10, 1972. The author feels that the rules
may eliminate some procedural delays, although it is unclear at this
time whether the new rules will actually encourage more states to use
the I.C.J.
JUSTICE;

Law of the Sea
WENK, E., THE POLITICS OF THE OCEAN; University of Washington
Press, Seattle, Washington 98105; (1972) $14.95; xviii, 590 p.; ISBN
0-295-95240-7, LC 72-5814; tables, endnotes, general index, index of
names, appendices.
The author describes, based on extensive personal experience in
the area, the disorganized evolution of policies and programs that
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attempt to use science and technology to exploit the seas. In addition
to recommendations on such specific concerns as managing the
coastal zones, conserving fisheries resources, eliminating pollution,
and promoting international cooperation, Wenk offers significant
proposals to improve the governmental process of making decisions
relating to science and the seas.
Miscellaneous
COMMITTEE ON LEGAL SERVICES TO THE POOR IN THE DEVELOPING

COUNTRIES, LEGAL AID & WORLD POVERTY: A SURVEY OF ASIA, AFRICA,
& LATIN AMERICA; Praeger Special Studies, supra; (1974) $18.50,

ISBN 0-275-08350, LC 73-15182; xvii, 309 p., tables, statutory appendix, bibliography.
A general exploration of the alternative purposes which legal
service programs for the poor can serve, and of the possible relationship of such programs to national development goals in the developing countries. Includes: Metzger, Legal Services to the Poor &
National Development Objectives; Dunning, Legal Systems & Legal
Services in Africa; Knight, Legal Services Projectsfor Latin America;
and Singhvi & Friedman, Free Legal Services in Delhi & Bombay,
India.
SHEARES,

R. &

ONIKI, S., NEXT STEPS TOWARD RACIAL JUSTICE;

United Church Press, 1505 Race St., Philadelphia, Pa. 19102 (1974)
$2.95; ISBN 0-8298-0278-9, LC 74-4035; 127 p.; bibliography, footnotes.
Text designed for religious schools covering various aspects of
racial discrimination and religion.
TransnationalLaw
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EXPLANATORY REPORT ON THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON CIVIL LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE CAUSED BY MOTOR VEHICLES;

Council of Europe, 67006, Strasbourg, France; (1973); available in the
U.S. through Manhattan Publishing Co., 225 Lafayette St., New
York, N.Y. 10012, $4.00; 44 p., English or French editions.
Includes introduction and background to the convention, discussions relating to fault, strict liability, and risk theories of liability, the
text of the convention, and resolutions regarding insurance and the
position of foreigners.
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EXPLANATORY REPORT ON THE EUROPEAN CON-

Council of Europe,
supra; (1973), $4.00, 19 p.; available in English or French editions.
Includes general considerations of the European Committee on
Legal Cooperation, comments on the convention, and the text of the
convention. "Time-limit" was the neutral term chosen by the Committee to represent the French term delai, as there is no exact word
VENTION ON THE CALCULATION OF TIME-LIMITS;

1974

BOOK NOTES

301

in English (deadline, statutory period, limitation, limit of action
being some possible alternatives).
TEREBILOV,

V.,

THE SOVIET COURT;

Progress Publishers, Moscow,

U.S.S.R., translated from the Russian by Murad Saifulin; available
in the U.S. from Four Continents Book Corp., 156 Fifth Avenue, New
York, N.Y. (1973) $3.00; LC 73-181250; 182 p., index.
Description of the current Soviet judiciary system, and a historical survey from 1917. In addition to legal institutions, government
agencies and mass organizations (e.g., "Comrades' Courts") are also
explained, along with the rights of Soviet citizens and aliens.

